DHARMA

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Table of Contents

Preface

Dharma, a Sanskrit word, has two principal meanings. The dharma of an individual is his essential nature, the intrinsic law of his 'being' and development. It also signifies the law of righteousness and piety. The implications of this double meaning are significant. Man's duty, how he ought to live, what he ought to believe, and what he ought to do about his beliefs are, among others, conditioned by his essential nature, his constitution and temperament.

The word *dharma* is derived from the Sanskrit root *dhr*, to mean, 'sustain, support, uphold'. It is variously defined as nature, the law of nature, that which supports, virtue, ethical law, the 'ought', merit, the potency of ethical actions, the right action, the law or the body of the doctrines of any faith, quality, characteristic, the law of the universe, reality, element, and category. The concept of *dharma* is all-encompassing of human activity in relation to itself in all its facets including spiritual realization, and in relation to the universe.

Dharma is the bottom-line of all the religious and spiritual faiths that have originated in India. In this sense, the religious and spiritual faiths and practices that have crystallized in the Indian sub-continent from pre-historic times are known as *Sanatanadharma*. The religions such as Buddhism, Jainism are the offshoots of *Sanatanadharm*a. Hinduism has been considered as a religion only for the last five, six centuries, being the successor, in name, to *Sanatanadharma*. *Sanatanadharma* is what constitutes the Indian psyche, philosophy, spirituality, religion, etc - its very way of life.

The concept of *dharma* in the sense of duty, right action and merit of the ethical codes such as *dharmasastras* is derived from *Mimamsa*. For *Mimamsa*, the doctrine of *karma* or action is the doctrine of *dharma* which, in a general sense, may be considered as duty or obligation, as *karma* and *dharma* are associated with commands and the doctrine of the unseen ethical force.

The role of *dharma*, according to Bhagavad-Gita, is to make man the ideal one. The ideal man is one who has realized his rational being and whose reason has become steady.

The concept of *dharma* in Buddhism is so comprehensive and all-inclusive that it can mean anything and everything in the universe. It includes elements, categories, qualities, things, law, way of life, form, etc. It also means the law, the doctrine and the truth taught by Buddha. What the doctrine of Buddha points to is the ultimate Reality. So *dharma*, in Buddhism, means the highest Reality.

In popular usage, *dharma* means a way of life, ethical law, positive law like civil law and criminal law, and simply religion. It denotes truth, knowledge, morality and duty. It is the truth about the state and function of the world, the truth about how to eliminate its evil tendencies and the truth about its immutable spiritual potentiality. It is knowledge in the sense that once one becomes aware of *dharma*, one acquires the knowledge to become free from the bonds of phenomenal existence. It is morality, for

it contains a code of moral conduct that is conducive to spiritual purity and maturity. It is duty, for whoever professes dharma has a duty to comply with its norms and achieve the goal that it sets forth.

Sri Sathya Sai has enunciated axioms over a period of decades that deduce principles for evaluation of ethical standards of human conduct in the tradition of *Sanatanadharma*. The principles of *dharma* including ethics enunciated hereinafter, except those specifically attributed to other sages, philosophers and thinkers, are the essence of the teachings of Sri Sathya Sai spread over the last six decades. As the teachings of the sages and philosophers in all ages and all parts of the world are essentially the essence of *Sanatanadharma* - the philosophy of eternity, the religion of humanity - mainly spiritual in content and character, the principles of *dharma* including ethics enunciated by Sri Sathya Sai look no different from the content of *dharma* and ethics enunciated by the sages and the divinely inspired philosophers of the past, in the east as well as the west.

1. Dharma

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Dharma, a Sanskrit word, has two principal meanings. The dharma of an individual is his essential nature, the intrinsic law of his 'being' and development. It also signifies the law of righteousness and piety. The implications of this double meaning are significant. Man's duty, how he ought to live, what he ought to believe, and what he ought to do about his beliefs are, among others, conditioned by his essential nature, his constitution and temperament.

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Dharma is sourced in divine revelation, sacred tradition and the practices of the wise. Where it is silent in any of the three sources, conscience of the individual making the ethical decision may be considered an additional source. The sources are serial in the order of their importance, the divine revelation in the *Veda*s being the most determinant and conscience being the least important and to be resorted to only in the event of the three main sources not yielding any normative guidance. Several *dharmasastras* and *dharmasutras* have sought to codify the norms of *dharma* over a period of time. The most influential, and also the earliest, treatise on *dharma* is the *Manavadharmasastra* (the laws of Manu), outlining the various rights and responsibilities of different *varnas* and *asramas* of the traditional *Vedic* society that had crystallized up to the period when the treatise was compiled.

Dharma is, on one count, the ethical potency or the force or the power of merit and demerit that controls the universe. It is the governing ethical force of the universe. It is the central concept of *Mimamsa*, which is the critical interpretation of the Samhita and the Brahmanam component of the *Veda*, essentially constituting the theistic school of Jaimini. According to it, *dharma* is essentially a philosophy of ethical action, but more concerned with the supra-sensual nature of the ethical force and the ritual. The supra-sensual nature of the ethical force and the ritual has otherworldly bearings in its significance and workings. As regards social action, the ethical force is concerned with this world and produces for the agent of action what he

desires and what his action deserves. It is left to the ethical codes such as *dharmasutras* for its elaboration and explanation.

Dharma is, on another count, that which supports, and, therefore, that which supports the universe. It is that which holds the plurality together; without it the manifold will fall apart. It is the grandest conception of the sovereignty of ethical action. Jaimini defines it as the good the characteristic of which is the impelling or the directing of man to action. But what is the good that impels a man to action? It is something to be achieved by action and is also *dharma*. *Dharma* thus produced brings forth the desired fruit of action. If the *dharma* is ethically right, the fruit it produces brings enjoyment. If it is ethically wrong, the result it produces brings forth suffering and we call it *adharma*.

The concept of *dharma* in the sense of duty, right action and merit of the ethical codes such as *dharmasastras* is derived from *Mimamsa*. *Mimamsa* is the basis and source of the whole of the Indian ethics, not only of the interpretative rules, but also the basic principles and the ideas of morality and positive law.

It is difficult to find an English word for the meaning given for *dharma* by *Mimamsa*. It is law in the sense of both the 'is' and the 'ought'. In literary and philosophical works, it is used in a variety of ways. In Buddhism it means everything from metaphysical reality to function, thing, quality and category. In Jainism it is the principle of motion.

Then, what is this *dharma*? According to *Mimamsa*, it is a potential force, which we generally call merit and demerit. We generally think that the two are only good and bad qualities attributed to men by God or society because of the kind of actions they perform. But *Mimamsa* says that merit and demerit are not qualities (*gunas*), they constitute the potential force, which is the Extraordinary and the Unseen. This force resides in the atman in the agent and controls and determines the future life of the atman here, hereafter and in the future lives, which it takes through transmigration.

We have to accept the reality of this unseen power, as otherwise we cannot explain how action performed now can cause or produce the fruit after a lapse of time. Between the end of action and the appearance of its result, there is a time interval. But there can be no causation with a time interval between the cause and the effect. Causation is a continuous process without any time intervening between the processes of the cause and the appearance of the effect. We have, therefore, to postulate that the action we perform does not end whenever activity is ended, but assumes the form of a potential force that can stay as potency until the occasion and opportunity arise for operation. We do not see this force; it is, therefore, unseen. It is not an ordinary kind of force like that of magnet; it is, therefore, extraordinary. Ethical activity becomes a force that controls the production of the forms of life we desire. This force produces the forms which the stuff of the world assumes and which the agent of action desires.

According to *Mimamsa*, a unitary force of activity controls and guides the forces of different individuals. This unitary Supreme or Universal Force preserves the unity of the universe. This gives rise to the idea that the universe is a system of forces,

a plurality of patterns of activity controlled by a supervising pattern of activity. If substances are regarded as unities of potential activities or forces, the universe may be regarded as a system of substances also. We have to bear in mind that the unity of the substances is not accomplished conceptually or by a law existing apart and imposed on the substances, but by a controlling force running through everyone of them like the force of gravitation binding together the members of the planetary system. The universe must, then, be a pattern of patterns, an active force controlling innumerable active forces. In *Mimamsa*, as in Buddhism, this active force is *dharma*. For both, *dharma* is the law, the support, the ideal of the universe; it is that which makes the universe what it is.

All *Mimamsakas* agree that *dharma* is the action enjoined by the *Veda*. For some, dharma is the action itself, but not the merit produced by it. The action is right because it produces 'good' for man. But for others, the objective of the *Vedic* injunction is the production of the unseen, that is, the *Veda* commands us to produce the unseen. Our actions are, therefore, right because they are in accordance with the injunctions of the *Veda*, but not because they produce good for man. *Dharma* is the unseen as the objective of the *Vedic* command, but not the action. Thus some emphasize the good, and some the right. An action is right for some because it produces the good, and for some others, an action produces the good because it is right. However, for all, it is action that becomes the unseen potency.

Some important ideas flow from the above discussion of the content of *Mimamsa* in relation to *dharma*. First, the *Veda* gives certain commands. Second, our actions follow the commands. Third, after our actions are completed, they assume the form of potential force called the Unseen and the Extraordinary. Fourth, our actions lie in wait as potential forces and become active when the occasion and the opportunity arise. Fifth, *dharma* in the sense of merit is that part of the potential force that produces good for the agent of action, and *adharma* in the sense of demerit is that part that produces evil. As the potential force is a transformed state of the action itself, it is also called action (*karma*). Generally both *dharma* and *adharma* are called *dharma* as in the usage of the word character.

For *Mimamsa*, the doctrine of *karma* or action is the doctrine of *dharma* which, in a general sense, may be considered as duty or obligation, as *karma* and *dharma* are associated with commands and the doctrine of the unseen ethical force. *Mimamsa* may be, thus, the metaphysics of ethical action as ethical action is a central controlling power of the universe. It believes, however, that man is free although his *atman* carries within itself the potential forces of his future. His past actions do not deprive him of his freedom, but produce the capital for his future life. He can make whatever use he can of his capital. Further, the effects of evil actions can be countered by good actions and can be prevented by expiatory actions. The potential force the atman carries is a mixture of the potentialities of good and evil actions. Sometimes, they cancel one another. The potentialities of good actions are strengthened by those of other good actions, but counter balanced by those of evil ones. It is not, however, necessary that every good or evil act must produce its particular effects.

In Bhagavad-Gita, *dharma* covers all the duties of social ethics as understood at that time and also the surrender to God. Even one's personality has to be

surrendered. It belongs to one of the *prakrtis* of God. We have to give Him back what belongs to Him. We have to consider ourselves to be instruments or occasions of the processes of the Cosmic Person, not independent agents. This amounts to becoming one with the source of the universe that is, surrendering one's own being to it.

The role of *dharma*, according to Bhagavad-Gita, is to make man the ideal one. The ideal man is one who has realized his rational being and whose reason has become steady. He preserves his equanimity under all conditions, whether favourable or unfavourable, whether in grief or in joy. He does not have any egoistic desires and looks upon all the events that happen without being disturbed. He does not have any attachment or longing for the objects of his senses and can withdraw his mind and senses from all objects. Attachment to objects is the destroyer of reason. For attachment breeds desire, desire leads to anger when it is frustrated, anger clouds mind, such clouding destroys memory, and then reason is destroyed. For reason and memory are intimately connected. So the ideal man is neither attached to the objects, nor hates them. He performs all actions without any egoity to attain peace.

While *Mimamsakas* explain *dharma* as the action commanded by the *Veda*, *Vaisesikas* explain it as that from which happiness in the world and the supreme good of salvation result. This concept of *dharma* includes both ethical obligation and salvation. It is to include in its meaning all proper actions turning man towards the world and also that which makes him withdraw from the world. By performing ethical actions, one obtains happiness in this world. By following the way to salvation, one obtains eternal bliss. The *Veda* provides both for ethical duties and the way to salvation. Therefore, *Vaisesikas* consider that both are to be termed *dharma*. As salvation is the highest ideal, it is to be sought after as the ultimate goal.

The concept of *dharma* in Buddhism is so comprehensive and all-inclusive that it can mean anything and everything in the universe. It includes elements, categories, qualities, things, law, way of life, form, etc. It also means the law, the doctrine and the truth taught by Buddha. What the doctrine of Buddha points to is the ultimate Reality. So *dharma*, in Buddhism, means the highest Reality.

In relation to *dharma*, Buddhism postulates Four Noble Truths. First, through wisdom one acquires a full vision of *dharma*. Second, through morality one purifies all that obscures the vision of *dharma*. Third, through meditation one matures *dharma* within oneself. Finally, one transforms oneself into an epitome of *dharma*.

In popular usage, *dharma* means a way of life, ethical law, positive law like civil law and criminal law, and simply religion. It denotes truth, knowledge, morality and duty. It is the truth about the state and function of the world, the truth about how to eliminate its evil tendencies and the truth about its immutable spiritual potentiality. It is knowledge in the sense that once one becomes aware of *dharma*, one acquires the knowledge to become free from the bonds of phenomenal existence. It is morality, for it contains a code of moral conduct that is conducive to spiritual purity and maturity. It is duty, for whoever professes dharma has a duty to comply with its norms and achieve the goal that it sets forth.

The ethical codes such as the *Manavadharmasastra* are regarded as the application of *Mimamsa* concept of *dharma* to different ethical, social and legal situations. The *Arthasastra* of Kautilya is regarded as a further articulation and explanation of a part of *dharma* of the ethical codes that deals with kings and governments. All the ethical and legal codes are called applications of the law of action or *dharma*. Sri Sathya Sai has enunciated axioms over a period of decades that deduce principles for evaluation of ethical standards of human conduct in the tradition of *Sanatanadharma*. The principles of *dharma* including ethics enunciated hereinafter, except those specifically attributed to other sages, philosophers and thinkers, are the essence of the teachings of Sri Sathya Sai spread over the last six decades. As the teachings of the sages and philosophers in all ages and all parts of the world are essentially the essence of *Sanatanadharma* - the philosophy of eternity, the religion of humanity - mainly spiritual in content and character, the principles of *dharma* including ethics enunciated by Sri Sathya Sai look no different from the content of *dharma* and ethics enunciated by the sages and the divinely inspired philosophers of the past, in the east as well as the west.

2. Ideals of Dharma

The motive for the postulation of *dharma* is the search for the ideal of life. This search implies that the seekers were not satisfied with the life – material, ethical and spiritual – they were living day-to-day. The search is for a deeper meaning of life than could be found in day-to-day existence, to a keen and critical sense of bliss, happiness and pleasure somehow developed by the people. Psychologically, the desire for mental and spiritual peace may be the result of too many privations or too much satiation.

The questions such as 'What is man's life? What is its meaning and purpose? How is man to plan his life and act to attain his ideal?' need deep reflective abilities to ponder. Man, therefore, must develop his reflective abilities. He must have time for reflection. But impartial reflection is not possible so long as man is carried away by the needs, duties and responsibilities of his daily life in family and society. So, man's life was divided into four stages called *asramas* about the time of the Aranyaka part of the *Veda* in India.

The first stage is that of the student. When the boy is about eight years old, he goes to his teacher's house and lives there until he finishes his studies. The second stage is that of the householder. When the boy finishes his studies and is grown up, he is asked by his teacher to go home and pay back the three debts. The first debt is to the forefathers and is paid back by marrying and keeping the family line with male children. The second debt is to the teachers and is paid back by educating the next generation. The third debt is to the gods that maintain and govern the universe and is paid back by performing sacrifices. A sacrifice may be of butter, cooked or uncooked food and the like. These three duties are called debts, as while meeting these obligations produces no rewards, but violating them produces punishment or unhappiness.

The third stage is called the stage of the forest-dweller. After the life of the householder, one retires to the forest along with one's wife and begins to reflect on the values of life one has been able to realize. This stage is, in fact, the stage of self-reflection and self-examination.

The fourth stage is that of the renouncer of the world, or that of the ascetic. At this stage, man gives up all connections with family and all rights and duties. He renounces the world. He spends the rest of his life as a man of God. He owns no property, lives by begging and changes his name so that others do not know his family connections. He may teach spiritual truths to whosoever seek them.

The division of life into four stages is prescribed to all men. But the last two stages are not obligatory. Nor are they considered necessary for spiritual realization, though they may be useful.

The caste system in India was an historical growth, but not a stratification of society according to a preconceived plan. When the Aryans entered India sometime between 2000 and 1500 B.C and began conquering the land, they found brown and dark skinned inhabitants who far outnumbered them. One Sanskrit word for caste is

varna meaning colour. The *Aryans* with their white skin could easily be distinguished from the dark skinned races. Since the Aryans were far fewer in numbers than the original local inhabitants, they found it convenient to establish a social structure with religious sanctions that would safeguard their cultural and political superiority and adapted what could have been a kind of caste structure of the pre-Aryans.

Accordingly they kept the religion of sacrifices for themselves. The priests in charge of religion were called *brahmanas*. They also kept the profession of warfare to themselves. The warriors were called *ksatriyas*. They kept part of the profession of trade to themselves and gave part to the local inhabitants. The traders were called *vaisyas*. Agriculture and other forms of manual labour were entrusted to the local inhabitants. The cultivators and the labourers were called *sudras*. Several sub-castes arose out of the mingling of the four.

While the functions associated with the asramas were called *asramadharma*, the functions associated with the *varnas* were called *varnadharma*. There was an inter-relationship in the functions between the *asramadharma* and the *varnadharma*. Although the four asramas or stages were recommended to all men, women and the fourth caste in general were dissuaded from taking to the third and the fourth stages.

Old wives of old men accompanied their husbands to the forest in the third stage. But it was thought that women always needed protection and they were prohibited from going independently to the forest where no protection was available. Since the fourth stage was hard and its follower had to live by himself, women were not allowed to take to it, even when their husbands took to the fourth stage, though there were exceptions.

The fourth caste was prohibited from taking to these stages as it was thought, rightly or wrongly, that members of that caste were not capable of self-reflection, self-examination and self-control, and was immature both in intellect and in character. But there were instances of men like Vidura and Suta who were saintly, and even taught the higher castes about ethics, immortality, the nature of God and the like. For the sake of social stability and welfare, such saints and sages of the fourth caste did not violate the social injunctions. The *dharma* associated with both the *varnas* and *asramas* was called *varna-asramadharma*.

It is relevant to note that the various obligations incumbent on members of the different *asramas* and *varnas* mutually support one another and that an imperfect performance of one's responsibilities harms society, and thus the world as a whole. These moral obligations inhere within the *varnas* and *asramas* themselves and cannot be assumed by a person of another place in society.

The Gita teaches, 'it is better to perform one's own *svadharma* (obligations) poorly than to do another's well'. *Svadharma* does not refer to one's individual or chosen personal obligations. Indeed it connotes an impersonal generic ethical category, which impels one to discharge one's duties determined by one's place in society. *Svadharma* thus embodies the same ethical values, as does *varna-asramadharma*.

However, in times of severe calamities, either natural or economic, the norms of action determined by *varna* and *asrama* may be suspended for the society to survive. In such circumstances, a *brahmana* may assume the duties of a warrior or a warrior may assume the duties of a *vaisya* to discharge the 'duty determined by emergency'. This is known as *apaddharma*. However, at no time, can a person who is not a priest earn a living by teaching the *Veda* or by performing *Vedic* rituals.

Some *dharmasastras* list out common moral obligations for all people regardless of sex, *varna*, asrama or age. For example, *Arthasastra* lists such moral obligations as that everyone must refrain from injuring others, must tell the truth, live purely, practise good will, be forgiving, exercise patience at all time, etc. Such obligations are known as *sadharanadharma* or *samanyadharma*.

It may happen that the obligations arising from *svadharma* may contradict the imperatives of *sadharanadharma*. A person trying to make an ethical decision has to choose between opposing demands. What happens, for instance, when a priest has to offer a blood sacrifice in a *Vedic* ritual or a warrior has to fight to kill the enemy? Killing or causing injury is against the moral obligations of *sadharanadharma*, while they are permitted in *svadharma*. Different religious traditions respond differently to the dilemma. While the *Vedantic* religious tradition permits *svadharma* to be followed, the traditions of Buddhism and Jainism overrule *svadharma* to follow *sadharanadharma.* However, as time passes by, the moral conscience of a society brings about changes in the concepts of *svadharma* and *sadharanadharma*, bringing them under the purview of law consistent with the said moral conscience of the society.

The division of the four castes became rigid by about the second century B.C, the time of Manu, the author of *Manavadharmasastra* (the code of Manu). Although these divisions slowly formed themselves in history, Bhagavad-Gita rationalized the division saying that God created the four castes according to character and profession. This rationalization followed the historical division.

It is worth noting that from the caste of a man we cannot be exact in inferring his race. For instance, many kings and even emperors in South India belonged to the *sudra* caste. Of the imperial dynasties of historical India, the Nandas and the Mauryas belonged to the *sudra* caste, the Guptas to the *vaisya* caste, and the Sungas, the Kanvas and the Satavahanas to the *brahmana* caste. Curiously enough, none of the great imperial dynasties of India belonged to the *kshatriya* caste.

When once a royal or imperial dynasty was founded, whatever be the original caste of the founder, the tendency was to have inter-marriages with other dynasties, irrespective of the origin of their caste. This way, there was considerable inter-mixture. Contributions to the development of Indian culture came from members of all the castes, though those made to philosophies and religious movements mainly came from *brahmanas* and *kshatriyas*.

In any case, the Gita says that not only men but also women of all castes are eligible for salvation, if they perform their duties in the spirit advocated by Him. All can seek the ideal of life; all can be ideal persons.

The *Sastras* also relate to the existence of people of the four *varnas* in each of the *varnas*, based on their personal qualities and duties. For instance, among the *brahmanas*, there are said to be *brahmanas*, *kshatriyas*, *vaisyas* and *sudras*. So is the case with the people of the other *varnas*.

There has been considerable controversy on the origin, content and manner of division in the Hindu society resulting from *varnadharma* or caste system as it is generally called. It is stated in the *Sastras* such as *Manisha Panchakam* that people are initially divided into four *varnas*, namely *brahmana*, *kshatriya*, *vaisya* and *sudra* based on their qualities and duties in the society. Generally the white complexioned are known as *brahmanas*, red complexioned *kshatriyas*, yellow complexioned *vaisyas* and the black complexioned *sudras*. The colours of the complexion stated do not refer to the caste or *varna* but to the qualities of the individuals. Whiteness represents *sattva*; redness represents *rajas*, yellowness represents the compound of *rajas* and *tamas*; and blackness represents *tamas*. The people bearing the qualities in the four different categories are given the names of the *varnas* with corresponding duties for performance.

It is commonsense that colour cannot be the basis of any *varna* system. The colours such as whiteness, redness, yellowness and blackness of individuals depend upon the climatic conditions of the places of their domicile, levels of nutrition, habits of food, nature of work handled, etc.

One is a *brahmana* not because he was born to a *brahmana* woman. Nor is one a *brahmana* because of undergoing the ritual of *Upanayana* or learning the *Veda*. One becomes a *brahmana* only when one follows the path of Truth and *Dharma*. The *Veda* enjoins that the one who is truthful, patient, compassionate, contemplative, loving, charitable, graceful, silent in prayer, simple, performs *Vedic* rites and sacraments and suffers to salvation is alone the *brahmana*. The emphasis is on the performance of one's duties and not on birth. Similarly people are categorized as belonging to other *varnas* based on the duties performed by them.

Taittariya Sruti records that all are born *sudras* by birth. May be, at the time of birth all are at the level of animal life. By performance of *Vedic* ritual of *Upanayana*, one becomes the twice born (*dwija*) and by studying the *Veda*, the *vipra*. Only after attaining *brahmajnana* or the knowledge of the Divine does one become a *brahmana*. Those born among the *sudras* but devoted to the Divine are *brahmanas*. Irrespective of birth, all those that are not devoted to the Divine are to be considered *sudras*.

The *Manavadharmasastra* of Manu which records the then prevailing *varna* (caste) system makes a graphic account of the parentage of some of the greatest *maharishis* who are all considered *brahmanas* because of their having attained *brahmajnana*. It records that Rushyasrunga is born of a deer, Vishwamitra is a *kshatriya*, Jambuka is born of fox, Gautama is born of rabbit, Valmiki is born of an ant-hill, Agastya is born of a pot, *Vedavyasa* is born of a chambadi woman, Vasista is born of a prostitute, Narada is born of a washerwoman, Koundinya is born of a widow, Maatanga is born of a scheduled caste (*madiga*) woman, Mandavya is born of a frog, Sankhya is born of a scheduled caste (*chandala*) woman, Gargeya is born of a

donkey and Sounaka is born of a dog. There is a school of thought that the reference to animals in the *Manavadharmasastra* as to the parentage of these *maharishis* is not to animals, but only to the names of their parents. All of them are among the greatest of the saints that have ever walked on earth. In such an event, is it possible for *varna* (caste) to be ever related to the accident of birth?

The rationalization of caste system in Bhagavad-Gita compares with the class system advocated by Plato. In fact, all advanced ancient societies had a caste structure, whether or not caste was determined by birth. In ancient India it was indeed the caste system that had prevented the massacre of the non-Aryans by the Aryans.

In India the caste system represents an attempt to subordinate military, political and financial power to spiritual authority. The education given to all classes still insists strongly upon the fact that man's final end is unitive knowledge of God. The popular philosophy of life has been based on the classics of devotion and the rules of aristocratic good breeding. Even now, in the period of extreme materialistic culture around the world, successful somototonics in India will, in middle life, give up wealth, position and power to end their days as humble seekers after enlightenment.

Aldous Huxley records with extraordinary clarity thus: 'Any confusion of castes, any assumption by one man of another man's vocation and duties of state, is always, say the Hindus, a moral evil and a menace to social stability. Thus, it is the business of the *Brahmins* to fit themselves to be seers, so that they may be able to explain to their fellow men the nature of the universe, of man's last end and of the way to liberation. When soldiers or administrators, or usurers, or manufacturers, or workers usurp the functions of the *Brahmins* and formulate a philosophy of life in accordance with their variously distorted notions of the universe, then society is thrown into confusion. Similarly, confusion reigns when the *Brahmin*, the man of non-coercive spiritual authority, assumes the coercive power of the *Kshatriya*, or when the *Kshatriya's* job is usurped by bankers and stock jobbers, or finally when the warrior caste's *dharma* of fighting is imposed, by conscription, on *Brahmin*, *Vaisya* and *Sudra* alike. The history of Europe during the later Middle Ages and Renaissance is largely a history of the social confusions that arise when large numbers of those who should be seers abandon spiritual authority in favour of money and political power. And contemporary history is the hideous record of what happens when political bosses, businessmen or class-conscious proletarians assume the Brahmin's function of formulating a philosophy of life; when usurers dictate policy and debate the issues of war and peace; and when the warrior's caste duty is imposed on all and sundry, regardless of psycho-physical makeup and vocation'.

3. Way of Life

By the time systematizations of philosophies started, that is, about the 5th century B.C, four main values of life and three ways of life for realization of the values became clear in the minds of the Indian thinkers.

The values of life are wealth, enjoyment, ethical merit and salvation. Wealth is needed in this world for enjoyment of life and also for ethical activity such as charities and performance of sacrifices. As it is for the sake of enjoyment, it has an instrumental value. But enjoyment should not be chaotic or unprincipled. The ethical laws of society and religion give the principles of enjoyment. Enjoyment has to be canalized according to them, and such canalization brings and accumulates merit (*dharma*). The principles are the laws of duty. More merit brings more enjoyment in this life and the lives to follow. Merit is obtained through enjoyment and merit itself brings the opportunities for further enjoyment.

While the followers of the early *Mimamsa* were content with the value of *dharma*, other thinkers introduced the value of salvation. Ethical action is meant not merely for more and more enjoyment, but also for obtaining the highest form of happiness, that is, the spiritual bliss. It is a pathway to liberation or salvation, which is emancipation from bondage to the laws of the world. It results in purifying our inward being and enables it to receive and recognize the reflection and grace of the Supreme Being.

Thus, every one of the lower values is made instrumental and subservient to the higher. It is considered that self-realization is possible through the realization of the four values in the world of action. As a general rule, it is necessary for man to realize the first three values and the fourth, although the highest, is recommended.

With the rise of Buddhism and Jainism, which over-emphasized the fourth value, the importance of the first three was lessened and even ignored. When salvation is the highest value, the best way for man to adopt is to renounce the world, give up all duties and rights and become an ascetic. Thus the life of the ascetic was extolled and came to be more respected than the life of the householder. In the *Vedic* orthodox way of life, as a historical phenomenon, the life of the ascetic was not considered obligatory. But gradually as the *Aryan* religion became more and more inward, the life of the forest dweller and of the ascetic was introduced into the *Aryan* way of life.

Indian culture and thought developed philosophies not only combining and reconciling the four values of life, but also for every value of life, the higher one including the lower. *Mimamsa* is essentially a philosophy of ethical conduct and so of the third value. The ethical codes are elaborations and applications of *Mimamsa* to practical life in society and politics. All the other well-known philosophies claim to be philosophies of salvation - the fourth and the highest value.

The way of life is the way man plans his life for realizing an ideal or value. It is called *yoga* and also *marga*. *Yoga* is derived from the verbal root *yuj*, meaning, ‘to

join'. *Yoga* is that which joins a man to his ideal, that is, enables him to realize his ideal. *Marga* means path or way. Indian thinkers have recognized many *margas* or *yogas* of which three are considered to be important.

The first way is the way of action, that is, ethical action. *Mimamsa* enunciates that, through ethical action alone, can man obtain happiness in every life. The way of action can also lead to salvation. Some contend that action necessitates the enjoyment of its fruit in the form of pleasures and pains, and so binds man to the world. But this is countered on the plea that action performed with detachment, without interest in the fruit of action, does not bind man to the world. The categorical imperatives, the payment of the three debts of the *asramadharma*, have to be obeyed. Actions done for the sake of their fruit have to be avoided. When there is no attachment to their fruit, man cannot be bound to them and to the world. Such a man, on death, attains liberation. None can live without action. One desirous of salvation should live a life of action without any interest in its fruit.

Bhagavad-Gita gives a fairly significant analysis of ethical action. Action is divided into two kinds - that which does some personal benefit and that which is not so motivated. This distinction corresponds to the non-obligatory and the obligatory kinds of action.

The non-obligatory actions are those, which a man performs for enjoying the fruit of those actions. They may, indeed, be ethical, not necessarily unethical. If a man prays to God for children or wealth, he performs a non-obligatory action. But if he prays to God or does charity without reference to the results, he performs an obligatory action. Thus all actions for sustaining the world and the society are obligatory and are called actions without desire, desire meaning one's own desire. And all actions meant for enjoying their results are non-obligatory and are called actions with desire. The actions of the first kind may otherwise be called selfless and non-egoistic, while the actions of the second kind may be called selfish and egoistic.

In the absolute, unconditional sense, there is no desireless action. Even the desire to do the right action is also a desire. Desirelessness, in the ethics of the Gita, means the absence of the desire to enjoy oneself the results aimed at. Otherwise, the action is an egoistic action.

The Gita makes the point clear in two ways. First, it says that God Himself is the desire in men that is not opposed to the law (*dharma*) of reality or the universe. If God Himself is desire that is in accordance with the law of the universe, there can be no way of escaping every type of desire, just as there is no way of escaping every type of action such as breathing. Thus desireless action means non-egoistic action, the desire behind which is the law of the universe. The kind of desire that is one of God's forms is the law that is the support of the world and society. Without action according to that desire, the society and the world may be destroyed. One who performs actions with the law of the universe as the guide always acts right and is not bound by the results of those actions.

Second, the Gita says that mean men act only when they desire the result for themselves. Man should take shelter in reason and act in accordance with his rational

dictates. While doing action, he shall do it with all the skill needed, for *yoga* is skillfulness in action. The rational way of action is only of one type, but the irrational is of many.

All actions except those of sacrifice (*yajna*) keep man in bondage. A sacrifice is not a mere ritual. It is giving away; it is offering to gods, beasts, plants, ancestors and even the spirits of the lower world so that all remain satisfied and work for the welfare of man and the world. Living beings are born of food, food out of rain, rain out of sacrifice, sacrifice out of action, action out of Brahma (one of the Hindu Trinity) and Brahma out of the Supreme Brahman. Thus, the Brahman, the all-pervading, is installed in sacrifice. God Himself is eternally active, but not with any motive or desire. He is active though He has everything.

The idea conveyed in the Gita is that ethical action is action according to the structure of the Cosmic Person, the Logos. Such action sets one on the path set by the Logos, lifts one above the pettiness and narrowness of one's finite self with its selfish and self-centered desires and ideals to the level of the Universal or Cosmic Person. It is at this level that one can realize one's oneness with the Supreme Being. Action in accordance with the structure of the Logos is, therefore, indispensable. This means that purification, that is, universalization of one's mind and self is impossible without ethical action.

The second way of life is the way of devotion. All the theistic schools of philosophy advocate this way. It is easy to speak of action with detachment from its fruit, but difficult to realize it. Where one cannot perform action with detachment, one should completely surrender oneself to God in love and devotion. Emotional attachment to God is easier than dry detachment from fruits of action. The former automatically brings about the latter. Man should realize that he is only an instrument in the hands of God and think that he is performing his duties in obedience to the will of God and that the fruit of his action belongs to God, but not to himself. One should, therefore, cultivate love of God and surrender to Him. Such a man, after death, may obtain liberation.

The third way of life is the way of spiritual knowledge. Communion with God or realization of the Supreme Being is a conscious process. Life's ideal can, therefore, be attained only through spiritual knowledge. So the way of knowledge is primary. Consequently, man should know what his spirit (*atman*) is by discriminating it from the non-self, for the pure self alone can have communion with God. Thus, ethical action purifies our mind and reason. Love of God, devotion and surrender to Him enable us to rise above our petty self. The way of action and the way of devotion are, therefore, the means to the way of knowledge.

4. God and Divine Ground

What is God, communion with whom is the life's ideal? In the words of St. Bernard, 'God is all everywhere equally, in His simple substance. Nevertheless, in efficacy, He is in rational creatures in another way than in irrational, and in good rational creatures in another way than in the bad. He is in irrational creatures in such a way as not to be comprehended by them; by all rational ones, however, He can be comprehended through knowledge; but only by the good is He to be comprehended also through love'.

In the words of Ruysbroeck, 'the image of God is found essentially and personally in all mankind. Each possesses it whole, entire and undivided, and all together not more than one alone. In this way we are all one, intimately united in our eternal image, which is the image of God and the source in us of all our life. Our created essence and our life are attached to it without mediation as to their eternal cause.'

God does not signify a category of things, nor does It have any quality, nor any activity, nor any relationship. As such, It cannot be defined by any word or idea. It is, therefore, the One. It Is; He Is.

'God is in the hog-trough no less than in the conventionally sacred image'. 'Lift the stone and you will find me.' 'Cleave the wood and I am there'. 'That art thou'! Those that have personally and immediately realized the truth of these sayings perceive God everywhere.

It is true that all perceivers cannot have such perceptions, as knowledge is a function of being. But the thing known is independent of the mode and nature of the knower.

God is the immanent - transcendent One, the essence and principle of all existence. God's nature is divine. It is other than and incommensurable with the nature of the creatures in whom God is immanent. That is why we can attain to the unitive knowledge of God only when we become in some measure God-like.

God created the world in Himself through *maya*. The *Vedic* meaning of *maya* is not illusion. It is wisdom, knowledge, capacity and wide extension in consciousness - *prajna prasrta purani*. Omnipotent Wisdom creates the world. Omniscient Power manifests or conceals it in Itself or for Its own delight.

The world is a movement (vibration) of God in His own being. We are the centers and knots of divine consciousness which sum up and support the processes of His movement. The world is His play for His own self-conscious delight. He alone exists, is infinite, free and perfect. We are the self-multiplications of that conscious delight, thrown out into being to be His playmates. The world is a formula, a rhythm, a symbol-system expressing God to Himself in His own consciousness; it exists only in His consciousness and self-expression.

God is the Absolute and Supreme Personality playing in the universe and as the universe. In the universe, He appears to be its Soul and Lord. As the universe, He appears to be the motion or process of the Will of the Lord and to become all the subjective and objective results of the motion. He is both the Existent and the state of existence. We call the state of existence the Impersonal Brahman, the Existent the Personal Brahman. There is no difference between them except the play of our consciousness. God descending into the world in various forms has consummated on this earth the mental and bodily form, which we call humanity

The divine Ground of all existence is a spiritual Absolute, ineffable in terms of discursive thought, but susceptible of being directly experienced and realized by the human being. This Absolute is the God-without-form. The ultimate end of man, the ultimate reason for human existence, is unitive knowledge of the divine Ground.

We, like God, are, in our inward being, *TAT*, which is expressed, but, in our outward being, terms of that formula, notes of that rhythm, symbols of that system. It will be our joy and our self-fulfillment if we lead forward God's movement, play out His play, work out His formula, execute His harmony and express Him through ourselves in His system.

This knowledge can come only to those who abandon self completely so as to make room, as it were, for God. In any generation, it may be that very few will achieve the final end of human existence. By its very nature, the opportunity is available to all sentient beings to come to unitive knowledge in one way or the other, as long as they seek to know who they are in relation to themselves, the universe and God.

The Absolute Ground of all existence has a personal aspect. The activity of the Brahman - the Absolute is Isvara. This personal God is manifested in Hinduism and Christianity as the Trinity of Gods and the Trinity of Persons respectively of whom it is possible to predicate such human attributes as goodness, wisdom, mercy, love, etc of the highest order.

The attribute-less Godhead is the Ground of all the qualities possessed by the personal God. The Godhead *is* and His *isness* contains goodness, love, wisdom and all the rest in their essence and principle. The Godhead is never the mere Absolute of academic metaphysics, but something more purely perfect, more to be adored than even the personal God or His human Incarnation. The Godhead is, thus, a Being towards whom it is possible to feel the most intense devotion and in relation to whom it is necessary to practise a discipline more arduous and unflinching than any imposed by a religion. The distinction between Godhead and God is as between rest and action. Godhead, the Being of God, is an eternal rest of God and of all created things.

'Every individual being, from the subatomic particle up to the most highly organized of living bodies and the most exalted of finite minds, may be thought of as a point where a ray of the primordial Godhead meets one of the differentiated, creaturely emanations of the same Godhead's creative energy', in the words of Aldous Huxley.

The creature, as creature, may be very far from God in that it does not know the nature of the divine Ground of its being. But the creature in its eternal essence - as the meeting place of creatureliness and primordial Godhead - is one of the infinite number of points where divine Reality is wholly and eternally present. For this reason, rational beings can come to the unitive knowledge of the divine Ground, while non-rational and inanimate beings may reveal to rational beings the fullness of God's presence in their material forms.

In the image or the sacramental object, the divine Ground is wholly present. Faith and devotion prepare the worshipper's mind for perceiving the ray of Godhead at its point of intersection with the fragment of the matter before him. Incidentally, by being worshipped, such symbols become the centers of field of force. The longings and prayers of generations of worshippers including highly evolved souls create, as it were, an enduring vortex in the psychic medium, so that the image lives with a projected objectivity. The religious experience of sacramentalists and image worshippers may be perfectly genuine and objective. But it need not always necessarily be an experience of God or the Godhead. It is, in most cases, an experience of the field of force generated by the minds of generations of worshippers and projected on to the sacramental object where it sticks in a condition of what is called second-hand objectivity that can be perceived by minds suitably attuned to it.

To realize God exclusively within oneself is easier than realizing Him, not only there, but also in the outer world of minds and things and living creatures. It is easier because the heights within reveal themselves to those who are ready to exclude from their purview all that lies without. But the process of inclusion of all that lies without enables one to scale the fullness as well as the heights of spiritual life.

Where there is exclusive concentration on the heights within, temptations and distractions are avoided and there is a general denial and suppression. But when the effort is to realize the divine Ground in the world outside as well as the soul within, temptations and distractions must not be avoided, but must be used as opportunities for advance. There must be no suppression of outward-turning activities, but their transformation into sacramental ones. Mortification becomes more searching and subtle, and there is need of unending awareness as to the levels of thought, feeling and conduct, which is the crux of spiritual life.

The world inhabited by ordinary people is mainly dull, sometimes briefly and intensely pleasurable, occasionally or often disagreeable and even agonizing. For those who make themselves fit to see God within the world as well as within their own souls, it wears a different aspect. Conformity to the will of God and docile submission to the leadings of the Spirit are the same as conformity to the Perfect Way. This is to refuse to have preferences and cherish opinions, keeping the eyes open so that dreams may cease and Truth reveals itself.

The doctrine that God is in the world has an important practical corollary. It refers to the sacredness of Nature, and the sinfulness and folly of man's overweening efforts to be her master rather than her docile collaborator. Sub-human lives and

insentient matter are to be treated with respect and understanding, not brutally oppressed to serve our human ends.

God may be worshipped and contemplated in any of His aspects. But to persist in worshipping only one aspect to the exclusion of all the others is to run into grave spiritual peril. If we approach God with the preconceived idea that He is personal, transcendental and all-powerful ruler of the universe, we get entangled in a religion of rites and sacrifices. Ritualistic legalism, no doubt, improves character. But it does not alter character, nor does it modify consciousness.

When God is thought of as immanent as well as transcendent, supra-personal as well as personal as the Perennial Philosophy affirms Him to be, is there complete transformation of consciousness including that of character, that is, enlightenment, deliverance or salvation, by whatever name it is called. It is better that the religious practices are adapted to this conception.

The world is what, in our eyes, it is, because of the consciously or unconsciously and physiologically remembered habits formed by our ancestors or by ourselves, either in our present life or in previous existences. These remembered habits cause us to believe that multiplicity is the sole reality. The idea of 'I', 'me' and 'mine' represents the ultimate truth from this angle.

The unitive Godhead, on the other hand, consists in seeing into the abode of Reality as it is and not as it seems to us. Obviously, this cannot be achieved so long as there is an 'us', to which reality can only be relative. This is the reason why the masters of spirituality stress for mortification, for dying to self. This mortification is not only of the desires, the feelings and the will, but also of the reasoning powers, of consciousness itself and also of our personal memory and inherited habit energies that make our consciousness.

To achieve complete deliverance, conversion from sin is not enough. There is to be a conversion of the mind resulting in revulsion in the very depths of consciousness. As a result of this revulsion, the habit energies of accumulated memory are destroyed and, along with them, the sense of being a separate ego. Reality is then perceived as It is in Itself. In the words of Blake, 'if the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would be seen as it is, *infinite*.' In the words of Aldous Huxley, 'by those who are pure in heart and poor in spirit, *samsara* and *nirvana,* appearance and reality, time and eternity are experienced as one and the same'.

Omnipresent Reality, according to Aurobindo, includes Matter at one end and Spirit at the opposite end. Matter is involved in Spirit. Conversely Spirit is evolved from Matter. The stages in the evolution are Matter, Life, Psyche, Mind, Supermind, Bliss, Consciousness-Force and Existence. The Supreme Reality is *Sachchidananda* – Pure Existence. It is *blissful* Existence. And yet it is this Sachchidananda that in the process of its 'involution' or 'descent' causes the multiplicity, the disharmony, frustration and suffering that we notice in the phenomenal world.

Three things prevent man from knowing God. The first is time, the second is corporeality and the third is multiplicity. These things must go out that God may come in. As long as God is thought of as being wholly in time, there is a tendency to regard Him as a numinous Being rather than a moral Being. The tendency is to treat Him as mere unmitigated Power rather than the Being of power, wisdom and love. This leads to propitiating Him by sacrifices for temporal power rather than worshiping Him as Spirit in spirit.

The 'Isvara' form of God, which Arjuna witnesses in Bhagavad-Gita, which Krishna makes him behold, is the terrible form of God of time. God in time is normally worshipped by material means. The objective is to achieve temporal ends. God in time is manifestly the destroyer as well as the creator. Because of this nature, it has seemed proper to man to worship God by methods, which are as terrible as the destructions he himself inflicts. This accounts for the offer of sacrifices in the worship of deities for temporal gains.

In all such cases, the divinity addressed is always a god in time or a personification of nature. The deity is nothing but Time itself, the devourer of its own offspring. In all these cases, the purpose of the rite is to obtain a future benefit or to avoid an evil, which time and nature hold in store forever. History is replete with instances that where religions and philosophies take time too seriously, are correlated with political theories that inculcate and justify the use of large-scale violence.

There is incarnation of God in human form that possesses the same qualities of character as the personal God. But the Incarnation exhibits them under the limitations imposed, being in a material body born into the world at a given moment of time. Contemplatives who follow the path of devotion conceive of and, indeed, directly perceive the Incarnation as a constantly renewed fact of experience.

But God exists timelessly as the Godhead, as the Brahman whose essence is Being, Awareness and Bliss. God who is Spirit can only be worshipped in spirit and for His own sake. The ultimate good is to be sought in an *Eternal Divine now*, which those who sufficiently desire this good can realize as a fact of immediate experience. The peace that passes all understanding is the fruit of liberation into eternity.

In everyday life, peace is also the root of liberation. Where there are violent passions and conflicts, this ultimate good can ever be realized. This approach promotes tolerance and non-violence. Every act of violence, the killing and torturing of individuals, interferes with the normal and natural relationship between individual souls and the divine eternal Ground of all Being. Such conduct is a sacrilegious rebellion against the Divine Order.

There is no better man than the one, who is reverent to God, at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by Nature or Divine will. He understands that the limit of good things is easy to attain while the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain. He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events some of which happen by necessity, some on their own and some are within our control. As for events that happen by necessity or on their own, they

cannot be called to account. As for the events in our control, praise and blame are naturally attached.

Such a man does not believe that good and evil are given by destiny or chance to man for the framing of a blessed life. Instead he believes that man is afforded opportunities for great good or great evil. He, therefore, thinks it better to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason. In the ethical scheme, it is better in a man's actions that what is well chosen should fail, rather than that what is ill-chosen should succeed.

If we love truth as such and seek it for its own sake, if we love our neighbour as ourselves, if we desire nothing by our religion or faith but to be acceptable to God, if we desire the salvation of all men equally and if we are afraid of evil or error only because of its harmful nature to us and our fellow creatures, we shall be possessing a catholic spirit, a community of interest in all goodness. The purpose of Eternity Philosophy - *Sanahanadharma* is to promote universal love that enables man to give the whole strength of the heart to God, and love his neighbour as himself. Said in other words, it is to inculcate a pure disinterested love of God and our neighbour.

This explains the historical fact that the religions, whose theology has been least preoccupied with events in time and most concerned with eternity, have been consistently the least violent and the most humane in political practice. Hinduism and Buddhism have never been persecuting faiths, have preached no holy wars and refrained from proselytization to promote imperialism unlike early Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism excepting Sufism. Another offshoot of such philosophy is a morality inculcating kindness to animals. The doctrine of divinity dwelling in all living creatures promotes kindness to animals and sub-human species, too, as an article of faith.

5. Human Being

Human Nature

Man is a three-in-one being, comprising body, mind and soul. The mind and the soul may also be called the psyche and the spirit. Human nature is thus tripartite consisting of spirit, mind and body. We live on the borderline between two worlds, the temporal and the divine, the physical – vital – human and the divine. Though nothing in himself, man is 'A no thing surrounded by God, indigent of God, capable of God and filled with God, if he so desires'.

Man himself is a doubly involved being. Most of himself in mind and below is involved in subconscience. Most of himself above mind is involved in a spiritual superconscience. When he becomes conscient in the superconscience, the heights and the depths of his being will be illumined not by reason but by spirit. Then only will he know the reality of his own mind, body and life. Mind will be changed into a greater consciousness. Life will be a direct power and action of the Divinity. The body becomes the very image of spiritual being. That transfiguration is the culmination of a long series of labourious steps. An involution of spirit in matter is the beginning, but a spiritual assumption of divine birth is the fullness of the evolution.

Mind affects its body in four ways. First, it affects subconsciously through subtle physiological intelligence; second, consciously, by deliberate acts of will; third, subconsciously again, by the reaction upon the physical organism of emotional states having nothing to do with the organs or the processes reacted upon; and fourth, either consciously or subconsciously, in certain 'supernormal' manifestations.

Outside the body, matter can be influenced by mind in two ways – first, by means of the body, and second, by a 'supernormal' process described as the PK effect. Similarly, mind can establish relations with other minds either indirectly by willing its body to undertake symbolic activities, such as speech or writing; or 'super-normally', by the direct approach of mind-reading, telepathy, extra sensory perception, etc.

In some fields, the physiological intelligence works on its own initiative as when it directs the never-ceasing processes of breathing or assimilation. In others, it acts at the behest of the conscious mind, as when we will to accomplish some action, but cannot will the muscular, glandular, nervous and vascular means to the desired end. An example of the activity of the physiological intelligence is mimicry; so does a parrot make the imitation.

As for the second, working on its own level, the conscious mind finds itself completely baffled by any problem of serious complexity. An example of the third way in which our minds affect matter is 'nervous indigestion'. In some persons, symptoms of ailment arise when the conscious mind is troubled by such negative emotions such as fear, envy, anger or hatred. These emotions are directed towards events or persons in the outer environment. But in some way or other, they adversely affect the physiological intelligence resulting in 'nervous indigestion'. Several

physical ailments such as tuberculosis, gastric ulcer, heart disease have been found to be closely correlated with certain undesirable states of the conscious mind. On the other hand, every physician knows that a calm and cheerful patient is much more likely to recover from such ailments than one who is agitated and depressed.

As for the fourth, occurrences such as faith-healing or levitation are known examples. Precisely how faith cures ailments, or levitation works against the laws of gravity we do not know. But they do happen. In the same way, we are unable to form any idea of the manner of working of the PK effect demonstrated by Professor Rhine. Nevertheless, the fact that the fall of dice can be influenced by the mental states of certain individuals has been demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt. If the PK effect can be demonstrated, the credibility of the direct influence of mind upon matter within and outside the body is further enhanced. The same is true of extra-sensory perception.

The acts willed by our minds are accomplished either through the instrumentality of the physiological intelligence and the body, or to a limited extent, rather very rarely, by direct supernormal means such as the PK effect. The good or bad states of the mind affect the bodies of the human beings.

The body is always in time, and the spirit is always timeless. But the psyche (personal consciousness) is an amphibious creature compelled by the laws of man's being to associate itself to some extent with its body, but capable, if it so desires, of experiencing and being identified with its spirit and, through its spirit, with the divine Ground. The spirit remains always what it eternally is. But man is so constituted that his psyche cannot always remain identified with the spirit. Thus the psyche passes from time to eternity when it is identified with the spirit and passes again from eternity to time, either voluntarily or by involuntary necessity, when it chooses or is compelled to identify itself with the body.

Contemporary philosophers make an attempt to describe human nature in terms of a dichotomy of interacting psyche and physique, or an inseparable wholeness of these two elements within particular embodied selves. Selfness or personality is a product of these two elements. The third element, that is, the spirit or the soul, the true element that makes man a human *being* is akin to, or even identical with, the divine Spirit or the Ground of All That Exists. Man's final end, the purpose of his existence, is to love, know and be united with the immanent and transcendent Godhead, the being of the eternal Ground. And only 'dying to' selfness and living to spirit can achieve this identification of self with spiritual not-self.

Human will is free. We are at liberty to identify our being either exclusively with our selfness and its interests, or exclusively with the divine within us and without, or with self at one moment or in one context and with spiritual not-self at other moments and in other contexts. The mind-body combine is capable of an enormous variety of experiences. It is open to us to identify ourselves with an almost infinite number of possible objects such as the pleasures of gluttony, intemperance, sensuality, money, power, fame, physical goods, hobbies, collections, professions, pains and illnesses, hopes, fears, schemes for the future, etc. We are free to identify ourselves with more than one of these things simultaneously or in succession. It is for

this reason that human personality is made very complex with an astonishingly improbable combination of traits.

A person born with one kind of psychophysical constitution identifies himself with one set of interests and passions, while a person with another kind of temperament will make a very different type of identification. But these temptations need not have been succumbed to. People can and do resist them. They can and do refuse to identify themselves with what would appear natural to them. This is generally possible, paradoxically, in times of crisis than it is when life is taking its normal course. When the going is easy, there is nothing to make us forget our petty selfness. In a crisis, one is prone to give up selfness and work for common good. That is why a spiritually evolved soul considers that every moment of human life is a moment of crisis. For, at every moment, we are called upon to make an all-important decision as to choose between the way that leads to death and spiritual darkness, and the way that leads to light and life. The choice is between temporal interests and the eternal ones; the choice is between the personal will and the will of God.

In order to fit himself to deal with the emergencies or crises of his way of life, the saintly person undertakes appropriate training of mind and body to subordinate them to the voice of the soul, often called inner voice. Here the aim is primarily to bring him to a state in which he is able to be aware continuously of the divine Ground of his own and all other beings. As a means to this end, the aim is secondly to meet even the most trivial circumstances of daily living without malice, greed, self-assertion or voluntary ignorance, but consistently with love and understanding. The aim of spiritual training is to make people become selfless in every circumstance of life. For the lover of God, the objectives are not limited, and every moment is a moment of crisis. Therefore, spiritual training is more difficult and searching than military training. This possibly explains why there are many good soldiers, but very few saints.

The biographies of the saints testify to the fact that spiritual training leads to a transcendence of personality not only in times of crises, but in all circumstances and in relation to all creatures. A saint ‘loves his enemies’; indeed, he does not recognize the existence of enemies. He treats all sentient beings with the same compassion and disinterested goodwill. The saints are never double-minded or half-hearted. However great their intellectual gifts are, they are profoundly simple. In all circumstances, they behave selflessly, patiently and with indefatigable charity. The biography of a saint is valuable and relevant only in so far as it throws light upon the means by which, in the circumstances of a particular human life, the ‘I’ was purged away - selfness was transcended - so as to make room for the divine ‘not - I’

Human Differences

No two human beings are alike. Yet it is possible to classify human differences. Sheldon has worked out the most adequate classification of such differences. Human beings, according to him, vary continuously between the viable extremes of a tri-polar system. Any given individual is a mixture, in varying proportions, of three physical and three closely related psychological components. The strength of each component can be measured according to empirically determined procedures. The three physical components are called endomorphy, mesomorphy and ectomorphy.

With endomorphic constitution is associated a temperamental pattern called Viscerotonia. Viscerotonic traits are love of food, love of comfort and luxury, love of ceremoniousness, indiscriminate amiability and love of people as such, fear of solitude and craving for company, uninhibited expression of emotion, love of childhood, an intense love of family life, craving for affection and social support, etc.

With mesomorphic constitution is associated a temperamental pattern called Somatotonia. Its traits are love of muscular activity, aggressiveness, lust for power, indifference to pain, indifference to others' feelings, love of combat and competitiveness, high degree of physical courage, need for activity while in trouble, etc.

With ectomorphic constitution is associated a temperamental pattern called Cerebrotonia. Its traits are over-alertness, over-sensitive introversion, no desire to dominate, intense passion for privacy, horror for the boarding school or the barracks, to be nervous, shy, tensely inhibited and unpredictably moody, etc.

Within the general population, variation is continuous. In most people, the three components are fairly evenly mixed. Those exhibiting extreme predominance of any one component are relatively rare. In spite of their rarity, it is by the thought-patterns characteristic of these extreme individuals that ethics and also theology have been, theoretically, mainly dominated.

In a person with high viscerotonic component, his tendency to externalize the emotions he spontaneously feels towards others can be disciplined and canalized so that a merely human kindliness becomes transformed into charity, universal goodwill and compassion towards all sentient beings.

In a person with high somatotonic component, the urge to do something in all circumstances is paramount. This craving for action is always associated with aggressiveness, lust for power, and self-assertion in the unregenerate somatotonic.

In a person with high cerebrotonic component, his special discipline consists in the mortification of his innate tendency towards introversion for its own sake, towards thought, imagination and self-analysis as ends in themselves. The highly evolved cerebrotonic takes to the way of knowledge through the mortification of consciousness, until it ceases to be ego-centered, and becomes centered in and united with the divine Ground.

6. Spiritual Experience

There are four kinds of spiritual discipline (*dhyana*). First, it is the discipline practised by the ignorant; second, it is devoted to the examination of meaning; third, it is contemplation of the Absolute; and fourth, it is oneness with the Absolute.

The discipline practised by the ignorant is the one of contemplatives who, considering that the body is transient, impure and full of suffering, and starting from that stage, advance by stages until they reach the cessation of all thought, the stage where there are no thoughts.

The discipline devoted to the examination of meaning is the one practised by those who, having gone beyond the egolessness of things, beyond individuality and generality, proceed to examine and follow up the meaning of the various aspects of the Absolute.

The discipline related to the contemplation of the Absolute leads the aspirant to recognize that the discrimination of the two forms of egolessness, individuality and generality, is only imagination and that the aspirant establishes himself in the reality of the Absolute.

The discipline related to oneness with the Absolute enables the aspirant to be in bliss characterizing self-realization attained by noble wisdom. It is perfect Enlightenment; it is neither bondage nor deliverance. The aspirant is so intoxicated with the bliss of mental tranquility that he realizes that the visible world is only the manifestation of Divine Mind Itself.

Non-rational creatures do not look before or after, but live in the animal eternity of a perpetual present. Instinct is their animal grace and constant inspiration. They are never tempted to live otherwise than in accord with their own animal *dharma*.

Reason, on the other hand, is a very important instrument in the life of man. Thanks to the power of reason and language, man lives nostalgically, apprehensively and hopefully in the past, the future as well as the present. He has no instincts to tell him what to do. He must rely on personal cleverness rather than inspiration from the divine nature of things. He finds himself in a condition of chronic civil war between passion and prudence. On a higher level of awareness and ethical sensibility, he finds himself in conflict between egotism and dawning spirituality.

This ‘wearisome condition of humanity’ is the indispensable prerequisite of spiritual enlightenment. Man must live in time to be able to advance into eternity. He is to live on the spiritual level, not on the animal level. He must be conscious himself as a separate ego in order to be able consciously to transcend separate selfhood. He must battle with the lower self in order to identify himself with the higher self within him. He must make use of his cleverness in order to pass beyond cleverness to the intellectual vision of Truth, the immediate, unitive knowledge of the divine Ground.

Reason and its works are not and cannot be a proximate means of union with God. The proximate means is intellect or spirit. In the ultimate analysis, the use and purpose of reason is to create the internal and external conditions favourable to its own transfiguration by and into spirit. Intellect and reason are two powers, but distinct as the perfect and the imperfect. The intellect means an intimate penetration of truth. The reason means only an enquiry and discourse.

Some thinkers question the very basis of the eternal Ground being unitively known by human minds at all. One is to realize that man is not only a body and a psyche, but also a spirit. He can at will live on the merely human plane or in harmony and even in union with the divine Ground of his being. The body is always in time; the spirit is always timeless. The spirit is within and beyond the man's psyche, 'uncreated and un-creatable'. This is the *atman* akin to or even identical with the Brahman. The spirit remains always what it eternally is.

But man is so constituted that his psyche cannot always remain identified with the spirit. In the statement 'At one time I am eternal, at another time I am in time', the word 'I' stands for the psyche, which passes from time to eternity when it is identified with the spirit, and passes again from eternity to time when it identifies itself with the body either voluntarily or under compulsion.

Good men spiritualize their mind-bodies. Bad men incarnate and mentalize their spirits. The completely spiritualized mind-body does not go anywhere when the person dies for he is already, actually and consciously where everyone has always potentially been without knowing. The person, who has not, in this life, gone into the eternal principle of all states of being, goes at death into some particular state, which is a matter of conjecture.

According to Buddhism and *Vedanta*, that which survives death is not the personality. It may be the joint product of a persistent consciousness and a modification of the psychic medium. If this conjecture is true, it is possible for a given human being to survive in more than one posthumous form. His 'soul' - the non-personal ground and the principle of past and future personalities - may go marching on in one mode of being, while the traces of the psychic medium may become the origin of the new individualized existences, having quite other modes of being.

'Experience' as emotion about God is incompatible with 'experience' as immediate awareness of God by a pure heart which has mortified even its most exalted emotions. 'It is mere self-love to be inconsolable at seeing one's own imperfections', in the words of Fenelon.

Self-reproach is painful. But the very pain is a reassuring proof that the self is still intact. So long as attention is fixed on the delinquent ego, it cannot be fixed upon God. The ego, which lives upon attention and dies only when it is withheld, cannot be dissolved in the divine Ground.

Without repentance or 'change of mind', there can be no beginning of the spiritual life. This change of mind is normally accompanied by sorrow and self-loathing. But these emotions are not to be allowed to become a settled habit of

remorse. Faults will turn to good provided we use them to our own humiliation, without slackening in the effort to correct ourselves. Discouragement serves no useful purpose. The real way of profiting by the humiliation of one's own faults is to face them in their true hideousness, without ceasing to hope in God, while hoping nothing from the self. Though emotion is to be the source of spiritual life, it is not to drown spirituality in its own canard.

One is to be aware of the peculiar spiritual dangers by which every kind of predominantly emotional religion is always menaced. Religions that promote revivalism to stimulate remorse, a saviour cult that stirs up fleshly love of the personal God, a ritualistic mystery – a religion that generates feelings of awe, reverence and aesthetic ecstasy in its ceremonials, each in its own way, run the risk of becoming a form of psychological idolatry.

In these systems, God is identified with the ego's affective attitude towards God and the emotion becomes an end in itself to be sought after and worshipped, as the addicts of a drug spend life in the pursuit of their artificial paradise. It is also true that religions that make no appeal to emotions have very few adherents while pseudo-religions win millions of enthusiastic devotees. Such devotees of pseudo-religions do not possibly go into the way of genuine spirituality. It, therefore, happens that those who follow the way to its end in the unitive knowledge of the divine Ground constitute a very small minority of the total. Many are called. But as a few choose to be chosen, only a few are chosen. The rest earn themselves another chance in their later lives in circumstances propitious to their desert. The cycle goes on.

7. Spiritual Exercises

General

Spiritual exercises constitute a special class of ascetic practices. Their purpose is mainly to prepare the intellect and emotions for those higher forms of prayer in which the soul is essentially passive to divine Reality. It is also to modify character by means of this self-exposure to divine Reality and increased self-knowledge. In the words of Ansari, the Sufi saint, 'know that, when you learn to lose yourself, you will reach the Beloved! There is no other secret to be learnt.'

The purpose of spiritual exercises is to free the mind from its infatuating desires for separateness and independent selfhood, and so make it capable of realizing the identity of its own essence with the universal Essence of Mind. The expedient means that promote spiritual exercises are, among others, the Way of Tranquility and the Way of Wisdom.

The purpose of the Way of Tranquility is to bring to a standstill all disturbing thoughts and to quiet all engrossing moods and emotions, to make it possible to concentrate the mind for the purpose of meditation and realization. Secondly, when the mind is tranquilized, the objective is to practise reflection or meditation in the more intellectual way by realizing the meaning and significance of one's thoughts and experiences. The idea is that the mind being perfectly tranquil will be most active in realization.

As for the Way of Wisdom, the purpose is to bring a man into the habit of applying the insight that has come to him as a result of the Way of Tranquility. Whatever a man is doing, he is constantly to concentrate his mind on the act and the doing of it, not on his relation to the act or its character or value. If he follows the practice in faith and with willingness, the bondage of old habits disappears and, in its place, appears confidence, satisfaction, awareness and tranquility. The Way of Wisdom is designed ultimately to accomplish the identity of the essence of one's own mind with the Universal Essence of Mind, the Highest Perfect Wisdom.

As for progress in spiritual life, one is to be patient with every one, above all with oneself. One is not to be disheartened by one's imperfections, but is always to rise up with fresh courage. There is no better means of attaining to the spiritual life than by continually beginning again, and never thinking that one has done enough. How can we be patient in bearing with our neighbour's faults, if we are impatient in bearing with our own? One who is fretted by one's own failings cannot correct them. All profitable correction comes from a calm, peaceful mind.

'He who interrupts the course of his spiritual exercises and prayer is a like a man who allows a bird to escape from his hand; he can hardly catch it again.'

'If one says 'it is enough, I have reached perfection', all is lost. For it is the function of perfection to make one know one's imperfection.'

As for spiritual exercises in daily life, the problem is how to keep oneself reminded, during the hours of work and recreation, of the Godhead. Some kinds of work and recreation are simple and permit continuous repetition of sacred name or mantra, unbroken thought about divine Reality or uninterrupted mental silence and alert passivity. But there are other tasks too complex to admit of constant remembrance of the Divinity. One, who is at serious work, if one is over-intent on recollection, is liable to make serious mistakes. The best way is to try to concentrate the mind before and afterwards, but while at work, to do it straightforwardly. Undivided attention is seldom demanded and is with difficulty sustained for long periods at a stretch. There are always intervals of relaxation. Everyone is free to choose whether these intervals shall be filled with daydreaming or with contemplation of the Divine or a spiritual exercise chosen.

The most commonly practised spiritual exercises are elucidated hereafter.

Meditation

The simplest and most widely practised form of spiritual exercises is repetition of the divine name, or of some phrase affirming God's existence and the soul's dependence upon Him. In India the repetition of the divine name or the mantra is called *japam* and is a favourite spiritual exercise among all the sects of Hinduism and Buddhism. The shortest mantra is AUM - a spoken symbol that concentrates within itself the whole *Vedanta* philosophy.

To this and other mantras Hindus attribute a kind of magical power. The repetition of these mantras is a sacramental act, conferring grace. The constant repetition of the mantras may, in favourable circumstances, have a profound effect upon the subconscious mind, inducing that selfless one-pointedness of will, thought and feeling without which the unitive knowledge of God is impossible. Further, it may happen that, if the word is simply repeated 'all whole, and not broken up or undone' by discursive analysis, the Fact for which the word stands will end by presenting Itself to the soul in the form of an integral intuition.

When this happens, in the language of the Sufis, 'the doors of the letters of this word are opened' and the soul passes through into Reality. Though all this *may* happen, it need not necessarily happen. There is no spiritual patent medicine for souls suffering from separateness and the depravation of God. It is possible that a mere mechanical repetition of the mantra may have a negative effect.

Intense concentration on an image or idea may be very helpful for certain persons in certain circumstances. It is helpful when the concentration results in mental stillness, a silence of intellect, will and feeling wherein the divine Word can be uttered within the soul.

But it is harmful when the image concentrated upon becomes so hallucinatingly real that it is taken for objective Reality and worshipped idolatrously. It is also harmful when the exercise of concentration produces unusual psychophysical results in which the person experiencing them takes a personal pride, as being special graces and divine communications. Of these unusual psychophysical occurrences, the most ordinary are visions, auditions, foreknowledge, telepathy and other psychic powers.

A curious bodily phenomenon is intense heat. Many persons who practise concentration exercises experience this heat occasionally. Some mystics have developed techniques whereby the accession of such heat can be regulated, controlled and put to useful work such as keeping the contemplative warm in freezing weather. This explains several saints in the heights and passes of the Himalayas doing their penance in freezing environment with minimum of clothing.

Intense concentration on any image or idea is always concentration on something produced by one's own mind. Sometimes, in mortified and recollected persons, the art of concentration merges into the state of openness and alert passivity, in which true contemplation becomes possible. But, some-other-times, the fact that the concentration is on a product of the concentrator's own mind results in some kind

of false or incomplete contemplation. The divine Ground reveals Itself only to those in whom there is no ego-centeredness or alter-ego-centeredness either of will, imagination, feeling or intellect. It is the state of imagelessness in contemplation and, in active life, the state of total non-attachment in which eternity can be apprehended within time; *samsara* becomes one with *nirvana*.

The Tibetan Book of the Dead gives an account as to the manner of concentration on image, leading to imageless contemplation in a graphic way: 'Whosoever thy tutelary deity may be, meditate upon the form for much time - as being apparent, yet non-existent in reality, like a form produced by a magician…Then let the visualization of the tutelary deity melt away from the extremities, till nothing at all remaineth visible of it; and put thyself in the state of the Clearness and the Voidness - which thou canst not conceive as something - and abide in that state for a little while. Again meditate upon the tutelary deity; again meditate upon the Clear Light; do this alternately. Afterwards allow thine own intellect to melt away gradually, beginning from the extremities.'

If exercises in concentration, repetition of the divine name, or meditation on God's attributes, etc help those who make use of them to come to selflessness, openness and that 'love of the pure divinity' making possible the soul's union with the Godhead, then such spiritual exercises are wholly good and desirable. If they have other results, they are better avoided.

Eckhart says, 'he who seeks God under settled form lays hold of the form, while missing the God concealed in it'. It is permissible to seek God provisionally under a form that is merely a symbol of Reality. And this symbol is to be discarded in favour of Reality sooner or later. To seek Him under a settled form, regarding it as the very shape of Reality is to commit oneself to illusion and idolatry.

The impediments in the way of the practice of the mental prayer are ignorance of the Nature of Things and the absorption in self-interest resulting in distractions. It is true that even the most saintly persons suffer, to some extent, from distractions. It is also true that a person who, in the intervals of mental prayer, leads a self-centered life will have more and worse distractions than one who lives never forgetting who one is and how one is related to the universe and the divine Ground. Some of the spiritual exercises actually make use of distractions in such a way that the impediments to selflessness and mental silence are transformed into means of progress.

One cardinal principle employed by spiritual teachers is not to use violent efforts of the surface will against the distractions, which arise in the mind during periods of recollection. It is said, 'the more you resist, and it persists.' Any violent reaction of the surface will against distractions automatically enhances the separate, personal self and, therefore, reduces the individual's chances of coming to the knowledge and love of God.

As the distractions appear in the foreground of consciousness, one may take notice of their presence, then, lightly and gently, without any straining of the will, one shifts the focus of attention to Reality which one glimpses or merely knows about in

the back-ground. In many cases, this effortless shift of attention will cause the distractions to lose their obsessive ‘there-ness’ and, for a time at least, to disappear.

Another way to circumvent distractions is to examine them dispassionately as they arise, and in tracing them back, through the memory of particular thoughts, feelings and actions, to their origins in temperament and character, constitution and acquired habit. This procedure reveals to the soul the true reasons for its separation from the divine Ground of its being. The soul discovers, specifically, the point where the eclipsing selfhood causes the distractions. Resolving to overcome the impediments in the way, the soul quietly puts aside the thoughts of them and, purged, empty and silent, passively exposes itself to whatever it may be that lies beyond and within.

Every soul that approaches God must be aware of who and what it is. To practise a form of mental or vocal prayer above one’s moral station is to act a lie. The consequences of such lying are wrong notions about God resulting in idolatrous worship and spiritual pride. Self-knowledge leading to self-hatred and humility is the condition of the love and knowledge of God. Spiritual exercises that make use of distractions increase self-knowledge. But one danger of employing distractions for increase of self-knowledge is a temptation to forget the end, and to become absorbed in a remorseful personal way to the exclusion of the pure Divinity.

Contemplation

Contemplation is the highest form of prayer. All are called to contemplation, because all are called to achieve deliverance, which is nothing but the knowledge that unites the knower with the Godhead. The life of mystical contemplation is the proper and normal development of the 'interior life' of devotion to God. There is no contradiction or irrationality in this concept. The principle of the two lives - the mystical contemplative life and the interior life - is one. It is in the life of mystical contemplation that the interior life is consummated. The end of both the lives is the same, being the eternal life. Further, the life of mystical contemplation in fact prepares one perfectly for the eternal life.

Al-Ghazzali regards that the mystics are not only the ultimate source of our knowledge of the soul and its capacities and defects, but, like the salt, preserve human societies from decay. These fervent mystics exist in all times. God does not deprive the world of them, for they are its sustainers. It is they who, with total self-abandonment, become capable of perpetual inspiration and so are made the instruments through which divine grace is mediated to the rest of the human society, which is impervious to the delicate touches of the Spirit.

But there are few contemplatives, because few souls are perfectly humble. Many aspirants shrink from the labour and refuge to bear with the dryness and mortification, instead of submitting, as they must, with perfect patience. The assertion that all are called to contemplation does not conflict with the doctrine that there are at least three principal ways to liberation - the ways of works, devotion and knowledge. If the ways of works and devotion lead to liberation, it is because they lead into the way of knowledge. A soul, which does not go on from the ways of devotion and works into the way of knowledge, is not totally delivered, for total deliverance comes only through unitive knowledge.

Based on temperament, the aspirants may be naturally drawn to one way of liberation. Though there may be born devotees, born workers, born contemplatives, it is nevertheless true that even those at the extreme limits of temperamental eccentricity are capable of making use of other ways than that to which they are naturally drawn. In view of the inner urge to reach the great end, the born contemplative can learn to purify his heart by work and direct his mind to devotion. Similarly the born worker and the born devotee can learn to 'be still and know that I am God.'

As for contemplation, God is not the only possible object. There have been and are still many philosophic, aesthetic and scientific contemplatives. But one-pointed concentration on that which is not the highest may become a dangerous form of idolatry. It is an evil in the sense that such one-pointedness may result in the atrophy of all but one side of the mind.

In cases where the one-pointed contemplation is of God, there is a risk that the mind's unemployed capacities may atrophy, if there is only one-pointedness of exclusion and mutilation. But this risk is offset if the one-pointedness of exclusion is a preparation for the one-pointedness of inclusion - the realization of God in the fullness of Cosmic Being as well as in the interior height of the individual soul.

For the fully enlightened, totally liberated person, time and eternity, the phenomenal and the Real, *samsara* and Nirvana are essentially one. His whole life is a one-pointed contemplation of the Godhead in and through the things, lives, minds and events of the world of becoming. Here there is no mutilation of the soul, no atrophy of any of its powers and capacities. On the other hand, there is a general enhancement and intensification of consciousness. At the same time there is an extension and transfiguration. No spiritual master has ever said that total absorption in God is a cursed evil.

Action is something added on to the life of prayer, not something taken away from it. Action that is 'taken away from the life of prayer' is action unenlightened, uninspired and unguided. Consequently it is apt to be ineffective and even harmful. We cannot act rightly and effectively unless we are in the habit of laying ourselves open to the leadings of the divine Nature of Things. We must draw in the goods of eternity in order to be able to give out the goods of time. This means that the life in which ethical expenditure is balanced by spiritual income must be a life in which action alternates with repose and speech with alertly passive silence. The bodies of men and animals are reciprocating engines in which tension is always succeeded by relaxation. Even the unsleeping heart rests between beat and beat. What a man pours out in love is what he takes in by contemplation.

The path of spirituality is a knife-edge between abysses. On one side is the danger of mere rejection and escape. On the other side are the dangers of mere acceptance and the enjoyment of things, which should only be used as instruments or symbols. Spirituality needs the disciplining of the will through the disciplining of consciousness. There is to be a conversion of the heart, the senses and the perceiving mind. There is to be a process of conscious discrimination between the personal self and the Self that is identical with the Brahman. The result of the discrimination is a kind of complete 'revulsion' of consciousness and the realization of a state of 'no-mind', which is the state of freedom from perceptual and intellectual attachment to the ego-principle. This state of 'no-mind' is something like being on a knife-edge between the carelessness of a sensual man and the over-eagerness of an aspirant for salvation. To retain the state of 'no-mind', one must learn to combine the most intense alertness with tranquil and self-denying passivity, that is, the intense determination with a perfect submission to the leadings of the spirit. In the words of Huang - Po, 'when no-mind is sought after by a mind, that is making it a particular object of thought. There is only testimony of silence; it goes beyond thinking.'

Salvation, the ideal of life for each individual human being, is regarded as deliverance out of folly, evil and misery into happiness, goodness and wisdom. As to the means of salvation, they are ethical, intellectual and spiritual simultaneously. Buddha's Eightfold Path sums up the means to salvation.

Complete deliverance, according to Buddha's Path, is conditional on the following. First is the Right Belief in the truth that the cause of pain and evil is craving for separative, ego-centered existence and that there can be no deliverance from evil either personal or collective, except by getting rid of such craving and the obsession of 'I', 'me' and 'mine'. Second is the Right Will, the will to deliver oneself

and others. Third is the Right Speech directed by compassion and charity towards all sentient beings. Fourth is the Right Action with the aim of creating and maintaining peace and goodwill. Fifth is the Right Means of Livelihood or the choice only of such professions as are not harmful in their exercise to any human being or, if possible, any living creature. Sixth is the Right Effort towards self-control. Seventh is the Right Attention or Recollectedness to be practised in all the circumstances of life so that we may never do evil by mere thoughtlessness. Eighth is the Right Contemplation, the unitive knowledge of the divine Ground. The above are the means, which it is within the power of man to employ in order to achieve his final end and be 'saved'. One is to work out one's salvation with diligence. Personal effort is what counts for realization.

There is one material difference between spiritual bliss arising from realization and corporal pleasures of the body-mind combine. The corporal pleasures beget a desire before we obtain them and, after we have obtained them, disgust. But spiritual pleasures are not, on the other hand, cared for or known when we do not have them. But they are desired when once we have them.

The bliss into which the enlightened soul is delivered is something quite different from pleasure associated with the body. Blessedness depends on non-attachment and selflessness. It can, therefore, be enjoyed without satiety and revulsion. It is a participation in eternity and, therefore, remains itself without diminution or fluctuation. The liberated soul attains to bliss eternal and immeasurable, and abides in the Brahman.

There are as many conceptions of salvation as there are degrees of spiritual knowledge. The kind of liberation actually achieved by the individual soul depends upon the extent to which the soul chooses to overcome its essentially voluntary ignorance.

Chandogya Upanisad states that the human body is mortal, forever in the clutch of death. Within it resides the self, immortal and without form. This self, when associated in consciousness with the body, is subject to pleasure and pain. So long as this association continues, man cannot find freedom from pain and pleasure. When the association comes to an end, there is an end also of pain and pleasure. Rising above physical consciousness, knowing the self as distinct from the sense organs and the mind, knowing Him in true light, one rejoices and one is free. One has true bliss.

Maitrayana Upanisad states that having realized his own self as the Self, a man becomes selfless. In virtue of selflessness, he is to be conceived as unconditioned. This is the highest mystery, betokening emancipation. Through selflessness, he partakes of no pleasure or pain, but attains absoluteness. All manner of virtue and goodness can never make man blissful so long as it is outside the soul, that is, so long as man works through his senses and reason, and does not withdraw into his self and learn who and what he is.

Sankara says: 'Talk as much philosophy as you please, worship as many gods as you like, observe all ceremonies, sing devoted praises to any number of divine beings - liberation never comes, even at the end of a hundred aeons, without realization of the self. This realization of the self is within and yet transcendentally

other than the individual ego. The realization of the self is enlightenment of the ignorance, and deliverance from the mortal consequences of that ignorance'.

Buddhism echoes the same concept: '*Nirvana* (liberation) is where there is no birth, no extinction; it is seeing into the state of Suchness, absolutely transcending all the categories constructed by mind; for it is the *Tathagata*'s inner consciousness.

Immortality is participation in the eternal now of the divine Ground. Survival is persistence in one of the forms of time. Immortality is the result of total deliverance. Goodness and virtue make men know, love, believe and delight in their immortality.

Silence

The spiritual life is nothing else but the working of the spirit of God within us. Therefore, our own silence must be a great part of our preparation for it. Much speaking or delight in it is often a great hindrance of that good which we can have from hearing what the Spirit or the voice of God, also called inner voice, speaks within us.

Unrestrained and indiscriminate talk is morally evil and spiritually dangerous. Most of the words we speak may be classified under three main heads. First is the category of words inspired by malice and uncharitableness towards our neighbours. Second is the category of words inspired by greed, sensuality and self-love. Third is the category of words inspired by pure imbecility, merely for the sake of making noise without rhyme or reason. All these are idle words and they outnumber the words dictated by reason, charity or necessity.

If we take into account the endless monologue of the mind, the idle words account overwhelmingly large. All these idle words are impediments in the way of the unitive knowledge of the divine Ground. The guard of the tongue, which is also a guard of the mind, is the difficult but necessary and fruitful mortification on the path of spiritual life.

Silence is distinguished into three categories - silence of the mouth, silence of the mind and silence of the will. To refrain from idle talk is difficult. More difficult is to quieten memory and imagination. Most difficult is to still the voices of craving and aversion within the will. While speaking distracts, silence and work collect the thoughts and strengthen the spirit.

Silence is of four types - silence of speech, silence of the senses, violent restraint and the silence of deep sleep. The first three types involve rigid *mouna* while the fourth one is conducive to liberation. In it, the *prana* or life force is neither restrained nor promoted; the senses are neither fed nor starved; the perception of diversity is neither expressed nor suppressed; and the mind is neither mind nor non-mind. One who is established in it may or may not meditate. There is knowledge of ‘What Is’ in that state and there is freedom from doubt. It is utter emptiness. It is without support. It is of the nature of supreme peace.

There are two types of *muni* - a sage who observes *mouna* or silence. One is the rigid ascetic and the other is the liberated sage. The rigid ascetic forcibly restrains his senses and engages himself in dry activities, devoid of wisdom, and with fanaticism. The liberated sage, on the other hand, knows the truth as truth and the unreal as unreal. He is endowed with self-knowledge and yet behaves like any other ordinary person. What is regarded as *mouna* or silence is based on the nature and behaviour of the sage concerned.

The last hundred years constitute, among other things, the Age of Noise - physical noise, mental noise and noise of desire. The resources of our almost miraculous technology have been an assault against silence. The radio, the television and the internet are conduits for flow of prefabricated din into our homes, work

places, transport, etc in the name of amusement. This din goes farther than the eardrums. It penetrates the mind, filling it with distractions. As advertising constitutes the main source of income for these channels of noise, the noise is carried from the ears, through the realms of phantasy, knowledge and feeling to the central core of wish and desire of the ego. All advertising, spoken, printed or visual, has one purpose - to prevent the will from ever achieving silence. Desirelessness is the condition of deliverance and illumination. The role of advertising is to promote universal craving. To extend and intensify the workings of that craving is the principal cause of suffering and wrongdoing. It is the greatest obstacle between the human soul and its divine Ground.

Prayer

Prayer is the most important medium of spiritual practices. It is applied to at least four distinct procedures - petition, intercession, adoration and contemplation. Petition is the asking of something for ourselves; and intercession for others. Adoration is the use of intellect, feeling, will and imagination in making acts of devotion directed towards God in His personal aspect or as incarnated in human form. Contemplation is that condition of the soul that opens itself to the Absolute Divine, the immanent and the transcendent Godhead.

To acquire his petition answered, a man need not have to know or to love God or even His image. All that he requires is a burning sense of fulfillment of his desires, coupled with firm conviction that there exists, out in the universe, something not himself, which can be dragooned into satisfying these desires. With the necessary degree of faith and persistence, the chances are that, sooner or later, somehow or other, he gets what he wants.

It is the experience of human beings through ages that whatever is sought with firm faith and conviction that God delivers. Whether what man gets, in response to his petition, is morally or materially good or not, only time can say. The trouble is that he never knows, until he gets it, what it actually is that he has asked for. Whatever people get by way of fulfillment of material desires, the folklore around the world – the voice of the wise men - is replete with jocular parables that the petitions answered by God have always led to catastrophic consequences. It may, however, be legitimate for us to pray for anything, which is legitimate for us to desire. For instance, we can desire our well-being but cannot desire the fruits of crime or wrongdoing.

As for intercession, it is at once the means to, and the expression of, the love of one's neighbour. In the same way, adoration is the means to, and the expression of, the love of God - a love that finds its consummation in the unitive knowledge of the Godhead, which is the fruit of contemplation.

Intercession is the best arbitrator of all differences with neighbours and others in the society, the best promoter of true friendship, the best cure and preservative against all unkind tempers, all angry and haughty passions. One cannot possibly have any ill temper or show any unkind behavior to a man for whose welfare one is so much concerned as to be his advocate with God in private. One cannot possibly despise and ridicule that man for whom one prays privately to God.

Adoration is an activity of the loving of the personal God or the God incarnated. But God is still considered separate individuality. Contemplation, on the other hand, is the state of union with the Absolute or the Divine Ground, in whatever way it is called.

The highest prayer is the most passive. The less there is of self, the more there is of God. That is why the path to passive or infused contemplation is very hard and, for many, disheartening because of elusive fruitfulness. The aspirant must die to the

life of sense, as an end in itself, to the life of the separate and individualized will. He is to still the mind to elevate the soul to the realm of the One All.

To pretend to devotion without great humility and renunciation of all worldly tempers is to pretend to impossibilities. He who is devout must first be humble. Then only his soul will be full of desire after God. A proud, vain or worldly-minded man may recite prayers day in and day out. But he cannot be devout as devotion is application of a humble soul to God, beyond the realm of mind, as its only happiness.

Spiritually, prayer is an offering and giving to God whatsoever He may justly require of us. It is an elevation of the mind, through soul, to God. It is an actuation of the soul towards God expressing, or at least implying, an entire dependence on Him as the fountain of all good, a will and readiness to give Him all love, obedience, adoration, glory and worship by humbling and annihilating the self. This is to lead finally to a desire to aspire to a union of spirit with Him. Prayer is thus the most perfect and most divine action that a rational soul is capable of. Of all actions and duties, it is the most indispensably necessary.

Simplicity

Real simplicity is almost sublime. All good men like and admire it, are conscious of sinning against it, observe it in others, and know what it involves. By simplicity is meant an uprightness of soul, which prevents self-consciousness. It is not the same as sincerity, which is a much humbler virtue.

Many people may be sincere, but not simple. Sincere people say what they believe to be true and appear strictly as they are. But they are forever thinking about themselves only and are not at ease with others, nor others with them. There is nothing easy, frank, unrestrained or natural about them.

To be absorbed in the world and never turn a thought within is one extreme as opposed to simplicity. To be self-absorbed in all matters is the other extreme, which makes a man wise in his own conceit. Both are the states of intoxication, one of outwardness and the other of inwardness, and unrelated to simplicity. Real simplicity lies in 'being equally free from thoughtlessness and affectation, in which the soul is not overwhelmed by externals, so as to be unable to reflect, nor yet given up to the endless refinements, which self-consciousness induces', in the words of Fenelon.

Simplicity is the most characteristic fruit of perfect mortification.

Such simplicity is a great treasure. One need take at least three steps to seek to realize it. The first is for the soul to put away outward things and look within so as to know its own real interest. The second is for the soul to add the contemplation of God, whom it fears, to that of self. This is a faint approach to the real wisdom, but still the soul is greatly self-absorbed. It is not satisfied with fearing God, and yet it wants to fear Him, thus going round in a perpetual circle of self-consciousness. This restless dwelling on self is far away from the peace and freedom of real love. Yet the soul needs to go through this state of trial, for, were it suddenly plunged into a state of rest, it would not know how to use it. The third step is that the soul begins to dwell upon God instead, ceasing from a restless self-contemplation, and by degrees forgets itself in Him. It becomes full of Him. Such a soul is aware of its own faults and errors. It is more conscious of them than ever and sees them in plainer form. But this self-knowledge comes from God and, therefore, the soul is not restless and uneasy.

Simplicity is the same thing as virtue. Personal sins and social maladjustments are all due to the fact that men have separated themselves from their divine source and live according to their own will and notions, not according to Divine Will or Pure Reason. The simplicity and spontaneity of the perfect sage are the fruits of mortification of the will and, by recollectedness and meditation, of the mind. Nothing is more difficult than being simple.

Some people consider that a life dedicated to simplicity and service is austere and joyless. But they are not aware of the freedom of simplicity. As long as one's life is not overcrowded with unnecessary possessions than actually required, one's life is full and blissful.

A vow of simplicity is this: 'I shall not accept more than I need while others in the world have less than they need.' One feels free if one's motive is of giving. Then it is for sure that one will be given whatever one needs.

Faith

The word *Faith* has a variety of meanings. In some contexts, it is used as a synonym for 'trust'. Analogous to this is our 'faith' in authority. It is the belief that what certain persons say about certain subjects is likely, because of their special qualifications, to be true. On other occasions, 'faith' stands for belief in propositions which we have not had occasion to verify for ourselves, but which we know that we can verify their veracity, should there be need. There is also the 'faith', which is a belief in propositions, which we know we cannot verify, but believe them to be true. This is an act of the intellect moved to assent by the will.

Faith in the first three senses of the word plays an important part in the moral sphere in day-to-day life. It is a precondition of all systematic knowing, all purposive doing and all decent living. Societies are held together by a wide spread faith in the other fellows' decency. Such a faith tends to create its own object of trust. In the intellectual sphere, faith lies at the root of all organized thinking. Science and technology could not exist if we had no faith in the reliability of the universe.

The fourth kind of faith is what is commonly called 'religious faith'. This is because the willed assent to propositions known to be unverifiable occurs only in religion. The core and spiritual heart of all the higher religions is the Perennial Philosophy.

There must, of course, be faith as trust. This is in the nature of confidence in one's fellow beings as the beginning of charity towards men, and confidence in the moral and spiritual reliability of the universe as the beginning of charity or love-knowledge in relation to God. There must be faith in the authority of those whose selflessness has qualified them to know the spiritual Ground of all being by direct perception as well as by report. There must also be faith in such propositions about Reality as are enunciated by philosophers in the light of genuine revelation. The propositions are such that the believer knows that he can verify them for himself, if only he fulfills the necessary conditions.

So long as the Perennial Philosophy is accepted in its essential simplicity, there is no need of willed assent to propositions known in advance to be unverifiable. However, such unverifiable propositions may become verifiable to the extent that intense faith affects the psychic substratum and so creates an existence, whose derived objectivity can actually be discovered. This is possible for a person whose mind is in the state of selflessness and alert passivity, which is the necessary condition of the unitive knowledge of the divine Ground.

Faith in the existence and power of any supernatural entity, which is less than ultimate spiritual Reality, and in any form of worship that falls short of self-naughting, will no doubt result in improvement of character, if the object of faith is intrinsically good. But this improvement is still within the temporal order and does not relate to the eternal life of timeless union with the Spirit. This eternal life stands in the knowledge of and faith in the Godhead.

According to Sankara, the immortality attained through the acquisition of any objective condition merited through good works inspired by love of, and faith in, something less than the supreme Godhead is liable to end, as *karma* can never be the cause of emancipation. The ultimate Ground simply 'Is'. Only when the individual also simply 'is', by reason of his union through love-knowledge with the Ground, can there be complete and eternal liberation.

In other words, the causal process takes place in time and cannot possibly result in deliverance from Time. Such deliverance can only be achieved as a consequence of the intervention of Eternity in the temporal domain. Eternity cannot, however, intervene unless the individual will makes a creative act of self-denial, thus producing, as it were, a vacuum into which Eternity can flow. To suppose that the causal process in time can, of itself, result in deliverance from Time is like supposing that water will rise into a space from which the air has not been previously exhausted.

Grace

The nature of a man's being determines the nature of his actions; and the nature of his being comes to manifestation first of all in the mind. What he craves and thinks, and what he believes and feels is the Logos - so to say. It is by this agency that an individual's fundamental character performs its creative acts. These acts will be morally good if the being is God-centered, bad and ugly if it is centered in the personal self.

A man's being is his potential energy directed towards or away from God. It is by this potential energy that he may be judged as good or bad. The difference between a good man and a bad man does not lie in that a good man wills what is good, and a bad man wills what is bad. The difference lies solely in that the good man concurs with the living inspiring spirit of God within him, and the bad man resists it. The bad man is charged with evil only because he resists the inspiring spirit of God.

Covetousness, envy, pride and wrath are the four elements of self, all of them inseparable from it. Covetousness, envy and pride are not three different things, but only three different names for the restless workings of the one and the same 'will' or 'desire'. Wrath arises from any of the three emotions if one or all are contradicted.

These four properties generate their own torment. They have no outward cause, nor any inward power of altering themselves. All self remains in this state until some supernatural good comes to it. Pain and evil are inseparable from individual existence in a world of time. For human beings, the inevitable pain and evil are intensified when the desire is turned towards the self and the many, rather than the Divine.

Philosophically, good is the separate self's conformity to, and finally annihilation in, the Absolute or the divine Ground, which gives it being. On the other hand, evil is the intensification of separateness, the refusal to know that the Absolute Being exists. This formulation is in terms of social utility. The crimes, which are forbidden everywhere, proceed from states of mind that are condemned as wrong. Those very wrong states of mind are incompatible with the unitive knowledge of the Absolute, which, ontologically, is the supreme good.

Men have been endowed with *free will* in order that they may will their self-will out of existence and so come to live continuously in a *state of grace*. All our actions, in the last analysis, must be directed to making ourselves passive in relation to the activity and the being of divine Reality.

Defined in psychological terms, grace is something other than our self-conscious personal self, by which we are helped. We have experience of three kinds of such help - animal grace, human grace and spiritual grace.

Animal grace comes when we are living in accord with our own nature on the biological level, not abusing our bodies by excess, but living wholesomely in a natural way. The result of being thus in harmony with the Logos in its physical and physiological aspects is a sense of well-being, an awareness of life as good, just because it is life. Life, in this state, like virtue, is its own reward. But, of course, the fullness of animal grace is reserved for animals. Man's nature is such that he must live a sub-conscious life in time, not in a blissful sub-rational eternity on the higher side of good and evil. As such, animal grace is something that man knows only occasionally when he does not feel self-consciousness.

Human grace comes to us either from persons, or from social groups, or from our own wishes, hopes and imaginings projected outside ourselves and persisting somehow in the psychic medium in a state of relative objectivity. We have all had experience of the different types of human grace. For example, during childhood the grace comes from mother, father and other members of the family. At a later stage, it comes from friends and from men and women morally better and wiser than us. There is the grace of the *guru* or the spiritual teacher, the grace which one's ideals present, etc.

Spiritual grace comes continuously or in its fullness only to those who have willed away their self-will to the point of being able truthfully to say, 'not I, but God in me'. Spiritual grace originates from the divine Ground of all Being to helping man to achieve his final end, which is to return out of time and selfhood to that Ground.

The artistic or creative inspiration in any field of activity is either a human or a spiritual grace, or a mixture of both. High artistic achievement is impossible without those forms of intellectual, emotional and physical mortification appropriate to the kind of art, which is being practised. Over and above this course of professional mortification, some artists have practised the kind of self-naughting, which is the indispensable pre-condition of the unitive knowledge of the Divine. The greatest of the artists, philosophers and men of science have mostly prepared themselves for their work by means of prayer and meditation, thereby inspired.

It may be of interest to note that mechanization is incompatible with inspiration. The advantage of automatic machinery is that it is foolproof. Because it is foolproof, it is also grace-proof. The man who tends such a machine is impervious to every form of aesthetic inspiration, either of human or of spiritual origin.

Love - Charity

'Love is infallible. It has no errors, for all errors are the want of love'. We can only love what we know. We can never know completely what we do not love. Love is a mode of knowledge. When it is disinterested and very intense, the knowledge becomes the knowledge of the Divine and so takes the quality of infallibility. Where there is no disinterested love, there is only biased self-love. Consequently there is only a partial and distorted knowledge of the self, and the world of things, lives, minds and spirit outside the life.

Charity is disinterested love. Unfortunately, charity has come to be synonymous with alms-giving in modern English. In its original sense, it signifies the highest and most divine form of love. The principal characteristics of charity are that it is disinterested; it seeks no reward; nor does it allow itself to be diminished by any return of evil for its good. As charity is disinterested, it must of necessity be universal. As it seeks no reward, persons and things are to be loved for their own sake.

Divine-love is *nirgunam (*without attributes), *niranjanam* (pure), *sanatana niketanam (*the final abode), *nitya (*eternal), *suddha (*unsullied), *buddha (*enlightened), *mukta (*free) and *nirmala swarupinam (*the embodiment of sacredness). Divine-love is all-pervasive. It is the Supreme Self.

Love seeks no cause beyond itself and no fruit. It is its own fruit, its own enjoyment. Unlike the lower forms of love, charity is not any emotion. It begins as an act of the will and is consummated as a purely spiritual awareness, a unitive love-knowledge of the essence of its object.

The highest form of love is the love of God. It is an immediate spiritual intuition, by which 'knower, known and knowledge' are made one. The means to, and earlier stages of, this supreme love-knowledge of Spirit by spirit consist in acts of a will directed towards the denial of selfness in thought, feeling and action, towards desirelessness and non-attachment. It is in the nature of 'holy indifference', a cheerful acceptance of affliction, without self-pity and without thought of returning evil for evil.

Peace from distractions and emotional agitations is the way to charity. Charity or unitive love-knowledge is the way to the higher peace of God. The same is true of humility, which is one of the characteristics of charity. Humility is a necessary condition of the highest form of love, and the highest form of love makes possible the consummation of humility in a total self-naughting. In the words of Ansari, the Sufi saint, 'would you become a pilgrim on the road of Love? The first condition is that you make yourself humble as dust and ashes'.

Feelings may be of service as motives of charity. But charity, as charity, has its beginning in the will - will to peace and humility in oneself, will to patience and kindness towards one's fellow creatures, will to that disinterested love of God which 'asks nothing and refuses nothing'. But the will can be strengthened by exercise and confirmed by perseverance.

All feelings get translated into charity when it is sublime love-knowledge of the Divine. Temperance is love surrendering itself wholly to Him who is its object. Courage is love bearing all things gladly for the sake of Him who is its object. Justice is love only serving Him who is its object, and, therefore, rightly ruling. Prudence is love making wise distinctions between what hinders and what helps itself.

The distinguishing marks of charity are disinterestedness, tranquility and humility. Where there is disinterestedness, there is neither greed for personal advantage nor fear for personal loss or punishment. Where there is tranquility, there is neither craving nor aversion, but a steady will to conform to the Divine Will. Where there is humility, there is no glorification of the ego or any projected alter-ego at the expense of others. Charity is essentially spiritual. It is purely of spiritual essence.

It, therefore, follows that charity is the root and substance of morality, and that where there is little charity, there will be much avoidable evil. It also follows that where there is charity, there can be no coercion, for love cannot compel, and God's service is, therefore, a thing of perfect freedom. But as it cannot compel, charity is a kind of authority, a non-coercive power, by means of which it defends itself and gets its beneficent will generally done in the world.

Our present economic, social and international arrangements are based, in large measure, on organized lovelessness. We lack charity towards Nature. We try to dominate and exploit the earth's mineral resources, ruin its soil, ravage its forests, pour filth into its rivers and poison its air. From lovelessness to Nature, we advance to lovelessness to the human beings. In the name of technological advancement, we go in for mass production and mass distribution. With them go mass-financing. The three have conspired to expropriate ever-increasing numbers of small owners of land and productive equipment, thereby reducing the freedom among the majority and increasing the power of minority to exercise a coercive control over the lives of their fellow beings. This coercively controlling minority is composed of private capitalists or governmental functionaries or both acting in collaboration. However, the coercive and, therefore, essentially loveless nature of the control remains the same.

The guiding principle of all social organization is to be, 'lead us not into temptation'. The temptations to be guarded against are the temptations against charity, that is, against the disinterested love of God, Nature and man. Charity is to preserve men and women from the temptation to idolatrous worship of things in time such as fanatical religiousness, state worship, revolutionary and regulated future worship, and humanistic self-worship all of which are essentially opposed to charity. Next come decentralization, widespread private ownership of land and the means of production on a small scale, discouragement of monopoly by state or major corporations and division of economic and political power. These social rearrangements may help to prevent ambitious individuals, organizations and governments from being led into the temptation of behaving tyrannously.

This is contingent on sovereign states giving up the right to prepare to make war on one another. So long as the organized lovelessness of war and preparation for war remains, there can be no mitigation of the organized lovelessness of our economic, social and political relationships worldwide. In the words of Aldous

Huxley, ‘war and preparation for war are standing temptations to make the present bad, God-eclipsing arrangements of society progressively worse as technology becomes progressively more efficient.’

Suffering to Salvation

Life in a body provides uniquely good opportunities for achieving salvation or deliverance. Man, being a spiritual creature, has need of a body without which he cannot attain the unitive knowledge of the divine Ground, which is the ultimate end of his life. Having achieved human birth, a rare and blessed incarnation, the wise man should strive to know God, and Him only, before life passes into death.

The Godhead is impassible. Where there is perfection and unity, there can be no suffering. The capacity to suffer arises where there is imperfection, disunity and separation from an embracing totality. This capacity is actualized to the extent that imperfection, disunity and separateness are accompanied by an urge towards the intensification of these creaturely conditions. The secret to end the suffering of an individual is to achieve unity within his own organism and union with the divine Ground.

The Four Noble Truths of Buddhism elucidate the concept thus: 'The elements which make up man produce a capacity for pain. The cause of pain is the craving for individual life. Deliverance from craving does away with pain. The way of deliverance is the Eightfold Path'.

The craving for independent and individualized existence, in other words, the urge to separateness can manifest itself on all the levels of life from the physiological through the instinctive to the fully conscious. It can be the craving of whole organism for its separateness from the environment and the divine Ground. Or it can be the craving of a part of the organism for separateness.

In the first case, it is the impulse, the passion, the desire, the self-will or the sin that is at work. In the second case it is illness, injury, functional or organic disorder that is at work. In either case, the craving for separateness results in suffering both for the craver and his sentient environment - other organisms in the external world, or other organs within the same organism.

In one way, suffering is private and in another way, it is contagious. While the being experiences suffering, the other sentient beings in the environment partake of such suffering, being conscious of the suffering by the sufferer. Suffering and moral evil have the same source - a craving for intensification of the separateness that is the primary datum of all creatureliness.

Man's capacity to crave more violently than any animal for the intensification of his separateness results in moral evil with the contingent suffering and in certain derangements of the human body. This arises mainly owing to the fact that civilized human beings do not, on any level of their being, live in harmony with the Logos or the divine Nature of Things.

They intensify their selfhood through gluttony, eating the wrong food and too much of it. They submit to chronic anxiety over money and chronic over- stimulation as they crave excitement. They suffer at work from the chronic boredom and

frustration, as they take up odd jobs in odd hours to satisfy the artificially stimulated demand for the goods of the so-called civilization.

The consequences of the wrong uses of the psychophysical organism are degenerative changes in particular organs such as the heart, kidneys, intestines, etc. The degenerating organs cause suffering to themselves and their physiological environment. In a similar way, the human individual asserts his own separateness from his neighbours, from Nature and God, with disastrous consequences to himself, his family and the society in general. Reversely, a disordered society, professional group or family influences its members to assert their individual selfhood and separateness with the same disastrous consequences to themselves as well as their constituents.

The effects of suffering may be morally and spiritually bad, neutral or good, according to the way in which the suffering is endured or reacted to. It is bad if it stimulates in the sufferer a conscious or unconscious craving for the intensification of his separateness. It is neutral if the craving remains as it was before the suffering. It is good if the suffering becomes a means for advance towards self-abandonment and the love and knowledge of God. It is the choice of the sufferer that ultimately determines one of the alternatives. This seems to be true even on the sub-human level. For embodied human selves, the choice is unquestionable.

The choice of self-abandonment in suffering makes possible the reception of grace on the spiritual level in the form of an accession of the love and knowledge of God, and grace in the mental and physiological levels in the form of a diminution of fear, self-concern and even of pain.

When an individual conceives the love of suffering, he loses the sensibility of the senses and so does the sense of pain. In the words of Eckhart, 'he who suffers for love does not suffer, for all suffering is forgotten (then)'. This is the secret of highly spiritually evolved individuals undergoing even major surgeries without any anesthesia as they choose self-abandonment in suffering.

Many sufferings are the immediate consequences of moral evil. These cannot have any good effects upon the sufferer as long as the causes of his distress are not eradicated. Each sin begets a special spiritual suffering. The more a sinner suffers through his sins, the more wicked he becomes. He continues to commit more and more sins in order to get free from their suffering.

Selfless and God-filled persons, who have been ready to accept suffering in order to help their fellow beings, relieve the suffering of sinners imprisoned in their selfhood. The selfless and God-filled person can and does act as a channel through which grace is able to pass into the unfortunate being who has made himself impervious to the Divine by the habitual craving for intensification of his own separateness and selfhood. It is because of this that the saints are able to exercise authority over their fellow beings. Their authority is all the greater because of its being entirely non-compulsive. They transfer 'merit' to those who are in need of it. It is rather the divine charge they carry, the eternal Reality for which they have become the conduit that transfers merit to those in need to relieve of their suffering.

All men are organically related to God, to Nature and to fellow men. If every human being is constantly and consciously in a proper relationship with his divine, natural and social environment, there will only be so much suffering as Nature makes it inevitable. But actually most human beings are chronically in an improper relation to God, Nature and at least some of their fellow men.

The wrong relationships manifest on the social level as exploitation, disorder, revolutions, wars, etc. On the natural level, they manifest as waste and exhaustion of irreplaceable resources. On the biological level, they manifest as degenerative diseases and the deterioration of racial stocks. On the moral level, they manifest as an overweening bumptiousness. On the spiritual level, they manifest as blindness to divine Reality and complete ignorance of the reason and purpose of human existence.

In such circumstances it is only natural that the righteous and the innocent also suffer, as the heart and the kidneys of an individual suffer if he is gluttonous in his habit. The righteous man can escape suffering only by accepting it and passing beyond it. He can accomplish this by being converted from righteousness to total selflessness and God-centeredness. The difficulties in the way of such transfiguration are obviously enormous. But the road to deliverance is never easy to pass by.

From the ultimate point of view, where there is no 'ought', there is no ethics. Disciplines for salvation consist of different forms of worship, yoga, etc. Nobody is morally obliged to practise them. Most of the Indian philosophers such as Vidyaranya do not regard such practices as an 'ought' or *vidhi*. But moral law is an 'ought', if it is to be treated as law.

There is a distinction between values which are an 'ought' and values which are only recommended to be good. Obtaining salvation, like obtaining wealth, is not an 'ought'. It may not be, therefore, justifiable to equate ethics and the theory of salvation. Ethics covers man's life aiming for the best in this world, his relation to other human beings and his duties in the society of which he is a member. The theory of salvation, according to the Indian thought, is that of the crowning phase of life coming after ethics, which is the ideal of life for each individual.

Mortification

Mortification or deliberate dying to self is never regarded as an end in itself. It possesses merely an instrumental value, as the means to something else. It has nothing of goodness or holiness. Its worth consists in removing the impediments to holiness, to help it to realize holiness or spiritual life. In mortification, the passions are routed and destroyed, leading to the discovery of wisdom, which is the surpassing good. In the words of Plato, 'the virtue of wisdom, more than anything else, contains a divine element, which always remains'.

The practice of mortification does not necessarily lead to a virtuous life. The mortified may practise all the cardinal virtues such as prudence, fortitude, temperance and chastity and yet remain a thoroughly bad man. This is for the reason that his virtues are accompanied by, and connected with, the sins of pride, envy, chronic anger and uncharitableness assuming the proportion of active cruelty. Mistaking the means for the end, the puritan fancies himself holy because he is austere. But austerity is just the exaltation of the ego of the individual. Holiness, on the other hand, is the total denial of the separative self and abandonment of the will to God. To the extent that there is attachment to 'I', 'me' and 'mine', there is no attachment to God and only affirmation of self.

Mortification, to be a virtue, has to be carried to the level of *non-attachment or holy indifference*. Otherwise, it transfers self-will from one channel to another. The difference between the mortified and yet proud and self-centered stoic, and the unmortified hedonist is that while the latter harms his own body, mind and spirit as he lacks the energy and motive to do harm to others, the former, being equipped with secondary virtues, looks down upon others not like himself, and does not hesitate to do harm to them with a perfectly untroubled conscience.

Mortification is not a matter, primarily, of severe physical austerities. It is possible for some persons, in certain circumstances, that the practice of severe physical austerities may prove helpful to advance towards man's final spiritual end. But in most cases, what is gained by such practices is not liberation or realization of the Divine, but the achievement of 'psychic' powers. The psychic powers are such as the petitionary prayer answered, the power to heal, the power to work miracles, to read the minds of others and into the future, etc.

To think that such *Siddhis* or *Riddhis* have anything to do with liberation is an illusion. In fact, they are obstacles in the way of spiritual advance. Carried to extremes, they may be dangerous to health. Without good health, the persistence of effort for spiritual advancement is difficult of achievement. Being difficult, painful and generally conspicuous, physical austerities only provide a ground to vanity and cause the downslide of the aspirant.

Mortification is the best when it results in the elimination of self-will, self-interest, self-centered thinking, wishing and imagining. Extreme physical austerities are not likely to achieve this kind of mortification. The acceptance of what happens to us in the course of daily living is likely to produce this result. If specific exercises in

self-denial are to be undertaken, they are to be inconspicuous, non-competitive and non-injurious to health.

For instance, in social relations, non-denial may take the form of the control of the tongue and the moods, no showy acts of over-humility; the form of refraining from saying anything uncharitable or merely frivolous; the form of behaving calmly and with quiet cheerfulness in spite of the external circumstances, or the states of our bodies pre-disposing us to anxiety, gloom or an excessive elation.

The most difficult of all mortifications is *non-attachment* to self-interest. This is, in essence, what Bhagavad-Gita says when Lord Krishna tells Arjuna to do his divinely ordained duty without personal craving for, or fear of, the fruits of his actions. Its objective is to achieve a *holy indifference* to the temporal success or failure of the cause to which one has devoted one's best energies. If it succeeds, it is well and good. If it meets with defeat, even then it is well and good.

Spiritually, the fitting disposition for union with God is that the soul should remain in that pureness and love which is perfect resignation and complete detachment from all things for God alone. As long as the bonds of human affections, however slight they may be, hold the soul, it cannot, while they last, make its way to God.

In the practice of mortification is rather an active resignation. Self-will is renounced so that the Divine Will may use the mortified mind and body as its instrument for good. In the words of Kabir, 'the devout seeker is he who mingles in his heart the double currents of love and detachment, like the mingling of the streams of Ganga and Jumna.'

Until we put an end to particular attachments, there can be no love of God with the whole heart, mind and strength and no universal charity towards all creatures for God's sake. Non-attachment is emptying one's mind and heart of all desires and affections. This enables the goods of God, which are beyond all measure, to be contained in the emptied heart. If the aspirant passes through life empty, who will be able to injure him?

Mortification is painful. But that pain is one of the pre-conditions of blessedness. Some degree of mortification is an indispensable prerequisite for the creation and enjoyment even of merely intellectual and aesthetic goods.

Those who choose the profession of artist, philosopher or man of science, choose, in many cases, a life of poverty and unrewarded hard work. By no means are they the only mortifications they have to undertake. Besides, the artist denies his ordinary human tendency to think of things in utilitarian terms; the critical philosopher mortifies his common sense, the man of science resists the temptation to over-simplify and think conventionally, and each must make himself docile to the leadings of mysterious Fact. Socrates, Galileo, etc are examples of the embodiment of mortification in a state of consciousness that corresponds to spiritual beatitude. The artist, the philosopher and the man of science know the bliss of aesthetic contemplation, discovery and non-attached possession.

It is by long obedience and hard work that the artist, the philosopher or the man of science comes to unforced spontaneity and consummate mastery. Every one of them knows that he never creates anything out of his personal consciousness. He submits obediently to the workings of 'inspiration'. He is aware that the medium in which he works has its own self-nature. He does not ignore it, nor does he override it. He makes himself its patient servant. In the process, he achieves perfect freedom of expression of his vocation. Similarly, life is an art. The man who is to be a consummate artist in living must follow, on all the levels of his being, the same procedure as that by which the artist, the philosopher or the man of science comes to his own state of perfection.

The goods of the intellect, the emotions and the imagination are real goods. But they are not the final good. Mortification of will, desire and action is not enough. There must be mortification in the fields of knowing, thinking, feeling and fancying. The total abstention from judgment upon one's fellows is another requisite of inward purity.

Rites, Sacraments and Ceremonials

Rites, sacraments and ceremonials are valuable in so far as they remind those who take part in them, of the true Nature of Things and of what ought to be their own relation to the world and its divine Ground. Any ritual or sacrament is good provided that the object symbolized is, in fact, some aspect of divine Reality and that the relation between symbol and Fact is clearly defined and constant. But the problem arises for those who have been brought up to think of God by means of one set of symbols, when it becomes very hard to think of Him in terms of other sets of symbols, words, ceremonies and images.

Idol worship helps devotees to concentrate on the Divine. Though the Divine is immanent everywhere, an idol becomes the centre of concentration of Divinity based on the true faith of the devotees worshipping it. A cow delivers milk only through its udder when the cowboy properly and affectionately approaches it, even though milk is present everywhere in the cow.

But most men worship the gods because they want success in their worldly undertakings. This kind of material success can be gained very quickly by such worship. Men, whose discrimination has been blunted by worldly desires, establish this or that ritual or cult and resort to various deities, according to the impulse of their inborn nature.

But no matter what deity a devotee chooses to worship, if he has faith, his faith is made unwavering. Endowed with the faith that God gives him, he worships the deity and gets from it everything he prays for. But this man of small understanding, because of discrimination blunted, prays only for what is transient and perishable. The worshippers of the lower gods go to them for personal ends. Those who worship the supreme Godhead realize Him.

If sacramental rites are constantly repeated in a spirit of faith and devotion, an enduring effect is produced in the psychic medium, crystallizing personalities, according to the more or less perfect development of the bodies with which they are associated. Within this psychic medium or non-personal substratum of individual minds, something persists as an independent existence with its own derived objectivity.

Those who perform the rites with faith and devotion actually discover something distinct from the subjectivity of their own imagination. As long as this projected psychic entity is nourished by the faith and love of its worshippers, it will possess, not merely objectivity, but powers to get people's prayers answered. However, all this happens in accordance with the divine laws governing the universe in its psychic, spiritual and material aspects.

There is profound truth in the notion that the gods (lower forms of the Godhead) feed on the sacrifices made to them. When their worship falls off, when faith and devotion lose their intensity, the gods sicken and finally die. There are several temples, mosques and churches around the world where even the most irreligious and un-psychic visitors cannot fail to be aware of some intensely numinous

presence. If is rather the psychic presence of men's thoughts and feelings projected into objectivity and haunting the sacred place, in the same way as thoughts and feelings haunt the scenes of some past suffering or crime. The presence in these consecrated shrines, the presence evoked by the performance of traditional rites, the presence inherent in a sacramental object, name, etc are all real presences, but not of God but of something which, though it may reflect the divine Reality, is yet less and other than It.

The relation subsisting between ritual and real presence depends upon the character of the worshipper's reaction to each. Systematically cultivated ritual contributes to the evocation, then results, for certain souls, in the immediate apprehension of the Presence which brings with it joys of a totally different and higher kind. The Presence is always that of the *divine being* - the god form that has been previously remembered. The projected objectivity of the Presence is occasionally so complete as to be apprehensible not only by the devout worshipper, but by even indefinite outsiders.

Similar is the experience of ardent devotees. Whoever recites the name of the divine form he or she worships in heart and soul will surely apprehend the form and does not get separated from it. By reason of that association, just as one associating with a maker of perfumes becomes permeated with the same perfumes, he or she will become perfumed by the divine form's compassion, and will become enlightened without resort to any other expedient means. Kabir, Mira and Tyagaiah are well known examples.

The intense faith and devotion, coupled with perseverance, by devotees in the same forms of worship or spiritual exercises, have a tendency to objectify the idea or memory, which is their content, and so to create, in some sort, a numinous real presence which the worshippers and even their associates actually apprehend. In so far as this is the case, the ritualist is perfectly justified in attributing to his hallowed acts and words a power, which, in another context, would be called magical. The *mantra* works; the sacrifice does something; and the sacrament confers grace. These are all matters of direct experience, facts that anyone who chooses to fulfill the necessary conditions, can verify empirically.

But the grace conferred is not always spiritual grace and the resulting powers need not necessarily be from God. Worshippers can, and very often do, get grace and power from one another and from the faith and devotion of their predecessors projected into independent psychic existences that are hauntingly associated with certain places, words and acts. Therefore, a great deal of ritualistic religion is not spirituality, but occultism, may be a refined and well-meaning kind of white magic.

There is no harm in this kind of white magic as long as it is treated that it is not true religion, but a certain kind of psycho-physical make up to remind people that there is God in the knowledge of Whom stands their eternal life. If the real presences the ritualistic white magic evokes are taken to be God in Himself and not the projections of human thoughts and feelings about God, then there is idolatry. This idolatry is, at its best, a very lofty and beneficent kind of religion. But the consequences of worshipping God as anything but Spirit and in anyway except in

spirit and in truth are necessarily undesirable in the sense that they lead to delay the soul's ultimate reunion with the eternal Ground.

Though spiritual masters of all major religions are opposed to ritualism, the history of religion clearly demonstrates that very large numbers of men and women in all religions have an ineradicable desire for rites and ceremonies. It may be that most people do not want spirituality or deliverance, but rather a religion that gives them emotional satisfactions, answers to prayers, supernatural powers, etc.

Further, some of those who do desire spirituality find that, for them, the most effective means to those ends are rites, ceremonies, incantations, repetition of name or mantra, etc. It is by participating in these acts and repeating these mantras that they are most powerfully reminded of the eternal Ground of all-being. Everything, event or thought can be made the doorway through which a soul may pass out of time into eternity. That is why ritualistic and sacramental religion can lead to deliverance. But, at the same time, every hallowed ceremony, mantra or sacramental rite is a channel through which power can flow out of the fascinating psychic universe into the universe of embodied selves. As every human being ordinarily loves power and self-enhancement, the power flowing into the embodied selves can lead away the worshippers from deliverance if they have not abandoned their self in the process.

All the masters of spiritual life are agreed that without self-knowledge there cannot be adequate knowledge of God and that without a constant recollectedness there can be no complete deliverance. It is desirable if man transforms the whole of workaday life into a kind of continuous ritual that every object in the world around him is regarded as a symbol of the world's eternal Ground and that all his actions are performed sacramentally. The man who has learnt to regard things as symbols, persons as temples of the divine Ground and actions as sacraments is a man who has learned constantly to remind himself of what he is in relation to the universe and God.

'That the Logos is in things, lives and conscious minds and they in the Logos' is the emphatic teaching of the *Veda*nta. Because of the indwelling of the Logos, all things have reality. But a vast majority of human beings believe that their own selfness and the objects around them possess a reality in themselves, wholly independent of the Logos. This belief leads them to identify their being with their sensations, cravings and private notions. In its turn, this self-identification with 'what they are not' keeps them off from divine influence and the very possibility of deliverance. To most of us on most occasions, things are not symbols and actions are not sacramental. And we have to remind consciously and deliberately ourselves that they are.

This process of conscious sacramentalization can be applied only to such actions as are not intrinsically evil. It is not possible to sacramentalize actions whose psychological byproducts are completely God eclipsing.

Rites, sacraments, ceremonies, liturgies, etc belong to public worship. They are devices by means of which the individual members of a group or congregation are reminded of the true Nature of Things and of their proper relations to one another, the universe and God. What ritual is to public worship, spiritual exercises are to private

devotion. They are devices to be used by the solitary individual when he prays to God in his privacy.

Miracles

The immediate awareness of the divine Ground is often accompanied by abnormal bodily states, which are not, of course, essential parts of that experience. To levitate, to go into trance, to lose the use of one's senses, etc are some such states, which many mystics consider not of divine grace, but of the body's weakness. In the words of St. Francois de Sales, 'one ounce of sanctifying grace is worth more than a hundredweight of those graces, which theologians call gratuitous, among which is the gift of miracles. It is possible to receive such gifts and yet to be in mortal sin; nor are they necessary to salvation'.

Highly evolved spiritual masters regard miracles as veils intervening between the soul and God. They urge that no attention be paid to the Siddhis or psychic powers which may come to them unsought, as a byproduct of one-pointed contemplation. The cultivation of these powers distracts the soul from Reality and sets up obstacles in the way of enlightenment and deliverance.

The rationalists know nothing of spirituality and regard the material world alone as supremely significant. They, therefore, convince themselves that miracles do not and cannot happen. Those who are aware of the spiritual life and its byproducts are convinced that miracles do happen, but regard them as of no consequence, and mainly negative and anti-spiritual.

The miracles of psychic healing are in great demand and, as a result, in steady supply. Those who are holy in virtue of being selfless channels of the Spirit may practise psychic healing with perfect safety. A correlative of psychic healing is that the sick must be ready to accept forgiveness along with the miracle of a bodily cure. Those who are holy and selfless will know which of the sick are ready to receive psychic healing. Such a practice works to the advantage of both the healer and the healed.

But unfortunately the knack of psychic healing seems in some persons to be inborn, while others can acquire it without being holy even to the smallest degree. As is said, it is possible to receive such graces and yet be in mortal sin. Such persons use their knack indiscriminately either for power or for profit. Often they produce spectacular cures. As they lack the power to forgive sins or to understand the psychological correlates, conditions or causes of the symptoms they have so miraculously dispelled, they leave an empty soul ultimately resulting in more evil than the original sickness cured.

Idolatry

The many varieties of present day idolatry may be classified into three categories - technological, political and moral. The devotees of the technological idolatry believe that their redemption and liberation depend upon material objects. They derive their philosophy of life from advertisement pages of the print and the visible media. The devotees of the political idolatry worship redemptive social and economic organizations. They believe that with imposition of the right kind of organizations on human beings, all kinds of problems from sin and unhappiness to nationalism and war will automatically disappear.

The moral idolaters are realists in as much as they realize that material goods and organizations do not guarantee the triumph of virtue and happiness. They realize that the individuals that comprise societies and use machines are the arbiters that determine whether there shall be decency in personal relationship, order or disorder in society. But they cease to be realistic and commit idolatry inasmuch as they worship, not God, but their own ethical ideals, inasmuch as they treat virtue as an end in itself and not as the necessary condition of the knowledge and love of God. Without that knowledge and love of God, virtue will never be made perfect or even socially effective.

The moral fault is the idolatry - the setting up of some idea which is most kindred to our own minds, and the putting it in the place of God. Truth and justice can at best be idols. While worshiping them, reverence, humility and tenderness might be forgotten. But God Himself includes at once truth and justice and all these qualities. It is, therefore, desirable to have God alone as idol if idolatry is required at all. Otherwise, narrow mindedness tends to wickedness, as it does not extend its watchfulness to every part of our moral nature, and the neglect fosters wickedness in the parts so neglected.

The idolatrous worship of ethical values in and for themselves defeats its own object. It defeats it not only because there is a lack of all-round development, but also, and above all, because even the highest forms of moral idolatry are God eclipsing. They, therefore, guarantee the idolater against the enlightening and liberating knowledge of Reality.

Some of those who use spiritual exercises make progress in the life of the spirit. Others, using the same exercises, make no progress. To believe that their use either constitutes enlightenment or guarantees it is mere idolatry and superstition. On the other hand, to neglect them altogether and to refuse to find out in what way they can help in the achievement of their final end is self-opinionatedness and obscurantism.

8. Moral Insight

The relationship between moral action and spiritual knowledge is reciprocal. Selfless behaviour makes possible an accession of knowledge, and the accession of knowledge makes possible the performance of further and more genuinely selfless actions, which in their turn enhance the capacity of the agent for knowing. This goes on without limit, if there is perfect docility and obedience.

The amount and kind of knowledge we acquire depends upon the will and also upon our psychophysical constitution and the modifications imposed upon it by environment and our own choice. It is said that where technological discovery is concerned, man's desire has been the important factor. Once something is definitely wanted, it has been produced again and again in a very short time.

The same is true in regard to ethical and spiritual discoveries. 'You are as holy as you wish to be' and 'you can know as much reality as you wish to know' are the mottos of the saints. This is for the reason that knowledge is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. The mode of the knower is, in all important respects, within the knower's control. 'Liberating knowledge of God comes to the pure in heart and poor in spirit'. Though such state of purity and poverty is enormously difficult of achievement, it is nevertheless possible to one that attempts it in all simplicity.

To learn to discriminate between the different kinds of rhetoric is an essential part of intellectual morality. Intellectual morality is as necessary a pre-condition of the spiritual life as are the control of the will and the guard of heart and tongue.

'The foundation of man's moral life is the dynamic relation of the human self to Absolute Being. By his very constitution as a self, man is called upon absolutely to affirm Being in all his interactions. What this affirmation of Being requires, that is, what actually constitutes an adequate response to Being in any particular situation, is a matter for discerning intelligence. It will depend not only on the determinate facts of the situation but also on the possibilities which man's presence to Being opens up to him. Morality, therefore, is necessarily a matter of invention and creativity. It does not merely look backwards to patterns already achieved, but forward for their enhancement. The ultimate norm in the moral realm is the law of intelligent responsiveness - its only absolute law. To be moral is to be for Being to live in its light, to seek always in all the situations in which we find ourselves to promote its reign. If we take reason as the faculty of the Absolute, then to be moral is to be reasonable in the fullest possible sense', in the words of Robert O. Johann.

Men are born into sympathy and antipathy, wishing and willing. Unconsciously at first, then consciously, men evaluate, 'this is good, that is bad'. Thereafter men discover obligation. 'This, being good, ought to be done; that, being bad, ought not to be done'. All evaluations are equally valid. Men are called upon to pass judgment on what their desires and dislikes affirm to be good or bad. In the light of our experience, we discover that what at first seemed good may later turn out to be bad; and that what at first seemed bad may turn out to be good which we feel ourselves under obligation to accomplish.

When we say that a man has a penetrating moral insight, we mean that his judgment of value-claims is sound; that he knows enough to be able to say what is good in the long run. When we say that a man has a strong moral character, we mean that he is ready to act upon the findings of his insight, even when these findings are unpleasant or even at variance with his first evaluations.

In actual practice, moral insight is never a strictly personal matter. The judge administers a system of law and is guided by precedent. Similarly every community that comprises the individual members has a moral code based upon past findings of what in fact is good in the long run. In most circumstances, most of the members of any given society permit themselves to be guided by the generally accepted code of morals. A few reject the code either in full or in part, while a few choose to live by another, higher and more exacting code.

It has been found, as a matter of experience, that it is dangerous to lay down detailed and inflexible rules for right livelihood. Most people see no reason for being righteous rigidly. Consequently they respond to any rigid code of righteous conduct by hypocrisy or open rebellion. The problems of right livelihood, in so far as they lie outside the jurisdiction of the common moral code, are strictly personal. The way in which any individual problem presents itself and the nature of the appropriate solution depend upon the degree of knowledge, moral sensibility and spiritual insight achieved by the individual concerned. For this reason, no universally applicable rules can be formulated except in general terms. Such general rules are, in the words of Lao Tzu, 'pity, frugality and refusal to be foremost of all things under heaven.'

9. Right Action

For *Sanatanadharma, Mimamsa* and Bhagavad-Gita are the barometer of 'Right Action'.

According to *Mimamsa*, actions are primarily of three kinds. First, obligatory actions are those that have to be performed by every man only because he is a man. Their performance supports man, society and the universe and does not bring any special kind of merit for man. But their non-performance produces demerit. Second, prohibited actions are those that produce demerit, but their non-performance does not produce any merit. The non-performance of prohibited actions is also obligatory. Third, actions are whose performance is optional. The injunctions regarding the actions that are optional are concerned with particular aims of the agent. If one wants to have a special status in this life or hereafter, one has to perform a certain sacrifice. But the particular desire is not an obligation.

Mimamsa recognizes, though discourages, another kind of actions, that is, the activities associated with black magic. If one wants one's enemy to die or suffer grievously, one performs certain sacrifices associated with black magic. Man may choose to perform them, though the sacrificer, too, suffers in the process. *Mimamsa* lays down rules for performing such rites, though it does not lay down rules for performing prohibited actions that produce demerit such as murder, causing grievous physical injury or theft.

Bhagavad-Gita adds the ideal of salvation to *Mimamsa* philosophy of life and action. Krishna says that those attached to actions, their fruit and their enjoyment cannot obtain salvation. He teaches people to realize that actions are performed by the body, a product of *Prakrti* and its attributes, but not by the *atman*. But as the *atman* is different from *Prakrti*, it should overcome its self-identification with it.

Yet so long as the *atman* is within the realm of *Prakrti*, it should continue to perform dutiful actions. So non-egoistic action is possible and natural, has its basis in the very nature of reality. Man has to transcend the realm of *Prakrti* as the nature of the *atman* points to such transcendence. Krishna's criticism of *Mimamsa* philosophy of life and action is only a criticism of the religion of sacrifices and gods without the ideal of salvation. It is not rejection of the *Veda* itself. Otherwise, he would not have said that He is the Sama*Veda* among the *Vedas*.

Bhagavad-Gita elucidates the role of action. One is to understand what right action is, what wrong action is and what non-action is. Wrong action is the prohibited action. The wise man sees non-action in action and action in non-action. Non-action does not mean non-movement of limbs. In such a case, life becomes impossible. Ethical non-action is action without any egoity. Merit and demerit, the results of action, do not accrue to the agent of such an action. For such agent knows that he is doing the action for the sake of *dharma*, not for his own sake. He also knows that it is not he, as the atman, but as the body that does the action. Man should perform all actions as skillfully as he can and surrender the fruit to God.

In this world, except a corpse, everything is active and activity yields its appropriate result. For example, if an astrologer predicts that a young man would become a great scholar, does that young man become a scholar without study? No. There is no place for fatalism in life. One shall apply oneself to self-effort to promote one's ultimate good.

Self-effort is of two categories. One is that of the past lives and the other is that of the current life. The latter can effectively counteract the former if it is so willed. Fate is none other than self-effort of past life or lives. There is a continuing conflict between these two in the present life. That which is more powerful ultimately triumphs.

Self-effort, which is not in accord with the scriptures, is motivated by delusion. When the desired result of self-effort is not there, one should examine if there is such deluded action. If so, it needs to be corrected. There is no power greater than right action in the present. One is, therefore, to take recourse to self-effort to overcome evil by good and fate by present effort.

One should never yield to laziness, but strive to attain liberation, realizing that life is ebbing away every moment. One should not revel in the filth known as sense-pleasure, as a worm revels in pus. One is to acquire wisdom by self-effort and then realize that the end of self-effort is the direct realization of Truth. As is the effort, so is the fruit.

One is to free oneself from likes and dislikes and to engage oneself in righteous self-effort to reach the supreme Truth. Self-effort is that which springs from right understanding of the scriptures and the teachings of holy persons.

Self-effort has a three-fold root and, therefore, three-fold fruit. It is an inner awakening in the intelligence, a decision in the mind and physical action. It is based on the knowledge of scriptures, instructions of the preceptor (*guru*) and one's own effort. Fate or divine dispensation does not enter here. The essence of all scriptures is that he who desires salvation should divert the impure mind to pure endeavor by persistent effort.

Even as an error of the past can be rectified and turned into good action by self-effort today, the habits of the past and the corresponding impressions (*samskaras)* can be overcome by appropriate self-effort. However, the notion of the j*iva*-hood can be overcome only by the attainment of liberation.

The *samskaras* (tendencies, impressions) brought forward from the previous lives are of two kinds. The pure ones lead one to liberation and the impure ones keep one in bondage. One is pure consciousness oneself, not inert physical matter. One is not impelled to action by anything other than oneself. It is open to one to strengthen the pure latent tendencies in preference to the impure ones. That is the reason why the holy men advise that one shall tread consciously the path that leads to the eternal good. The wise seeker knows that the fruit of his endeavor is always commensurate with the intensity of his self-effort. Fate or destiny or God does not ordain it otherwise. The seeker is, therefore, to endeavor for his true good - his salvation by a

keen and intelligent study of the scriptures, by having the company of the holy ones and by right self-effort.

Renunciation, a facet of right action, is of three types - sacrifice, charity and penance. All the three are actions. They purify the soul. They are obligations to every man who has to perform them without any attachment to the fruits that may result. One who gives up actions through ignorance is under the influence of the Attribute of Darkness (*tamas*). One who gives them up because of the trouble they involve is under the influence of the Attribute of the Active (*rajas*). Neither is right. The one who performs them without desire for their fruit is under the influence of the Attribute of the Transparent (*sattva*). He is the true renouncer of action, the true knower and the truly wise (*jnani*).

The three initiators of action are the knower, the known and the knowledge. The three factors of action are the agent, action and the instruments of action. Of these, the agent, action and knowledge are of three kinds, according as they are determined by the three Attributes. The knowledge that sees unity in multiplicity, the unmanifest Brahman in the manifested difference is determined by the Transparent. This leads man to act with the idea of the welfare of the whole universe in view. The agent here is untouched by the results of action. That which sees the differences as separate from one another is determined by the Active. This leads man to act with the idea of the immediate result and its relevance to the agent in view. That which leads man to action without any thought is determined by the Dark. This leads man to act without any idea of the result as in the case of animals.

In another context, Bhagavad-Gita classifies actions into five kinds, according to the kinds of causes that produce action. It may be produced by the body, the agent (*atman*), different types of instruments, different kinds of bio-motor and vital functions, and even fate as the unknown factor. The will of the agent alone cannot produce what is aimed at. All have to cooperate in the right way and in the right mix. All have to be favourable. Action is also classified into three categories – bodily action, speech and thought (mental action). All the three have to be pure and under the guidance of the Transparent.

Bhagavad-Gita is interested in the *dharma* of man and society, and not in the metaphysical problem of the ultimate *Dharma*. Both Arjuna and Krishna are eager that the law of society is preserved in any case. For the purpose, Arjuna is prepared to give up fighting and retire to the forest as an ascetic. For if the rulers are killed, who will maintain the social order? The castes will then mix up, men and women become licencitious, the foolish, the incompetent and the vicious will become the lawmakers. The caste and tribal laws will go to the winds.

But Krishna points out that Arjuna is indulging in psychological rationalization. In the name of preserving social order, he is going to violate that very order, by refusing to perform the duties of a warrior and defender of justice. Every man should perform the duties incumbent on his station in society. Even Krishna, the Absolute, has His duties. He performs them, though He has nothing to gain by them. If He does not perform His duties, men will imitate Him and the world will go to naught. He will then be responsible for disorder, promiscuity and ultimate destruction

of the world. It is only for maintaining and defending order, that is, *dharma* that He, as the Brahman, takes on incarnations to punish the wicked and destroy disorder.

The *Avatar* (Divine Incarnation) becomes incarnate in order to assist human beings to achieve the union of man with timeless Spirit. This He does in three ways - by teaching the true doctrine in a world blinded by voluntary ignorance, by inviting souls to a 'carnal love' of His humanity, not indeed as an end in itself, but as the means to spiritual love - knowledge of Spirit, and finally by serving as a channel of grace. Here Bhagavad-Gita shows the intimate involvement of the Divine and His interest in the world.

Bhagavad-Gita gives a new meaning to the concept of sacrifice (*yajna*), which is a part of *dharma* according to *Mimamsa*. Arjuna has to perform the duties of his station in society, even if they involve the killing of his kinsmen. When he does the actions to fulfill his obligations, with no personal interest, the demerit that results will not accrue to him. It goes to, and dissolves itself, in the Cosmic Person.

Such action is surrender to the Cosmic Person and to the Absolute. This surrender to God is itself 'sacrifice' in which the oblation is man and his actions.

The sacrifice of surrender is performed in different ways. All those that make this surrender are called *yogis*. Some *yogis* surrender everything feeling that they and their actions go to the Brahman and are the Brahman. This is oneness or *samadhi* with the Brahman's activities, the placement of one's self in the Brahman. Others offer sacrifices differently, depending upon their level of enlightenment.

For example, some worship sacrifice as God Himself. Some offer the senses as oblations to self-control. Some offer the activities of senses and of life as oblations. Some offer sacrifices with substances like food, some with the practice of yoga, some with study, some with breath control, etc. All such *yogis* are performing sacrifice that purifies their soul. The purpose of sacrifice according to the Gita is the purification of mind and soul, not enjoyment and pleasure as given by *Mimamsa*.

Right action is the means by which the mind is prepared for contemplation. Those who constantly practise the four virtuous acts, in which all other virtues are included, namely, the requital of hatred by love, resignation, desirelessness and obedience to the *dharma* or Nature of Things can hope to achieve the liberating realization that the soul and all other things have as their living principle the divine Godhead. In Buddhism, too, the first seven branches of the Eightfold Path are the active, ethical preparation for unitive knowledge of Suchness. Those who practise the path can hope to achieve the liberating realization that *samsara* and *Nirvana* are one.

10. Ethics

While *dharma* primarily relates to the intrinsic law of man's being, righteousness, charity and piety ultimately leading to the enlightenment of the soul for communion with God – the ultimate goal of a human being, *ethics*, though part of *dharma*, in general parlance, mainly in the West, relates to human conduct in society.

The term ethics or ethic means a pattern or norm or code of conduct adopted by a group of people. The term also applies not merely to the various codes of conduct approved but also to the activity of appraising, evaluating and revising these codes. This involves consistent and critical enquiry into the ethical beliefs and subjects them to close scrutiny.

Ethical Philosophers formulate and formalize existing standards. Often they propose new standards, new norms and patterns of conduct for observance by the groups. This means, among other things that those engaged in ethical evaluation must be willing to pursue the implications of the issues wherever they lead to. They lead afar encompassing considerations of, among others, duty, responsibility, equality, justice, rights, legitimate authority and benefit.

Ethical deliberation begins with specific problems of individuals facing a choice and being uncertain about what to do. These problems can be big or small, great or low, physical or spiritual, personal or family, social or political and the like. Every human being faces one or the other of these problems and deliberates to some extent in search of a satisfactory solution.

Ethical deliberation, to be informed and intelligent, involves proper analysis and appreciation of facts related to the issues. Ethical perplexity and disagreement among different individuals is mainly because of ignorance or disputes about the facts. In such deliberation we appeal to the principles, which our society has presumably accepted and as such we accept. But in many cases, we find these principles in conflict with each other. Ethical deliberation involves sorting out these principles and weighing one against the other. This is indeed a more difficult task than ordinarily realized.

In an individual's ethical deliberation, public opinion plays a very important role both directly and indirectly in view of the fact that an individual is an integral part of the society.

After ascertaining the facts, after sorting and weighing the principles at stake and after applying partially principles – written and unwritten, it is necessary to make a decision. Much of ethical deliberation consists in coming to know one's own mind. This stage precedes the final step to make up one's mind and act thereon. It is generally understood that a moral problem, as it arises, consists in bringing oneself to do what one considers being right. However, most ethical philosophers consider that ethics is not primarily concerned with getting people to do what they believe to be right, but rather with helping them to decide what is right.

Ethical theory thus constitutes the basis of ethical deliberation. This attempts to state and evaluate principles by which ethical problems may be solved. Ethical theorist articulates the principles that will tell us the right thing to do in a given situation, or to decide what is right, or what things are worth doing. He has no concern whether the individuals or the groups approve or disapprove of the course of action indicated on ethical grounds. Ethical theory is not concerned with what public opinion is actually about on moral matters in a given situation, but with what public opinion ought to be.

Moral virtues such as liberality, temperance, benevolence, charity come about as a result of habit. That is why its name *ethike – ethics* is derived from the word *ethos* (habit). It, therefore, follows that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature. For nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. Nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another way. In a way, we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.

Man has rights because he is 'a *person* - a spiritual being, a whole unto himself, a being that exists for itself or itself that wills its own proper perfection. Therefore, and for *that very reason*, something *is* due to man in the fullest sense, *for that reason* he does inalienably have a *suum*, a 'right' which he can plead against everyone else, a right which imposes upon every one of his partners the obligation at least not to violate it… Man has inalienable rights because he is created a person by the act of God', in the words of Pieper.

'Rights of man' denote what is right for man to strive for. Unfortunately, 'rights' are usually employed to mean a mysterious prescriptive right to claim. A person is defined as a self-conscious, self-objectifying, rational being, in a sense of rational which sees 'reason' as a constructive, organizing principle of thought, not simply as an abstracting instrument of analysis in the service of the passions.

Ethics is, therefore, 'the discipline dealing with what is good and bad, or right and wrong, or moral duty and obligation… a group of moral principles or set of values and the principles of conduct governing an individual or a profession, or standards of behavior', consistent with the inalienable rights that inhere in him. The word 'conduct' implies only persons in as much as only persons *conduct* themselves, while animals behave, machines function and stars move.

11. Evolution of Ethics

Principles

Moral principles or demands are not personal convictions. They are the usages, customs and norms, etc, which are broadly termed the rules on which our common life depends. The evaluation of these rules is the main problem of ethics. These detailed systems are in the background of every ethical deliberation. These systems constitute the written codes and customary practices that comprise our legal system. The legal system defines their power and the stage. Many of these rules bear heavy sanctions. Various associations institute their own methods of reward and punishment for overt and covert acts of their constituent members.

From the point of view of the individual, these rules are forces to be reckoned with. It is true that people may undertake to change them in minor ways. But for the most part, they have to accept them and live within the limits prescribed under the said rules. Even if one considers that one is in revolt against the existing system, one cannot do away with the rules of the system as long as one is part of the system. An individual is part of a highly complex institutional system that becomes functional only on the basis of the rules, which the same individual denounces for his own reasons. The seeds of change are, however, built into the system. When a large number of people consciously consider the need for change of any of the rules governing the system, conscious acceptance of a change in the rules brings about a change in the system itself.

Most of the rules of a society are not explicitly and expressly formulated. We know of them by observing how people act, by listening to the leaders of the community – religious, spiritual, social and political, in a way submitting in some measure to the discipline of recognized authorities. To see the location of the ethical problem we are faced with, it becomes necessary for each of us to formulate the principles that we consider are at issue. This is not always easy. People are generally sensitive to the existence of an ethical problem, but they may not be able to focus on the issues with clarity.

How does ethical theory or philosophy proceed in formulating its principles? It is an intellectual discipline. Like other such disciplines, it is difficult to make it intelligible to anyone who is not familiar with it. The search for general standards of value and of conduct is the central task of ethics. Eminent ethical philosophers have, in different ages and regions, sought to introduce general principles that apply to a great variety of cases. They try to deduce principles for evaluating alternative standards from pithy axioms, just as the mathematician tries to deduce theorems from a few basic assumptions. Jesus Christ, Kant, Spinoza, among others in the West, Manu, Confucius, Sri Sathya Sai, among others in the East, have enunciated pithy axioms that deduce principles for evaluation of ethical standards that apply generally for their respective ages.

An ethical philosopher is not contented merely to formulate ethical principles. He seeks to justify them or at least to demonstrate that they are reasonable and

effective. A system of ethical principles is acceptable only if it is consistent within itself. In a complex theory where it is possible to argue for acceptance of opposite ends, inconsistency is difficult to perceive. It is, therefore, necessary to formulate the principles with care and exactitude, spelling out their consequences for critical scrutiny.

Besides internal consistency, ethical philosophers are to take into account the natural and the social sciences and attempt to deduce their principles to mirror the moral experience of their age and region. In trying to do justice to the moral convictions of their culture and age, moral theorists may interpret them in their own way, with adequate scope for difference of opinion as to their very convictions. Indeed, they may seek to criticize bulk of the present day convictions on high moral ground with a view to guiding the people on the right path for achievement of the desired ethical ends.

Further, ethical philosophers may relate ethical principles to other fields of enquiry. It often turns out that ethical principles are involved in the principles of other disciplines. For example, Karl Marx's theory that the value of a commodity is measured by the amount of labour required to produce it is in reality an ethical principle, which was used as an instrument of political revolution. One important aspect of the relations of ethics to other disciplines is that, on the one hand, philosophers attempt to uncover the values that underlie various disciplines while, on the other hand, they seek the ethical principles that may be implicit in other disciplines. One view is that ethical evaluations are embodied in all opinions of all disciplines, as much as an evaluation is embodied in the economic theory of Karl Marx.

A characteristic of all enquiry is that as questions are formulated more and more clearly, their answers are sought in unexpected directions. The history of science is replete with such instances, may be with such instances only. As philosophers raise questions as to justification of ethical principles, their quest for answers takes them far away from ethics proper. This only confirms the familiar saying that an answer to a question begets further questions.

Though not all, some ethical philosophers consider that ethics shall include moral persuasion and ethical methodology. Moral persuasion is the attempt to induce someone's attitude toward particular ethical principles. It includes moralizing and exhortation explaining the rationale for particular moral action in a given situation.

This shall not be confused with employing propagandist methods. Nor is moral persuasion to be treated as a special pleading for an uncritically accepted moral position. Moral persuasion is legitimate and socially valuable. In the absence of moral persuasion, there is no way to sharpen our perception of the issues involved in an ethical question.

Effective moral philosophers do not tell us what principles they favor. Indeed they do not assume any moral position at all. They indicate application of ethical principles through their very actions. The lives of such men and women are the ethical

and moral messages they convey. The lives of Jesus Christ and Sri Sathya Sai are such examples.

The moral persuasion adopted by ethical philosophers is generally through their writings, talks, etc. Much of the world's literature that explores the human situation, standing the test of time is moralistic. In so far as philosophers try to convince their readers of the truth of the ethical principles they formulate, they enter the territory of the moralist. The techniques of moral persuasion are an important factor in the justification of their principles. For practical ethical philosophers, there may be no borderline between ethics and moral persuasion.

Morality is thought to pertain to the conduct of human affairs and relations among human beings on the one hand and between human beings and the state on the other. Morality is considered related to religion in the sense that belief in God, as Kant says, 'rewards the righteous and punishes the wicked' is necessary to ensure full moral commitment.

However intertwined, morality and religion are considered distinct. Morality is usually thought of as a way of regulating the conduct of individuals in communities. It represents a response to the problem of cooperation among competing persons or groups and aims at settling disputes that may arise in social contexts. Force also represents a method of adjudicating conflicts. But morality differs from force by appealing to principles or rules of conduct that are regarded as legitimate. It amounts to establishing a justification potentially acceptable to each member of the community. This is in the context of a perceived social responsibility towards those who, for no fault of theirs, are seriously disadvantaged. Moral legitimation may sometimes involve appeal to shared religious beliefs to secure acceptance. But this is not a necessary aspect of moral justification, which can appeal to reason or to considerations of human welfare.

Moral norms are considered as among the most authoritative guides to conduct. This means that the dictates of morality take precedence over self-oriented or prudential considerations. The presumption that something is morally wrong is a sufficient ground to refrain from doing it. Thus human reason becomes the final forum of judgment, as to subordinate reason to other considerations is to renounce the very possibility of rational action.

The perspective of impartiality in social relationships is called the moral point of view. Varying moral approaches seek to integrate into the moral point of view for choice in decision-making.

Evolution

Ethics evolves, as it is part of the evolutionary process. Standards of rightness or wrongness are in some way to be related to the movement of that process through time.

Evolution is an all-comprehensive process of which human existence forms a part. Evolution from cosmic stardust to the present human society is a comprehensive and continuous process. It transforms continuously the matter as well as the potentialities of mind. It is creative. During the process of transformation, new and more complex organizations are progressively evolved and new possibilities are opened up.

Increase in the organization is generally gradual, but on occasions there is sudden rapid passage to a totally new and more comprehensive type of organization. This kind of organization involves new emergent properties and quite new methods of further evolution. Two such occasions are creation of life from inorganic matter and of man from pre-human life. Biological and organic evolution was rendered both possible and inevitable when material organization became self-reproducing.

When life arrived on earth from inorganic matter, it was characterized by very great material complexity and by the capacity for self-reproductive evolution. On this new level, the evolutionary process was much accelerated in time due to the emergence of a new agency of evolution called Natural Selection as enunciated by Darwin.

During about a billion years of organic evolution, the degree of organization attained by the highest forms of life including human species increased enormously, with the increase in the possibilities of control, of independence, of inner harmony and of experience. In certain types of animals, there had come about an increase in consciousness or mind. Biologists consider that mind is a gradual development of some universal property of the world-stuff on our planet. Higher organizational levels of life such as some birds and mammals have the same general nature of mind as of human beings. In these organizational levels of life, there has been a steady evolution of mental faculty towards greater capacities for feeling, knowing, willing and understanding. In human species, mind has attained very high development.

There is thus a direction within the multifariousness of evolution, which can be legitimately called progress. It consists in the capacity to attain a higher degree of organization without, however, closing the door to further advance. In the organic phase of evolution, this depends on all-round improvement as opposed to the limited improvement or specialization. Such limited improvement or one-sided specialization may lead to a dead end after which no advance is possible. For instance, insects are stated to have reached an evolutionary dead end over 30 million years ago, and birds a little later. Most evolutionary trends that we notice are specializations, which either come to a stop or are extinguished.

In the last half-million years or so a new and more comprehensive order of organization has arisen. On this new level, the world-stuff is once more introduced

totally to new possibilities with new methods of evolutionary operation at its disposal. Biological evolution has been merged into and succeeded by conscious or social evolution.

The ancestral man became capable of true speech and conceptual thought. It became possible to transmit conscious experience on the vehicle of words and other symbols over a period of time. Reason made possible the pooling of individual experiences. For the first time in evolution, tradition and education became continuous and cumulative processes. With this development, a self-reproducing society came into being as a new type of organization.

The mechanism of evolution has been transferred on to the conscious or social level. Part of the struggle for existence between separate individuals or groups is transposed into conflict in consciousness either in individual mind or the tradition of the group. The slow methods of variation and heredity are over-taken by the speedier processes of acquisition and transmission of experience. Physical trial and error are more and more transposed to the sphere of thought.

As the mechanism of evolution becomes conscious, ethics gets injected into the evolutionary process. Before man came on to the scene, that process was just amoral. With the emergence of man on the stage of biological evolution, it became possible to introduce faith, courage, love of truth, goodness, that is to say, moral purpose, into evolution.

The attainment of the social type of organization opens an indefinite range of possibilities to the evolving world-stuff. It leads to an understanding of what exists in the cosmos and of the conflicts it is to endure. It can create and appreciate consciously beauty, truth and other values. It becomes aware of good and evil. It becomes capable of new emotional states of love, reverence, happiness and peace. It can inject some of its own purpose into events. All its experiences will have inherent value. Through the attainment of this new level of conscious and social organization, the evolutionary process has taken a new and apparently indefinite lease of life.

12. Faculty of Human Mind

Human mind has four states. The highest is intelligence; the second is thinking; the third is belief and the last is imagining. These four states are to be arranged in a proportion, assigning to each a degree of clearness and certainty corresponding to the measure in which their objects possess truth and reality.

Intelligence determines the power of the mind. By the knowledge of the mind we shall determine the remedies against the emotions. From this knowledge of the mind alone we are to deduce everything that relates to blessedness.

Spinoza makes a detailed analysis of the power of mind, emotions and the role of the knowledge of the mind in relation to the emotions, etc. An important truth is that the power of an emotion is limited by the power of its cause, in so far as the essence of the emotion is manifested or limited by the essence of the cause itself.

As thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind, exactly so are the modifications of the body or the images of things arranged and connected in the body. If we detach an emotion from the thought of an external cause and connect it with other thoughts, then the love or hatred toward the external cause and the fluctuations of the mind arising from these emotions will be destroyed.

An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it. In other words, the more an emotion is in our control, the less does the mind suffer from it. There is no modification of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. It follows that there is no emotion of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception, for an emotion is an idea of a modification of the body.

Everything that exists has an effect. We understand clearly and distinctly everything that flows from an idea, which is adequate in us. It is, therefore, a necessary consequence that everyone has the power, at least in part, of understanding clearly and distinctly himself and his emotions. Also he brings it to pass to suffer less from the emotions.

We have, therefore, to strive to acquire a clear and distinct knowledge as far as possible of each emotion. This is to enable the mind to pass from the emotion to think those things that it perceives clearly and distinctly and with which it is entirely satisfied. The mind is also to be led to strive to separate the emotion from the thought of an external cause, and get connected with true thoughts. This enables that the emotions of love, hatred, etc be destroyed and that the desires to which the emotions give rise cannot be excessive. All the desires or appetites are passions only in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas. And they are classed among the virtues whenever they are excited or begotten by adequate ideas. As the mind possesses the power of thinking and forming adequate ideas, the remedy for the emotions in our power consists in possessing a true knowledge of them.

In so far as the mind understands all things as necessary, so far has it greater power over the emotions, or suffers less from them. The mind can cause all the modifications of the body or the images of things to be related to the idea of God. He, who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions, loves God. The more he loves Him, the better he understands himself and his emotions. In other words, he who clearly understands himself and his emotions rejoices. His joy is attended with the idea of God. Therefore, he loves God. The more he loves God, the more he understands himself.

This love of God above everything else ought to occupy the mind. God is free from passions, nor is He affected with any emotion of joy or sorrow. He who loves God cannot strive that God should love him in return. This love of God cannot be defiled either by the emotion of envy or jealously. The more people imagine to be connected with God by the same bond of love, the more is this love of God strengthened. Incidentally there is no emotion directly contrary to this love and able to destroy it. We may, therefore, say that this love of God is the most constant of all the emotions.

'It is, therefore, clear that the power of the mind over the emotions consists in the knowledge itself of the emotions; in the separation by the mind of the emotions from the thought of an external cause which we may imagine in confusion; in duration in which the modifications related to objects we understand, surpass those related to objects conceived in a confused manner; in the multitude of causes by which the modifications related to God are nourished; and in the order in which the mind can arrange its emotions and connect them one with the other'.

We realize the power of the mind over the emotions when we compare the emotion of one man with that of another or one emotion with another of the same person and discover that a person is affected or moved by one emotion more than another.

The power of any emotion is limited by the power of the external cause as compared with our own power. But the power of the mind is limited solely by knowledge. Passion is estimated solely by privation of knowledge. In other words, that through which ideas are called inadequate estimates it. Therefore, it follows that mind suffers the most when its largest part consists of inadequate ideas wherein it is distinguished by what it suffers rather than by what it does. On the other hand, the mind acts the most when its largest part consists of adequate ideas distinguished by those belonging to human virtue rather than human passion or impotence.

Again, our sorrows and misfortunes mainly proceed from too much love toward an object which is subject to many changes, and which we can never possess. No one is troubled or anxious about any object one does not love. Similarly no wrongs, suspicions, hatred etc arise except from love towards objects of which no one can be truly the possessor.

The foregoing clearly establishes the power of the clear and the distinct knowledge of the mind over the emotions in so far as they are passions, to make them constitute the smallest part of the mind, if not actually to eliminate them. On the other

hand, it begets a love toward an eternal object of which we really partake, a Love not vitiated by what we normally call love. It can always become greater and greater, occupy the largest part of the mind and thoroughly affect it.

It is stated that what is present to the mind is its perceptions. All the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, thinking, etc belong to this category. Judgments by which we distinguish moral good and evil also belong to this category. To approve of one character, to condemn another, are only so many different perceptions.

Perceptions are of two kinds - impressions and ideas. We distinguish between virtue and vice and pronounce an action praiseworthy or blamable by means of our ideas. Some consider that virtue is conformity to reason; that there are external conditions of things that are the same to all rational beings; that the immutable measure of right and wrong imposes an obligation on all human beings. All these systems occur in the opinion that morality, like truth, is discerned merely by ideas and their comparison. To judge of these systems, we need to consider whether, by reason, we can distinguish between moral good and evil or whether we need some other principles to make that distinction.

Morals and the feelings of love and hatred have their origin in mind. They arise in mental qualities. Consideration of the principles such as sympathy, justice, etc throws considerable light on these aspects.

The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations. Whatever affects one will find its echo in some degree among all others. This is like a motion of a string communicating itself to the rest of the strings equally wound up. The affections readily pass from one to another and beget corresponding moments in every human creature. When I perceive the causes of any emotion, my mind is conveyed to the effects and is actuated with a like emotion. No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are sensible of its effects or causes. From them we infer the passion. These causes and effects generate in us what we call *sympathy*.

13. Ethical Mechanism

Ethics is not an entity. It constitutes the results of the workings of a particular psychological mechanism. This is what we call an ethical mechanism. This mechanism is an agency for securing that certain of our feelings, thoughts and actions shall be consciously felt and judged to have the qualities of rightness or wrongness. It gives us what we call moral sense. This sense of rightness or wrongness based on emotions helps to determine our actions and potential actions based on sentiments, beliefs and principles. The moral sense does not, however, guarantee that the feelings it comes across are correct, or that its judgments are objectively valid.

The ethical mechanism serves as a supporting psychological framework. It is like our skills, habits, likes, dislikes, conditioned reflexes, etc. Its peculiarity is that it charges all feelings, thoughts and actions passing through it with the special emotive qualities of rightness or wrongness.

Ethics evolves in an individual since infancy. The development of ethical mechanism in an individual is comparable to the growth of an individual from the stage of the ovum. The ovum has no ethics, as it has no backbone. Ethics, like a backbone, comes out of non-existence into existence in each individual development. As the backbone of an adult stiffens around the notochord of an infant, so the normal infant develops a forerunner for the moral stiffening of adult ethics. The psychoanalysts call it super ego. Julian Huxley calls it the photo-ethical mechanism.

The notochord in an infant appears to be formed in the beginning of the second year of the postnatal life of the infant. It is said to arise as the result of a special kind of conflict among the unregulated impulses the infant is endowed with.

Studies in psychology since the days of Frued give a graphic account of the ethical dialectic since the birth of an infant. The primal desire of the newborn is undisturbed tranquility of mere existence. But the inevitable deprivations and discomforts disturbing the tranquility lead to the emotion of rage. This is what causes the infant howl in rage which is itself disturbing, for the infant feels threatened and over-mastered by its own aggressiveness, as Flugel describes it.

This primal desire for undisturbed existence in the outer world remains as a permanent component of the individual's emotional setup. There is always a temptation to regress towards this infantile shelter and peace or to attain an equivalent for it, either in surrender to some real or imagined authority or in some essentially regressive escape.

Meanwhile, the primal reaction of frustrated rage itself provokes a further reaction. At this stage the infant makes no distinction between self and 'not self'. It confuses the impotent but sinister rage with the objects in the outer world, which have provoked it. It takes then the first step what psychologists call projection. The infant tinges outside objects with its own emotional hues and passions. As the self begins to get demarcated from the outer reality, the tendency is for the infant to project its own evil on to outer objects, including other persons considering the self – good and

pleasant. At about this stage, the first step is taken towards the setting up of our ethical mechanism in the shape of the semi physiological morality associated with the restraint of excretions.

As the infant begins to grow, as a baby, it draws a distinction between itself and the outer reality. It is the mother or the efficient mother-substitute that represents the outer reality or the external world mediating its impacts on the child. The mother, with the father at a later stage, impacts on the growing consciousness of the child in two opposite aspects. She is its chief object of love. She is also its source of satisfaction, security and peace. On the other hand, the mother is considered the Authority, the chief source of power mysteriously set over the child and arbitrarily suffering its impulses projected towards the external world.

The frustration of the impulses of the child generates hate, anger and destructive wishes in the child. This is what the psychoanalysts call aggression diverted against the thwarting authority. But this authority hated is also the mother loved.

The child is thus faced with the primal conflict. Two opposite sets of impulses are directed towards the same object, and this object is the centre of the external world for the child. As Flugel puts it, 'it is man's unique and inevitable tragedy, due to his long period of helpless infancy, that he is compelled to hate those whom also he most loves – a condition which is to some extent continued throughout life in his relations with his own super-ego, which is a centre to which both love and hate are directed and from which love and hate emanate'. In this case the qualities of the parents are injected from without, to become part of the structure of the child's mind, which the psychoanalysts call introjection.

The parents have to exercise control over the child, and in so doing are to be strict, even harsh and will sometimes appear even cruel. Their actual strictness is compounded with the child's own thwarted aggressiveness. Thus the dialectic of growth even at this stage succeeds in introjecting a parent figure very different from the real parent. In this way, it appears that the proto-ethical mechanism acquires its own alarming and barbaric features. This appears why the semi-conscious or the unconscious core of the mechanism is so harsh and severe calling all the time upon the self to make atonement for its load of primal guilt.

The conflict is normally won by love. The aggression of the child including the fantasies of death wishes gets tinged with the quality of guilt, in other words, called wrongness, merges into love the child feels for its parents. Hate, anger, etc occasionally emerge into action in the form of rage or temper. For the most part, the psychoanalysts say, they are either suppressed into the background of consciousness, or wholly repressed into the unconscious. If repressed, part of the emotion of guilt accompanies them into the unconscious. In the unconscious, they continue to exist. Though refused conscious recognition, they constantly demand an outlet in some form, overt or covert.

Julian Huxley characterizes the proto-ethical mechanism or super ego thus: 'The proto-ethical mechanism may be considered as a special adaptation to the

peculiar conditions of human infancy. Owing to the plastic and decompartmentalized nature of human mind, man is faced with different kinds of conflicts to which other animal species are not subject. When adult, he can generally arrive at their resolution in action, with the aid of reason and experience. But the infant is unable to solve them rationally or even consciously for lack of a requisite basis of experience. In the infant action is secured by the evolution of nervous machinery whereby one of the conflicting impulses is inhibited when the other comes into action. This occurs on the muscular level, the reflex level and the instinctual level. This kind of mechanism operates in animal behaviour. In an infant this operates on the highest level of thought and behaviour by repression or later by suppression.'

From the biological point of view, the proto-ethical mechanism is in part an adaptation for securing action instead of indecision in the face of conflict, particularly for securing one kind of action rather than another. It is an adaptation for choosing between the conflicting impulses. In the process a load of guilt gets attached to one of them, thereby securing full or partial acceptance of the other. There is always some true repression involved in the formation of the proto-ethical mechanism for every child. But the amount will vary from one child to another depending upon the inherited temperament and more upon its relations with its mother.

What each child generally inherits is a capacity to build up this mechanism. Its 'intuitions' as to what constitutes right or wrong are derived from the outer reality largely mediated through its mother. The parents' demands for control over primitive impulses of the child give rise to infantile ethics embodying the shock of the child's discovery of a world outside itself not amenable to its wishes. Out of this primal conflict grows the beginning of ethics. Primitive love conquers primitive hate by saddling it with the burden of the primal guilt. With this, the polarity of right and wrong becomes attached to thoughts and actions of an individual.

The infant's personality incorporates, by inescapable heredity, a multitude of impulses many of which are bad and violent. It is only the helplessness of the infant that prevents us from realizing the extent and strength of evil it contains. This accounts the amount of badness, which every human nature has to cope during its development in adult life.

Psychoanalysts observe that one unrealistic quality of the child's mind is its belief in the 'omnipotence of thought'. It is the confusion of wish with fulfillment and the feeling that its all-powerful impulses are to achieve their aim. When this feeling is associated with violent hate and aggression towards mother or father, the child is haunted by the half-unconscious fear that it has somehow destroyed its parent or something essential in the parent and so lost the love and support, which the child realizes, is essential, once its rage is past. This horror of loss, this fear of withdrawal of external support may last through the rest of its life. This is further accentuated by an actual coldness or physical absence of the parent. If any disasters visit the individual in later life, he or she may attribute them to divine wrath. The infantile 'omnipotence of thought' may also haunt in adult life in the belief of what is called wish-fulfillment of all kinds.

The child is endowed by nature with unlimited desires. But as it grows up, it realizes that they can be satisfied only to a limited extent. The child's earliest thoughts are not backed by experience and reason. When the thought comes to realization, it must be adjusted to external reality. The child must learn to incorporate experience with the aid of reason. It is beset by conflicts, both external and internal, which must in some measure be resolved before the child can think clearly and act decisively.

The mind of the child is, thus, chaos in conflict with itself. With the formation of the primitive super-ego or proto-ethical mechanism, it develops a definite and relatively permanent structure.

It is true that none of us generally remembers this first stage in our moral development. Part of it can be retrieved through special psychoanalytical procedures. Recent studies in what is called hypnotic regression establish the possibility of retrieving the moral, mental and spiritual attitudes of the early infancy and even the earlier lives of an individual. Basically the proto-ethical mechanism is an intellectual construction based on scientific psychological studies.

Every normal individual, therefore, carries a certain load of unconscious guilt from early childhood as it has been totally repressed by the primitive super-ego. It is not, however, unconscious, though not active, for guilt is a form of psychological tension and, therefore, seeks to discharge itself to reduce its tensional stress. Secondly, the same type of tension is consciously produced in relation to the events of life by the super-ego or the conscience of the individual. The super-ego operates by generating a sense of guilt, when our actions do not square with the results of the super-ego's mechanism for judging and feeling the rightness or wrongness of thoughts and acts.

This conscious guilt can reinforce or be reinforced by the permanent load of unconscious guilt carried from the childhood. The tension can be eased by favourable circumstances, as it can be increased by unfavourable circumstances such as frustrations resulting from loneliness, failure, disappointment and the like.

Once the moral sense is developed, the developing human being can continue to tilt the balance of action and thought, by means of the ethical forces now at his disposal – the moral load of guilt or felt wrongness, the moral supposition of felt rightness. The developing human being now reaches a stage that is crucial and decisive in the field of ethics. His microcosm has developed a moral structure. In doing so, he has introduced morality into the macrocosm - morality with all its accompaniments such as right and wrong, good and bad, sin and saintliness, vice and virtue, guilt and expiation.

It is thus seen that the human beings achieve an internal ethical realism. It is better to be realistic in one's ethics than being unrealistic. In the proper adjustment of sense of guilt to reality, one element of our ethics seems to get validated.

14. Moral Organism

The *individual* man who does not include relation to others of his community, in his very being, is a fiction. For example, a child is not born merely as a member of a family. It is born into other spheres such as nationality, race, religion, language, social tradition, etc. The being of a child is in conformity with the community into which it is born.

A man is not a mere individual. To know what a man is, we must not take him in isolation. In short, man is a social being. He is real only because he is social. He can realize himself only because it is as social that he realizes himself. The mere individual is a delusion of theory. Any attempt to seek realization in isolation is the mutilation of human nature.

The practical person who is moral is at peace with reality. He becomes reconciled to the world and to life. Evils do not discourage him. He comforts himself with the thought that superficial views lie in the head, not in the heart. He sees the true account of the state, which holds it to be neither mere force nor convention, but the moral organism, the real identity of might and right. He sees the heart of a nation rise high in the bosom of each one of its citizens till its safety and honour are dearer to each than his own life.

Each individual knows that what is stronger than death is hate or love, hate for love's sake, and that love does not fear death. The state lives. It is the objective mind, which is subjective and self-conscious in its citizens. It feels and knows itself in the heart of each. It speaks the word of command and gives the field of accomplishment. In the activity of obedience to it, it bestows on individuals access to life of satisfaction and happiness.

The community is the real moral organism, which, in its members, knows and wills itself, and sees the individuals to be real. Morality exists all round it. It faces the individual members with the categorical imperative on one side and surrounds them with love on the other.

The belief in this real moral organism is the one solution of ethical problems. It denies despotism and individualism, while it preserves their truth. Unless we have intense faith and self-consciousness in the members of the community and the state, the state is ossified; the truth of individualism is saved. Unless each member realizes the whole by and in him, he fails to realize his own individuality; the truth of despotism is saved.

Generally considered, the best communities are those that have the best men for their members. Reversely, the best men are the members of the best communities. This is not a vicious circle. The two problems of the best man and the best community are two distinct aspects of the same problem as to how to realize in human nature the perfect unity of homogeneity and specification. Each of these without the other is unreal. Personal morality, political and social institutions cannot exist apart. They thrive or suffer together. The community is moral because it realizes personal

morality. Personal morality is moral because, and in so far as, it realizes the moral whole.

The moral organism is not a mere animal organism. In the moral organism, the member knows himself and, therefore, knows the whole in him. The narrow external function of the man is not the whole man. He has a life of his own and he seeks its realization knowingly. What counts for him is not the visible outer work so much as the spirit in which it is done. The breadth of one's life is not measured by the multitude of one's pursuits, but by the fullness of whole life one lives. It is true that less and less depends on each of us, as this or that man, as the community is more and more organized. That does not mean that the individuality of each is, therefore, lessened.

A question arises, 'how do I get to know in particular what is right and wrong'? The problem is to be approached from a concept of the role of moral philosophy. Philosophers, in general, are agreed that all philosophy has to do is 'to understand what is'. Moral philosophy has to understand morals, which exist in a given society and at a given time, but not to make them or to direct making them. Ethics does not have to make the world moral, but to reduce to theory the morality current in the world at the given time. If we consider that moral philosophy is to supply us with particular moral prescriptions, it confuses reflective with intuitive judgment. That which tells us what is right or wrong in particular is not reflection but intuition.

We know what is right in a particular case by an immediate judgment or intuitive understanding. We are to recognize first that moral judgments are not discursive. Secondly, they do start from and rest on a certain basis. And if we put the two together, we see that what we call intuitive understanding evolves to do what is right.

Our ordinary way of judging in morals is not by reflection and explicit reasoning. But these judgments are not isolated impressions. They stand in an intimate and vital relation to a certain system, which is their basis. Different people in different societies and also in the same society may judge issues differently. Generally we know why they do so. Each group may have subsumed intuitively the issues in its own way. Every man has the morality he has made his own, in his mind. He sees, feels or judges accordingly though he does not explicitly reason from data to a conclusion. On the intellectual side, our moral judgments are intuitive subsumptions.

For this reason, according to Nietzsche, there is no place for moral judgment in relation to one's acts. For, there are altogether no moral facts. Morality is merely an interpretation, may be, misinterpretation of certain phenomenon. Moral judgments, like religious ones, belong to a stage of ignorance at which the very concept of the real and the distinction between what is real and imaginary is lacking. Truth is nothing but 'imaginings'. Moral judgments are, therefore, not to be taken literally, as they contain some absurdity. But for those who know, they reveal the most valuable realities of cultures and inwardness. For them they remain invaluable. Morality is thus a mere sign language, mere symptomatology. One will be able to profit from it, if one knows all about it.

The end of morality for the ruling class, ironically, is to 'improve' common man. By improvement is understood taming of the man and the breeding of a particular kind of man. For example, beasts are 'improved' in menageries. What is done there is that the beasts are weakened and they are made less harmful. Through the depressive effect of fear, pain, wounds and hunger, they become sickly beasts. It is no different if man is tamed in the name of 'improvement'.

If a man is to know what is right, he should have imbibed by precept and example the spirit of his community, its special and general beliefs as to right and wrong. With this whole embodied in his mind, he should articulate it in any arising case, not by reflective deduction, but by intuitive subsumption.

Every act has many sides, many relations and many points of view from which it may be regarded. As such it has many qualities. There are always several principles under which one can bring an act, and as such there is not the smallest difficulty in exhibiting it as the realization of either right or wrong.

No act in the world is without some side capable of being subsumed under a good rule. For example, theft can be considered as economy, care for one's relations, protest against bad institutions, etc. Similarly cowardice is prudence and duty, courage, rashness and a vice, and so on. We have principles of all sorts like these and each case has all sorts of sides. Which side is the essential one, and which principle is the right one, rests in the end on one's private choice. No reasoning can say which moral point of view here is right.

But the ordinary moral judgment is not a discursive one. It does not look to the right or the left, nor does it consider the case from all sides, and consciously subsume one principle. When the case is presented, it fixes on one quality in the act, referring that unconsciously to one principle in which it feels the whole of itself, and sees the whole in a single side of the act. So far as right and wrong are concerned, it perceives nothing except this quality of the case. It refuses to try to perceive anything else.

Practical morality is single mindedness and having one idea only. The way to corrupt the morality of any person is, on the side of principle, to confuse him by forcing him to see in all moral and immoral acts other sides and points of view, which alter the character of each. Similarly on the side of particulars, it is to force him to warp his instinctive apprehension through personal affection for himself or some other individual.

We realize that there is some causal process in nature and organic connection between events and things in the lives of people. Our ego is not loose and separate from the universe; it is not a law unto itself above the moral dharma and, in many respects, above the natural law of causality.

15. Religious Consciousness and Morality

Reflection on morality leads us to see the necessity of a religious point of view. It tells us that morality is not all perfect, and is in such way as implies a higher, that is religion.

The dictates of religion, in the context of the diversity of religions, are extremely variable. On the mention of religion, people's first thoughts turn naturally to the religion they themselves profess. This is a source of miscalculation. The dictates of true religion coincide, in all cases, with those of felicity or utility.

Morality issues in religion. Everyone sees some kind of connection between true religion and morality. A man who is religious and does not act morally is an imposter. Religion is not the mere knowing or contemplating of an object, however high. Religion is essentially a doing, a doing which is moral. It implies a realizing, and a realizing of the good self.

Morality is not religion. In morality, the ideal is always a 'to be'. The reality in us and the world is partial and inadequate. No one will ever be able to say that it will answer to the ideal. 'Morally considered, both the world and we are all we ought to be, and ought to be just what we are'. We have at best the belief in an ideal, which, in its pure completeness, is never possible of realization. All morality is, in one sense or another, touched by emotion.

Religion is more than morality. In the religious consciousness we find the belief in an object, a not-myself; an object, which is real. It may be vague and indistinct, but still an object. An ideal that is not real cannot be the object of religion. Because it is unreal, the ideal of personal morality is not enough for religion.

Religion must have an object. In that object is not an abstract idea in the mind, nor one particular thing or quality. It is not even a collection of such things or qualities. In short, it is nothing finite. It cannot be a thing or person in the world. It cannot exist in the world as a part of it, or as this or that course of events in time. It cannot be the *All* – the sum of things or persons, in the ordinary sense, since, if one is not divine, no putting of ones together will beget divinity.

Its positive character is that it is real. In the religious consciousness we find that it is the ideal self considered as realized and real, while in morality it is 'to be'. The ideal self here is real and truly is. This is the nature of the religious object, though the manner of apprehending it may differ widely. It may be anything from a vague instinct to the most thoughtful reflection.

In the very essence of the religious consciousness, we find the relation of our will to the real ideal self. 'We find ourselves, as this or that will, against the object as the real ideal will, which is not ourselves, and which stands to us in such a way that, though real, it is to be realized, because it is all and the whole reality'.

The object of religion, which the self appropriates by faith, is the inseparable unity of human and divine. It is the ideal, which, as will, affirms itself in and by will. It is will, which is one with the ideal. It is known in its truth when it is apprehended as an organic human-divine totality, as one body with diverse members, as one self, which realizes, wills and loves itself in many selves.

For faith, this object is the only real one. Faith involves the belief that the course of the external world, in spite of appearances, is the realization of the ideal will, and that on the inner side, the human and the Divine are one. In other words, faith involves the belief that the world is the realization of humanity as a divine organic whole, and that, with that whole, the inner wills of particular persons are identified. Faith holds that there is an organism that realizes itself in its members and also wills in those members on the subjective side, and is conscious of itself, as they will and are conscious of themselves in it.

The divine will of the religious consciousness has no content other than the moral ideal. Religion is practical. It means doing something, which is a duty. All moral duties are also religious; so all religious duties are also moral. In order to be, religion must do. Its practice is the realization of the ideal in one and the world. If the religion is separated from the real world, it has nothing left to do. It simply becomes a form.

The practical content which religion carries out comes from the state, society, art, science, etc. But the whole of this sphere is the sphere of morality. All duties there are moral. When it is so, then it is possible that one religious duty may collide with another religious duty, just as moral duties may collide with one another. But, religion as such does not collide with morality.

Morality survives within religion, as the process of realization. As mere morality, it vanishes. As an element, it remains and is stimulated. Practical faith is the end in religion. Religion issues in the practical realizing of the reconcilement. Where there is no such realization, there is no faith, and no religion. In religion, morality is consummated in oneness with God.

Religious beliefs and practices are among the factors determining the behavior of a given society. To some extent, the collective conduct of a nation is a test of the religion prevailing within it. It provides a criterion by which we may legitimately judge the doctrinal validity of that religion and its practical efficiency in helping individuals to advance towards the goal of human existence.

Those who turn to God without turning from themselves are tempted to evil in several characteristic and easily recognizable ways. First, they are tempted to practise magical rites by means of which they hope to compel God to answer their petitions and, in general, to serve their private or collective ends. The ugly practice of sacrifice, incantation etc is a product of this wish to treat God as a means to indefinite self-aggrandizement. Second, they are tempted to use the name of God to justify what they do in pursuit of fame, power and wealth. They believe themselves to have divine justification for their actions and perpetrate, may be with a good conscience, shameful

abominations. Third, there are the temptations that arise when the falsely religious begin to acquire the powers, which are the fruit of their magical practices.

It is true that sacrifice, incantation and 'vain repetition' actually do produce powers, especially when practised in conjunction with physical austerities. When men devote themselves energetically enough to their pseudo-religion, they do get results. Some of these results are the product of autosuggestion. Others are due to something in the psychic medium, which makes, not necessarily for righteousness, but always for power. It is known that people who turn towards God without turning from themselves often acquire a knack of getting their petitions answered and sometimes develop considerable supernormal powers such as those of psychic healing and extra-sensory perception. But one thing is certain. They do not reach God.

A question arises as to how far it is morally profitable to be possessed of these miraculous powers. Anyone who sacrifices anything but his own person or his own interests seeks his own advantage. What applies to sacrifice, applies equally to incantations, rituals and vain repetitions, when these are used as a form of compulsive magic. Rites and vain repetitions have a legitimate place in religion as aids to recollectedness, reminders of truth temporarily forgotten because of worldly distractions. But when spoken or performed as a kind of magic, they may be either pointless or enhance the individual ego. Either way they do not contribute to the attainment of man's social and final end.

The religious systems of the world have been built up, in the main, by men and women who were not completely selfless or enlightened. All religions have had their dark and frightful aspects. The good they do is rarely gratuitous. All the organized religions of the world have emotion-rousing doctrines and practices. They do good, but not gratuitously. The price paid varies according to the nature of the individual worshippers. Some choose emotionalism and become idolaters of feeling. Thereby they pay for the good of their religion by a spiritual evil. Others resist the temptation to self-enhancement, and mortify their self, including its emotional side, and worship God rather than their own feelings and fancies about God.

16. Ethical Theory

Ethical Law

The common element in the diversity of ethical theories is to discover some final end or good or some ultimate and supreme law. Some have held that the end is loyalty or obedience to a higher power or authority. Of them, some have found this higher principle in Divine will, some in the will of the secular ruler or state, some in the maintenance of institutions in which the purpose of superiors is embodied and some in the rational consciousness of duty. All of them are agreed on the bottom-line of a single and final source of law.

Some others have asserted that it is impossible to locate morality in conformity to law-giving power and that it must be sought in ends that are goods. Some have sought the good in self-realization, some in holiness, some in happiness, and some in the greatest aggregate of pleasures. The bottom-line of these thinkers is the assumption that there is a single, fixed and final good.

The blunt assertion that every moral situation is a unique situation having its own unique good may not hold water. A moral situation is one in which judgment and choice are required antecedently to overt action. The action needed is to be searched for. What is needed is to find the right course of action, the right good. Hence enquiry is exacted. This enquiry is intelligence. Our moral failures go back to some weakness of disposition, some absence of sympathy, some kind of bias that makes the judgment of the matter carelessly or perversely. Wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of disagreeable, balance of interests enabling us to analyze and decide intelligently are distinct moral traits - moral virtues.

The theory of fixed ends inevitably leads thought into a web of disputes that evade settlement. If there is one supreme end, what is it? There are a number of natural goods such as health, wealth, honour, good name, friendship, aesthetic appreciation, learning, moral goods such as justice, temperance, benevolence, etc. Who is to decide the right way when these ends conflict with one another? We find ourselves in the midst of unreconciled disputes with no indication of the way out.

Meanwhile, the special moral perplexities requiring the input of intelligence go unenlightened. We cannot seek or attain health, wealth, learning, justice or kindness in general. Action is always specific, concrete, unique and individualized. Consequently, judgments as to acts to be performed have to be similarly specific.

To say that a man seeks health or justice is only to say that he seeks to live healthily or justly. How to live healthily or justly is a matter that differs from person to person. Not man in general, but a particular man, for his own reasons, aims to live healthily. Consequently, health cannot mean for him exactly what it means for another individual. A man needs to be healthy in his life, not apart from it. Life is nothing but the aggregate of his pursuits and activities. An individual, therefore, aims at healthy life not as an independent or separate good, but as part of the unique end concerning his whole personality.

Moral goods and ends exist only when something has to be done. The fact that something requires to be done shows that there are deficiencies or evils in the existent situation. These deficiencies or evils are specific. None is an exact duplicate of another. As such a good of the situation has to be discovered, projected and attained on the basis of the exact defect identified for rectification. It is to be injected into the situation from within. Yet it is possible to classify corresponding goods into categories or classes based on human experience. Health, wealth, industry, temperance, amiability, courtesy, learning, aesthetic capacity, initiative, courage, patience, enterprise, thoroughness and a multitude of other generalized ends are considered as goods. But the value of this systemization is analytic. Classification of the goods suggests methods of action to be tried to tackle the perceived ills. Its value is in promoting an individualized response in a specific situation.

Morals are not a catalogue of acts, nor a set of rules to be followed mechanically. The need in morals is for specific methods of enquiry to locate difficulties and evils, and of contrivance to formulate plans of action for dealing with them. Each individualized situation calls for effective methods of enquiry and suitable plan of action.

The belief in fixed values has led to a division of ends into two categories – intrinsic and instrumental. The intrinsic values are stated to be those that are really worthwhile in themselves. The instrumental values are those that are of importance only as means to intrinsic goods. Historically, this concept has been the source and justification of a difference between ideal goods on one side and material goods on the other. Of late, intrinsic goods are considered aesthetic and instrumental goods are considered economic. The distinction, carried into practice, has had a tragic import. They become relevant only if they are woven together into the texture of daily life and made composite.

It looks necessary to do away similarly with the traditional distinction between moral goods like the moral virtues and natural goods like health, wealth, art, science and the like. The experimental logic related to morals makes every quality that is judged to be good according as it contributes to amelioration of existing ills. In so doing, it enforces the moral meaning of natural science.

Moralists usually draw a sharp line between the field of the natural sciences and the conduct that is regarded moral. But a moral that frames its judgments of value on the basis of consequences must depend upon the conclusions of science. Science is nothing but the knowledge of the relations between changes, which enable us to connect things as antecedents and consequences. The narrow scope which moralists often give to morals such as isolation of some conduct as virtuous or vicious is perpetuated by the exclusion of the subject matter of natural science from a role in formulation of moral standards and ideals. The same attitude operates in the other direction to keep natural science a technical specialty.

This leads to the consideration for avoidance of the distinction between the natural sciences and moral science. When biology, medicine, chemistry, physics, etc. contribute to the detection of concrete human woes into the development of plans for

relieving of human suffering, they become moral. They become part of the apparatus of moral enquiry or science. Natural science thus gets humanistic in quality. It is to be pursued not in a technical way for the sake of its own truth, but for being socially relevant. It is technical in the sense that it provides the technique of social and moral engineering.

When the consciousness of natural science is focused on the consciousness of the human value, the split among the material, the mechanical, the scientific and the moral ends will be done away with. Human forces that waver because of this division get unified. When morals are focused in intelligence, things intellectual are moralized. This leads to termination of the vexatious conflict between naturalism and humanism.

Deliberation

In the mind of man, appetites and aversions, hopes and fears concerning one and the same thing arise alternately. Diverse good and evil consequences of the doing or omitting the thing come into our thoughts successively. As a result, sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair or fear to attempt it. The whole sum of these desires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing is either done or thought impossible is what we call Deliberation.

Of things past there is no deliberation. But of things impossible which we think possible, we may deliberate, not knowing it is in vain. It is called deliberation – de-liberation, because it is putting an end to the liberty we had of doing or omitting according to our own appetite or aversion. Every deliberation is said to end when that whereof we deliberate is either done or thought impossible, because till then we retain the liberty of doing or omitting according to our appetite or aversion.

In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action or to the omission thereof is that we call the Will - the act, not the faculty of willing. Will is the last appetite in deliberation.

Every class of men deliberates about the things that can be done by their own efforts. Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate. We deliberate not about ends, but about means. We assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained. If it can be attained by different means, we consider by which it is most easily and best produced. If it is achieved by only one means, we deliberate how and in what way it will be achieved. Deliberation is, thus, about the things to be done by the agent himself and actions are for the sake of things other than themselves.

The same thing is deliberated upon and is chosen because it is that thing which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice. This is when the object of choice has not already been determined. The moving principle in the agent is what chooses. The objective of choice is within our own power, which is desired after deliberation. Choice, thus, is the deliberate desire of things in our power.

The end is what we wish for; the means are what we deliberate about and choose; therefore, actions concerning means must be according to choice and voluntary. The exercise of the virtues is concerned with means. Therefore, virtue is also in our power, as is vice. Where it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act, and vice-versa. If to act, where it is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will be base, will also be in our power, and vice-versa. If it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this is what being good or bad means, then it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious. This establishes that no one is involuntarily happy, but wickedness is voluntary. If, as is asserted, the virtues are voluntary, so are the vices, for the same is true of them.

Objective Morality

Ethics deals with questions such as the following, at all levels.

'How should we live? Shall we aim at happiness, knowledge and / or virtue or the creation of beautiful objects? If we choose happiness, should it be our own, or the happiness of many or all? Is it right to be dishonest for a good cause? Can we justify living in opulence while people are starving around or elsewhere? Should we disobey the law, if we do not subscribe to the objects of its enforcement? What are our obligations to our fellow beings and to other sentient creatures with which we share this planet?'

The subject of ethics consists of the fundamental issues of practical decision-making. Its major concerns include the nature of ultimate values and the standards by which human actions can be judged right or wrong.

The terms ethics and morality are closely related to each other. Ethical judgments are considered synonymous with moral judgments, and ethical principles with moral principles. These applications are considered an extension of the meaning of ethics. In the strict sense of the term, ethics refers to the field of study or branch of enquiry that has morality as its subject matter. In this sense, ethics may be considered equivalent to moral philosophy.

Although ethics is viewed as a branch of philosophy, its all-embracing practical nature links it with many other areas of study such as anthropology, sociology, theology, biology, history, economics and politics. Yet it remains distinct from such disciplines for the reason that it is not one compiled of facts, as the sciences and other disciplines of enquiry are. Rather, ethics has to do with determining the nature of normative theories and applying the sets of principles so arrived at to practical moral problems.

Ethics, as the systematic study of what we ought to do, might have come to existence when human beings started to reflect on the best way to live. This reflective stage might have emerged long after human societies had developed some kind of morality, usually in the form of customary standards of right and wrong conduct. The process of reflection might have arisen from such customs. Thus, ethics became part of social living with the introduction of the first moral codes.

It is commonly believed that there are no ethical universals, that is, there is so much variation from one culture to another that no single principle or judgment is generally accepted. Yet, concern for kin and reciprocity to those who treat us well are considered good in all human societies. Similarly all societies have, for obvious reasons, some constraints on killing and wounding other members of the group or the society. Beyond that common ground, the variations in moral attitudes are generally more striking than the similarities. Such variations are not considered an impediment for the human societies to flourish while holding radically different views about social relationships.

Ethics itself is not primarily concerned with the description of moral systems in different societies. What concerns description is anthropology or sociology. In contrast, ethics deals with the justification of moral principles.

However, some hold that ethics must take note of the variations in moral systems as this knowledge shows that morality is simply a matter of what is customary and is always relative to a particular society. According to this view, no ethical principles can be valid except in terms of the society in which they are held.

On the other hand, some others hold that there are some features common virtually to all human moralities. This concept suffers from a fallacy in that something that is universally approved does not necessarily make it right.

From the standpoint of ethics whether human moral codes closely parallel one another or are extra-ordinarily diverse, the question of how an individual should act in a given situation remains open. Even if one is told that virtually all other human societies agree on a particular course of action, one may choose not to go that way. One may find it difficult to have an objective answer to one's own dilemma in a given situation. The possibility or otherwise of an objective morality has been one of the constant themes of ethics for ages.

The first ethical precepts were passed down by word of mouth by parents and elders. As societies learned to use the written word, they began to set down their ethical beliefs. These records constitute the first historical evidence of the origins of ethics.

Indian ethics was philosophical in the beginning. In the *Veda*, the oldest of the philosophical literature of the world, ethics is an integral aspect of philosophical and spiritual enquiry of the nature of Reality. What is said in the *Veda* as to how people ought to live may, therefore, be the first philosophical ethics.

In the *Vedic* philosophy, the basic principle of the universe is *Ritam*. From this word is derived the western notion of right. The principle of *Ritam* gives rise to the notion that the *Veda* postulates a faith - not belief, in a right moral order built into the universe itself, which is ever in motion, as there is perfect symmetry in the whole universe. Truth and right are linked together. To understand the ultimate truth of human existence is to understand what is right. To be enlightened is to know what is real based on living rightly, for these are not two separate things, but are intertwined integrally.

The ethics that is thus traced to the very essence of the universe is not without its detailed practical applications. These are based on four ideals or goals, namely prosperity, satisfaction of desires, moral duty and spiritual enlightenment. These goals promote virtues such as honesty, rectitude, charity, non-violence, modesty and purity of heart. They also promote discarding the vices such as falsehood, egoism, cruelty, adultery, theft and injury to human beings.

As the eternal moral law is part of the *Veda* which is itself considered part of the universe, to do what is praise worthy is to act in harmony with the universe, and

accordingly will receive its proper reward. On the other hand, once the true nature of the self is understood, it becomes apparent that those who act in pursuance of vices are acting self-destructively.

Ethics itself is not regarded as matter of conformity to the existing laws. Instead, the desire to be ethical is an inner desire. It is part of the quest for spiritual perfection or enlightenment, which is the highest of the four goals of life.

Like every other human characteristic, our ethics, as its manifestation in our morality, has its inner and outer components. The main internal component is the capacity to experience acts or ideas as right or wrong, good or evil. It is to feel the sense of rightness or wrongness. The second is the craving for certitude in respect of such feelings. The capacity to feel rightness or wrongness is called healthy conscience.

Equally important are the external components of morality and ethics. They are in the facts of nature such as famine and disease, birth, sex and death. Their effect upon morality will vary with the stage and type of the human civilization. With the rise in technological development, ethics has shifted its focus from the general moral duty of righteous living to the specific moral duty of seeing that the external components do not cause much harm. Even sexual morality cannot but be affected by such external factors as the effective birth control or the existence of wide spread venereal disease.

The current moral codes and systems have a decisive effect on individual ethics. In most cases, the individual accepts the existing social ethics without much question and regards any deviation from it as bad. This is a consequence of the way our ethical mechanism works. Only a small minority questions the validity of current ethical assumptions.

The most important point is the realization that moral systems are bound to change with change in social systems. In the absence of the appropriate material and social conditions, the relevant general ethical principles may even remain unformulated. Even if formulated, they may be vague and have no bearing on the problems at issue.

The technological development brings its own ethical problems, many of them unpredictable. Some concern the value and the utilization of the world's new leisure; some others with the provision of an ethical assurance of the ends for which the overpowering new means are employed. Communications have improved so vast that the world has shrunk politically into a single unit. Human civilization has already been given a moral precept that nations must combine if man wishes truly to achieve the good. The moral precept is reinforced by a moral threat of eternal damnation - unite or perish.

Democracy is anchored deeply in man's physical nature - his individuality. Through the centuries, the measure of his advance has been the growing definition and significance obtained by men as individuals. The gain has been the greatest in the nations that have been most free. Persons are of greater worth than any systems,

which they may compose. The infinite variety of men is not expressed in populations, but in personalities. Human divinity is the basis of democracy. Only when each member of a society is free to develop his native gifts to the utmost, will that society reach its highest efficiency and its members their deepest satisfaction.

Relativity of Ethics

Men desire freedom and fear it. Craving liberty and self-determination, men desire to stand alone as individuals; but fearing loneliness and responsibility, they wish also to unite with their fellowmen as members of a group. This implies a relativity of ethics. Individual ethics grow, with the growth of the individual, while social ethics evolve. The evolution of ethical systems and standards shows a broad correlation with that of the societies in which they flourish.

In all the advanced civilizations known to history, there have always been separate sets of ethics, partly competing and partly overlapping. For example, the ruling class has built up official ethics mainly to secure stability. There has been the working moral code of ordinary people and the ethics of simple everyday goodness. There has been the ethics of oppressed classes and minorities concerned either with surrender or with revolt against the ruling class. There has been the ethics that promotes a sense of personal salvation or an escape from wickedness or violence in the society.

The actual variety of ethics is immense. The relevant factor is that all existing societies manifest considerable ethical disunity. This is because of the inherent conflicts and contradictions. The conflicts are between classes and groups, between long term and short term good, conflicts within the individual between his needs for conformity with the social group of which he is part and his personal needs for salvation or perfection.

Thus ethics is not an entity, but a loose covering term for a large number of quite different kinds of individual and social adaptations. The bottom-line is that each of the activities is concerned with the label of rightness or wrongness. In all historical societies, these different kinds of adaptations are of varying degrees of efficiency. They are always to some extent in conflict.

Man on earth has introduced morality into the cosmos in the same way he has introduced the so-called Laws of Nature. There is much good as well as bad in the objective happenings of the cosmos and the actions of its living inhabitants. But moral law does not exist until man appears with his capacity for perceiving goodness and badness and also for generalizing about right and wrong. The happenings of the cosmos contain the potentiality of being evaluated in the form of moral law only in relation to the concepts and feelings of rightness and wrongness. So is the case with the Laws of Nature. Things ever happen in the physical world in an ordinarily and regular way. When man grasps them intellectually, do the formulations become the Laws of Nature. Julian Huxley observes, ‘the ethical potentialities of the macrocosm are actualized in the moral mechanism of the microcosm; but the microcosm in its turn reacts upon the macrocosm, and so begins ordering events in terms of morality’.

The legalistic stage of social ethics has had a long and elaborate evolution. Society institutionalizes a more rational level of individual ethical development in which moral transgression is envisaged in terms of the damage done to the interests of society or of its individual members. And some attempt is made to ‘make the punishment fit the crime’.

One of the simplest methods is reparation. The offender is forced to make good the damage he has inflicted, either directly or indirectly, by means of a payment or a service. Confession is another method of relieving the sense of guilt. It is accepted as moral equivalent for punishment. Another rationalization is that crime can be prevented through severity of punishment. This is based on the understanding that punishment is regarded not only as the necessary safeguard of the social order, but also as good for those on whom it is inflicted to prevent recurrence of similar crime.

Meanwhile, man's ethical evolution is slowly entering on a new phase - the replacement of punishment by treatment. It has now been established beyond doubt that severity of punishment does not reduce the commission of crime. It is realized that crime is lessened if the society is more just and less frustrating. Treatment for avoidance of crime as for avoidance of physical ailment can be either curative or preventive, either individual or social.

The replacement of punishment by treatment implies the partial replacement of legal systems and processes by social sciences and their applications, in so far as they embody the social framework of ethics. It also implies that the primal inner ethical conflict shall reach a higher level of resolution before being institutionalized. This involves the passage of the individual to ethical maturity, and some degree of inner illumination, some substitution of unconscious by conscious ethical motivation.

It is, of course, obvious that only a part of the current social ethics becomes institutionalized at any given point of time, whether in social or religious ritual, in law or official regulations. A large part generally remains in the background, a fluid but nonetheless potent agency shaping men's thoughts and actions.

Three such attitudes deserve mention. One, too much good fortune is felt to invite the wrath of God, or too much success His resentment so that, in either case, disaster is to be expected or feared as a punishment. Proverbs of the type 'pride goes before a fall', 'all that goes up is bound to come down' are common in all cultures and in all periods.

Second, as Flugel says, 'we are all at least dimly conscious of failing in numerous respects to live up to the standards of our super-ego; hence we all feel guilty, and in turn experience in some measure the 'need for punishment' which is the basic method of dealing with guilt. Only through the pain of punishment can we get rid of the burden of our guilt. If we do not experience sufficient pain, if things go too well for us and we have too much luck, we begin to feel uneasy because our need for punishment has not been met. The influence of this fear in retarding human progress is difficult to estimate but has certainly been very great… Third, a characteristic of social ethics throughout history has been the provision of an enemy, as an outlet for hate, repressed aggression and outwardly directed need for punishment'.

17. Metaphysics of Morals

Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has the capacity of acting according to the conception of laws, that is, according to principles. As reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, will is nothing but practical reason. That is, the will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes as practically necessary as good. This means that the relation of objective laws to a will which is not completely good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason to which this will is not by nature necessarily obedient.

The conception of an objective principle so far as it constrains a will is a command of reason. The principle or formula of this command is called, according to Immanuel Kant, an Imperative. All imperatives are expressed by an 'ought', and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will. This relation is that of constraint. Imperatives always indicate that it is good to do or to refrain from doing something to the will. Practical good is what determines the will to act by means of the conception of reason, that is, on grounds that are valid for every rational being as such.

A perfectly good will may be equally subject to objective laws of the good, but it cannot be conceived as constrained by them to act in accord with them. This is for the reason that, according to its own subjective constitution, it can be determined to act only through the conception of the good. Imperatives are thus only formulae expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational human being.

All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. If the action is good only as a means to something else, the imperative is hypothetical. If it is thought of as good in itself, and hence as necessary in a will which of itself conforms to reason, as the principle of this will, the imperative is categorical.

The hypothetical imperative, therefore, says only that the action is good to some purpose, either possible or actual. The categorical imperative, which declares the action to be its objectively necessary without having any other end, holds a practical principle.

Every practical law presents a possible action as good and thus as necessary for a subject practically determinable by action. Therefore, all imperatives are formulae of the determination of action, which is necessary by the principle of a will, which is in any way good. All sciences have some practical part, which consists of what are called imperatives of skill.

The principles of action that are thought of as necessary to attain a possible purpose are in reality infinitely numerous. Whether the end is reasonable and good is not the issue at all. What is of concern is what must be done in order to attain the end.

There is one end, which we may presuppose as actual in all rational beings so far as imperatives apply to them. There is one purpose, which we presuppose that all human beings do have by a necessity of nature. This purpose is happiness. This is necessary to a purpose, which we assume, with assurance, for everyone because it belongs to the essence of man. Skill in the choice of means to one's own highest welfare may be called prudence in a narrow sense. Thus the imperative, which refers to the precept of prudence, is only hypothetical. The action is only commanded as a means to another end.

Finally there is one imperative, which directly commands a certain conduct without making its condition some purpose to be reached by it. It concerns not the material of the action and its intended result, but the form and the principle from which it results. What is essentially good in it consists in the intention, the result being whatever it may. This imperative is categorical and may be called the imperative of morality.

The three principles or imperatives that distinguish volition are thus the rules of skill, the counsels of prudence and the commands or laws of morality. It may also be said that the first imperative is technical, the second pragmatic and the third moral, as it belongs to free conduct as such.

The question arises as to how all these imperatives are possible. In other words, the question is how the constraint of the will, which the imperative expresses in the problem, can be conceived. As for the imperative of skill, whoever wills the end, so far as reason has decisive influence on his action, wills also the necessary means to it that lie in his power. While willing an object as his effect, the use of the means is simultaneously thought and the imperative derives the concept of necessary action to this end from the concept of willing this end.

As for the imperatives of prudence, they would completely correspond to those of skill and be analytical, if it were only easy to give a definite concept of happiness. In such a case it would be said that whoever wills the end, wills also the only means to it, which are in his power. But the concept of happiness is so indefinite that, although each person wishes to attain it, he can never definitely and self-consistently state what it is he really wishes and wills. The reason for this is that all elements, which belong to the concept of happiness, are empirical and to be taken from experience, while for the idea of happiness, a maximum of well-being is needed in his present and in every future condition.

It is impossible even for a clear-sighted person to form a definite concept of what he really wills. If he wills riches, knowledge, power, health etc, each of the elements brings about anxiety, envy, hatred, ill-will, etc. causing unhappiness. He is, therefore, not capable, with complete certainty, of asserting what would truly make him happy. He cannot act according to definite principles so as to be happy, but only according to empirical counsels such as economy, courtesy, restraint, diet etc. These are the elements that are revealed in experience to promote welfare of a person.

Hence, the imperatives of prudence cannot, in the strict sense, command actions objectively as practically necessary. They are, therefore, to be taken as

counsels rather than commands of reason. There can be no imperative, which would, in the strict sense, command us to do what makes for happiness, as happiness is an ideal not of reason but of imagination. This imperative of prudence, therefore, differs from the imperative of skill only in that its end is given, while in the latter it is merely possible.

Then, the main question how the imperative of morality is possible, remains. The moral imperative, which is categorical and unconditional, is only a pragmatic precept. It makes us attentive to our own advantage and teaches us to consider it. This can be taken as a practical law. This is for the reason that what is necessary merely for the attainment of an arbitrary purpose can be regarded as itself contingent. We can get rid of the precept once we give up the purpose, while the unconditional command leaves the will no freedom to choose the opposite. Thus, this moral imperative alone implies the necessity, which we require of a law.

Secondly, in the case of the law of morality, the cause of difficulty in discerning its possibility is very weighty. The difficulty is both in the theoretical knowledge and the practical application. The categorical imperative contains, besides the law, only the necessity that the maxim or the subject principle of acting should accord with this law. The law contains no condition to which it is restricted. The maxim should, therefore, accord with the universality of the law. The categorical imperative represents this conformity of the maxim to the law.

There is, therefore, only one categorical imperative. It is, 'act only according to that maxim, by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. This one imperative can be considered as the principal source of all imperatives of duty.

The universality of law according to which effects are produced constitutes what is called nature, that is, the existence of things so far as universal laws determine it. In this context, the universal imperative of duty can be expressed as 'act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature'.

This leads to formulating duties, categorizing them into duties to ourselves and to others, and also into perfect duties and imperfect ones.

For example, a man in despair seeks to end his life. He asks whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. For love of himself, he makes it his principle to end his life to avoid evil. But it is questionable whether this principle of self-love could become a universal law of nature. He immediately sees a contradiction in a system of nature whose law is to destroy life by the feeling, which is otherwise to impel the improvement of life. In this case, it will not exist as nature. Hence, that maxim cannot obtain as a law of nature. It, therefore, contradicts the supreme principle of all duty.

Similar contradiction arises if a man in need to borrow money makes a promise to repay the loan, though he knows that he will not be able to repay it, but he also sees that nothing will be loaned him if he does not make a firm promise to repay it at a certain time. Such instances arise in day-to-day life to most people. They are

some of the duties we hold to be true, derived from one clear principle. We must be able to will that a maxim of our action becomes a universal law. This is the canon of the moral estimation of our action in general.

Some actions are such that their maxim cannot even be thought as a universal law of nature without contradiction. In some others, this internal impossibility is not found, though it is still impossible to will that their maxim be raised to the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself. It is, therefore, seen that the former maxim conflicts with the narrower duty, while the latter conflicts with the broader or meritorious duty. Thus all duties, as far as the kind of obligation is concerned, depend on the said one principle.

The question that now arises is 'is it a necessary law for all rational beings that they should always judge their actions by such maxims as they themselves could will to serve as universal laws'. If it is such a law, it must be connected with the concept of the will of a rational being as such.

To discover this connection we have to take a step into a region of metaphysics, quite different from speculative philosophy. This region is the metaphysics of morals. In a practical philosophy, it is not a question of assuming grounds for what happens, but of assuming laws of what ought to happen, even though it may never happen, that is to say, objective and practical laws. Here, it is a question of objectively practical laws and thus of the relation of a will to itself so far as it determines itself only by reason. Everything, which has a relation to the empirical, automatically falls away, because if reason of itself alone determines conduct, it must necessarily do so *a priori.* The possibility of reason thus determining conduct, therefore, needs investigation.

The will is thought of as a faculty of determining itself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. Such a faculty is found only in rational beings. That, which serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination, is an end, and if it is given by reason alone, it must hold alike for all rational beings.

On the other hand that which contains the ground of the possibility of action whose result is an end, is called the means. The subjective ground of desire is the incentive, while the objective ground of volition is the motive. Thus arises the distinction between subjective ends based on incentives and objective ends based on motives, valid for every rational being.

When practical principles disregard subjective ends, they are formal. When they have subjective ends, they are material. The ends, which a rational being arbitrarily proposes to himself, as consequences of his action, are material ends, and only relative. Their relation to a particular faculty of desire in the subject gives them their worth. This worth cannot afford any universal principles for all rational beings, or valid and necessary principles, for every volition. They cannot give rise to any practical laws. These relative ends are only grounds for hypothetical imperatives.

If something has absolute worth in its existence and, as an end in itself, could be a ground of definite laws, in it could lie the ground of practical law, that is, a possible categorical imperative.

A man, that is, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. Rational beings are designated 'persons' as their nature indicates that they are ends in themselves. Such beings are objects of respect and restrict all arbitrary choice.

Thus, if there is to be a supreme practical principle and a categorical imperative for the human being, it must be one that forms an objective principle of the will from the conception that every rational being is an end in himself. This objective principle can serve as a universal practical law. The ground of this principle is that rational nature exists as an end in itself. The practical imperative, therefore, postulates that one is to act in such a way that one treats humanity, whether in one's own person or in another, as an end only and never as a means.

We may consider a few duties to one's self as exemplifying the above principles. First, according to the concept of necessary duty to one's self, he who contemplates suicide will ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. Man is not a thing and, therefore, cannot be used merely as a means. He is to be regarded in all his actions as an end in himself. Therefore, he cannot dispose of man, in his own person, so as to kill or mutilate him.

Second, as concerns obligatory duties to others, he who intends a deceitful promise to another realizes that he intends to use another merely as a means. This person, as a rational being, must always be considered as an end in himself. As such the concern of the man intending a deceitful promise cannot be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself.

Third, regarding meritorious duty to one's self, it is not sufficient that the action does not conflict with humanity in one's person as an end in itself. It must also harmonize with it. To neglect one's furtherance of faculties might be consistent with the preservation of humanity but not for furtherance of its end. As such it may not be considered consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself.

Fourth, regarding meritorious duty to others, the natural end, which all men have, is to contribute to their happiness. Humanity might not perish if one did not contribute to the happiness of others, provided one did not act against the interests of others. But, such non-contribution by one to the happiness of others affects the harmony of humanity as an end in itself. It is for the reason that the end of any person who is an end in himself, must as far as possible also be the ends of others with whom he is connected, if that conception of an end in itself is to have its full effect on that person.

This principle of humanity and of every rational creature as an end in itself is the supreme limiting condition on freedom of the actions of each man. First, it is not borrowed from experience because of its universality. It applies to all rational beings generally. Experience does not help to determine anything about them. Second, in

experience, humanity is not thought of as an object, which we really make our end. In fact it is thought of as the objective end, which should constitute the supreme limiting condition of all subjective ends, whatever they may be. This principle arises from pure reason. Thus, the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself. Third, the practical principle of the will is the supreme condition of its harmony with its universal practical reason, that is, the idea of the will of every rational being as making universal law. By this principle, all maxims that are inconsistent with the universal lawgiving nature of will are rejected. The will is only subject to the law in such a way as to be regarded as being legislative.

Thus the imperatives are conceived universally either as conformity to law by actions, or as the prerogative of rational beings as such. They exclude, from their legislative authority, admixture of any interest as an incentive. The principle of morality that flows from this consideration is that man is subject only to his own, yet universal, legislation and that he is only bound to act in accordance with his own will, which is, however, designed by nature to be a will giving universal laws. Immanuel Kant calls this principle 'the principle of autonomy' of the will.

The concept of each rational being as a being that must regard itself as giving universal law through all the maxims of its will, so that it may judge itself and its actions from this standpoint leads to the concept of a *realm of ends.* By realm is meant the systematic union of different rational beings through common laws. All rational beings stand under common objective laws. What these laws have in view is just the relation of these beings to each other as ends and means.

A rational being belongs to the realm of ends as a member when he gives universal laws in it while also makes himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when he legislates through the freedom of the will. This is possible when he is an independent being with power adequate to his will. Morality, therefore, consists in the relation of every action to that legislation through which alone a realm of ends is possible. This legislation is found in every rational being arising from his will and this 'will' through its maxims could regard itself as universally law-giving. The necessity of acting according to the objective principles of rational beings as universal law-giving is called practical constraint, that is, Duty. Duty pertains not to the sovereign in the realm of ends, but rather to each member, and to each in the same degree.

Duty does not rest at all on feelings, impulses and inclinations. It rests merely on the relation of the rational beings to one another. Reason relates every maxim of the will as giving universal laws to every other will and also every action toward itself. It does so from the idea of the dignity of a rational being who obeys no law except that which he gives himself.

In the realm of ends, everything has either a *price* or a *dignity*. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else its equivalent. On the other hand, whatever is above all price and admits of no equivalent has a dignity. That which is related to general human inclinations and needs has a *market price*. That which accords with certain taste such as pleasure in the realm of our faculties has an *affective price*. That,

which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself and does not have a price or relative worth, has an intrinsic worth, that is, *dignity*.

Morality is, therefore, the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself, because only through it, is it possible to be a legislative member in the realm of ends. Thus morality and humanity, in so far as it is capable of morality, alone have dignity. Skill and diligence in work have a market value. Wit, lively imagination and humour have an affective price. Fidelity in promises and benevolence on principle has intrinsic worth.

What justifies the morally good disposition or virtue is the participation it affords the rational being in giving universal laws. He is thus fitted to be a member in a possible realm of ends to which his own nature has destined him. As an end in himself, he is destined to be legislative in the realm of ends, obedient only to those laws which he himself gives. Accordingly, his maxims belong to a universal legislation to which he is also subject.

A thing has no worth other than that provided for it by the law. The legislation that determines all worth must have a dignity. Its worth is, therefore, unconditional and incomparable. The esteem that a rational being must have for it is called *respect*. Autonomy is thus the basis of the dignity of both human nature and rational nature of every human being.

All maxims have a form that consists in universality. The maxims are such as to hold as universal laws of nature. They have a material, that is, an end. In this respect, the rational being is to serve in every maxim as a condition restricting all relative and arbitrary ends. All maxims that arise from autonomous legislation are to harmonize with a possible realm of ends as with a realm of nature. 'Morals' regards a possible realm of ends as a realm of nature. In this concept it is a practical idea for bringing about that which is not actually real but which can become real through our conduct.

That will is absolutely good which cannot be bad, and thus it is a will whose maxim, when made a universal law, can never conflict with itself. This principle is thus its supreme law - 'Always act according to that maxim whose universality as a law you can at the same time will'. This is the only condition under which a will can never come into conflict with itself, and such imperative is categorical. The categorical imperative can also be expressed thus: 'Act according to maxims which can at the same time have themselves as universal laws of nature as their object'. That is the formula of an absolutely good will.

Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself independently of any property of objects of volition. Hence the principle of autonomy is: 'Never choose except in such a way that the maxims of the choice are comprehended in the same volition as a universal law'. The principle of autonomy is the sole principle of morals. This principle is a categorical imperative and the imperative commands this very autonomy.

The doctrine of the will has been invented mainly for the purpose of punishment, that is, it makes it possible to impute guilt to one's action. Under this doctrine, men are considered *free* so that they might be judged and punished, so that they might become guilty. So every act has to be considered as willed, and the origin of every act has to be considered as lying within the consciousness of the agent.

Man is not the effect of some special purpose, of a will. He is not the object of an attempt to attain an ideal of humanity, an ideal of happiness or an ideal of morality. It is wrong to wish to devolve one's essence on some end or other. Man belongs to the whole. He is in the whole. There is nothing that can judge, measure, compare or sentence our being. If so, it amounts to judging, measuring, comparing or sentencing the whole. There is nothing besides the whole.

Schopenauer considers that the will, considered purely in itself, is without knowledge and merely a blind incessant impulse. The will is nothing else than the world as ideal life, precisely as it exists. The world as idea is the complete mirror of the will, its objectivity in which it knows itself in ascending grades of distinctness and completeness, the highest of which is man. Will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world. Life is the phenomenon, the visible world being the mirror of the will. Therefore, life accompanies the will inseparably as the shadow accompanies the body.

The whole of nature is the phenomenon and also the fulfillment of the will to live. The form of this phenomenon is time, space and causality that enable the individual to come into being and pass away. For, every individual is transitory only as phenomenon, but, as thing-in-itself, is timeless and, therefore, endless. But it is also only as phenomenon that an individual is distinguished from the other things of the world, though as thing-in-itself he is the will which appears in all.

The will in itself is absolutely free and entirely self-determining; for it there is no law. That the will as such is free follows from the fact that, according to this view, it is the thing-in-itself, the content of all phenomena. The phenomenon, on the other hand, is absolutely subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason in its four forms. Everything is, as phenomenon, as object, absolutely necessary. But *in itself*, it is will and this is perfectly free to all eternity. The phenomenon, the object, is necessarily and unalterably determined in that chain of causes and effects that admits of no interruption. The relation between will and phenomenon, thus, explains the union of freedom with necessity.

The assertion of an empirical freedom of the will agrees precisely with the doctrine that places the inner nature of man in a soul. The inner nature is originally a *knowing*, an abstract *thinking* nature. According to Schopenauer, will is primary and original. Knowledge is merely added to it as an instrument belonging to the phenomenon of will. Therefore, every man is what he is through his will. His character is original as willing is the basis of his nature. Through the knowledge added to his nature, he experiences what he is. As a consequence, he knows himself. Therefore, he cannot become other than what he is. In view of this, he wills what he knows; and he knows what he wills.

The concept of good is essentially relative. It signifies the conformity of an object to any definite effort of the will. Accordingly, everything that corresponds to the will in any of its expressions and fulfills its end is thought to be good, however different such things may be in other respects.

In other words, we call everything good that is just as we wish it to be. What is good to one may not be good to another. The conception of good divides itself into two categories. One is that of the direct and present satisfaction of any volition and the second is that of its indirect satisfaction that has reference to the future. The opposite of good is expressed by the word *bad* or *evil*, which denotes everything that does not correspond to any effort of the will.

The good is, thus, essentially relative, for its being consists in its relation to a desiring will. The highest good signifies the same thing, a final satisfaction of the will after which no new desire could arise. In other words, it is the attainment, which would afford enduring satisfaction of the will. But such a consummation is not possible, nor even thinkable. There can be no such thing as a permanent fulfillment which shall completely and forever satisfy its craving. If there is to be permanent fulfillment or complete satisfaction, it can only be by self-effacement and denial of the will - the true absence of will. This alone stills and silences its struggle, gives undisturbed contentment and redeems the world. This will be the absolute good, which an individual can look to, and is related to the soul.

If a man is disposed to do wrong whenever an opportunity presents itself with no external power to restrain him, we call him bad. Such a man, while asserting his will to do wrong, denies the will that appears in other individuals. The source of this action is a high degree of egoism. Two things are apparent in his action. One is that an excessively vehement will to live expresses it. The second is that his knowledge, unrelated to reason, does not go beyond his egoism in relation to other individuals. Therefore, he seeks his own well being alone, completely indifferent to that of all others. These two qualities are the constituent elements of bad character. This great intensity of will is in itself and directly a constant source of suffering. For much intense suffering is inseparable from much intense volition. Very bad men suffer most inwardly. From this inward torment, there arise the delight and glee in the suffering of others. This constitutes wickedness, rising to the pitch of cruelty. This suffering of others is not a means for attainment of the end of its own will, but an end in itself.

This phenomenon may be explained in another way, too. For a man with envy towards others, every privation is infinitely increased by the enjoyment of others. It is relieved by the knowledge that others also suffer the same privation. The ills common to all and inseparable from human life cause no trouble. The recollection of greater suffering by others than our own stills our pain. In a way the sight of the suffering of others soothes our own. If a man is filled with an exceptionally intense pressure of will, the suffering of others becomes for him an end in itself as the very spectacle of it delights him. Thus arises the phenomenon of pure cruelty, bloodthirstiness and the like.

Excessive vehemence of will, which is felt in the case of every bad action, also results in a sting of conscience or remorse. Whatever may be the vehemence of the

will of the individual prompting him to be wicked and cruel toward others, there arises in the inmost depths of his consciousness the feeling that such an order of things is only phenomenal and that their real constitution is quite different. This feeling, which is not distinct or abstract feeling, is the content of remorse.

We call a person who voluntarily recognizes and observes moral limits between right and wrong, even though not secured by the state or any external power, *just*. The just man never carries the assertion of his own will so far as to deny the will appearing in another individual. Thus, in order to increase his own well being, he will commit no crime, he will respect the rights and the property of others and he does not merely assert his own manifestation of will and deny all others. Justice is the conduct of a just man. Thus, in the inmost nature of *justice* lies the resolution not to go so far in the assertion of one's own will as to deny the manifestations of the will of others, by compelling them to serve one's own.

Voluntary justice has its inmost source in a certain degree of penetration of the principle of individuation, while the unjust remain entirely un-involved in this principle. This penetration, in a higher degree, may lead to benevolence and well being, to love of mankind. The good man makes less distinction than is usually made between him and others. In him it is knowledge that masters the blind striving of will. The principle of individuation does not hold him tightly in its grasp. The suffering he sees in others touches him as closely as his own. He, therefore, tries to strike a balance between them, denies himself pleasures, and practises renunciation so as to mitigate the suffering of others. He sees that the distinction between him and others is only an illusive phenomenon. He recognizes directly and without reasoning that the in-itself of his own manifestation is also that of others. To him, the will to live, which constitutes the inner nature of everything, lives in all. This applies to everybody including the wicked. Therefore, he does not cause any suffering even to the wicked.

The opposite of the sting of conscience or remorse is the good conscience. It is the satisfaction, which we experience after every disinterested deed. It arises from the knowledge that our true self exists not only in our own person, this particular manifestation, but also in everything that lives. The knowledge that everything living is just as much our own inner nature, as is our own person, extends our interest to everything living. Whoever is able to say this to himself with clear knowledge and firm conviction, is certain of all virtue and blessedness. In this way the heart is enlarged. This is a kind of soul relationship with every being with whom he comes in contact.

If the principle of individuation further penetrates to a still higher degree, the will turns away from the normal life. Man attains to the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true indifference and perfect will-lessness. The phenomenon by which this change is marked is the transition from virtue to asceticism.

Voluntary and complete chastity or the denial of the will to live is the first step in asceticism. Second, it shows itself in voluntary and intentional poverty. It arises either as possessions are given away to mitigate the sufferings of others, or it is an end in itself as a constant mortification of wills itself, its visible form, its objectivity and

the body. He nourishes the body sparingly lest it excite more strongly the will to seek expression in the worldly possessions. He is absorbed in the inward, direct, intuitive knowledge from which alone all virtue and holiness proceed and which is expressed in precisely the same way in the conduct of life. Intuitively every man is conscious of all philosophical truths. Only the ascetic realizes and lives the truths.

18. Ethics – Individual & Social

Individual & Social Ethics

Man has invented a new mechanism of heredity – the transmission of civilization to his descendents by writing, teaching and artistic creation, which have been made possible by conceptual thought and language. The essential feature of human evolution is that it is a process dependent on man's social life. Man's evolution has shown the richness of individual experience and gradually the development of society.

Man's growth has a bearing on his ethical origins. Long before a baby can speak it is involved in social relations with its parents, nurse or other members of the family. It begins to pick up the lesson that the enrichment of the individual personality depends on the enrichment of the society and that this, in turn, demands a certain sacrifice of one's own individual desires, not to infringe on the individuality of others. If we look at the origin of our ethical beliefs, we see that essentially their function is to enable society to persist and the best ethics enables society to progress.

Morality has also an individual function, negatively in liberating the individual from his load of guilt to some extent, and positively in guiding him towards ethical fulfillment, the achievement of moral nobility of personality, the sense of oneness with something beyond and larger than ourselves. This is because that man is, at one and the same time, finite, limited, imperfect and conditional, but also capable of grasping the idea of the perfect and the unconditional, and recognizing an ideal beyond the temporal existence.

Social ethics manifests evolution. Human codes of morality change, adapt themselves to local and temporal conditions, become diversified and exhibit long-term trends, whether of specialization, regression or true progress. The function of social ethics is to helping society to persist, to reproduce itself, and in some cases to change and to advance.

The function of individual ethics, on the other hand, is to helping the individual towards moral adaptation, moral growth, moral fulfillment and satisfaction. Individual ethics is seen to consist of two processes - the attempt to be free from the tension caused by guilt, whether conscious or unconscious; and the adjustment of the developing individual to the outer world, notably the community in which he lives.

Human evolution operates chiefly by means of tradition and that tradition is the product of individual minds. Social ethics is, of course, not the mere summation of individual moralities, nor, indeed, any simple function of them, but rather a complex resultant of their interaction. Nevertheless, individual ethical development is an integral part of social ethics and a necessary cog in moral evolution.

Man is the possessor of an ethical mechanism for attaching the labels of rightness and wrongness to his own deeds and thoughts, as well as to those of others and to things. This ethical mechanism operates partly on a rational and conscious

level in the form of what is generally called *conscience*. In it reason is fused with emotional impulse and conscious blend into unconscious processes.

This mechanism also operates partly on a purely irrational and unconscious level distorting the structure of his psyche in various ways, tending on the whole to make it illogical and unrealistic. Because of this nature, he is certain to have in his make-up a need for punishment, a superstitious belief in luck and omens, an irrational fear of being too lucky or successful, a tendency to wish fulfillment, and a craving for certitude often coupled with the need to hate some cause, movement, person or group.

From the evolutionary angle, the human being is not a static entity, but a process, as a momentary cross-section of change is always taking place in time. The same is true of his ethics. His ethics, too, is a process, not a fixed system. In the individual ethical process, the developing human being incorporates innate tendencies, certain emotional responses towards outer events and objects, a certain amount of knowledge of the outer environment and various ways of dealing with it in general and with the specific situations, which it presents.

In his evolving ethics, there is a constant procession of action and reaction, inward and outward, between the microcosm and the macrocosm. This interaction issues in a directed process, which may be called 'the dialectic of personal growth'. This has inevitably an ethical aspect. The ethical dialectic works out for the individual from the act of birth till death – a continuous process. The process has many directions, some more desirable than others.

Every human being, thus, inevitably evolves in his ethics. This ethical development consists partly in resolution of the primal ethical conflicts in ever more sane, rational and complete ways. This is partly an adjustment of his selfish impulses and wishes with those of the community and its prevailing morality, and partly the achievement of experiences and activities, which have intrinsic value such as knowledge, love and beauty. Further, the peak of individual ethical evolution consists in the resolution of all inner moral tensions in a harmonious though dynamic peace. At this level of ethical development, there is no longer any conflict between selfish and social impulses so that activity will always be moral. At the same time, the individual will have the possibility of enjoying experiences of higher intrinsic value than any other, in the shape of unitive knowledge of the Divine, and love.

But there is an obvious limitation on the value of individual ethical development. Human nature being what it is, all its varieties cannot hope to attain the highest level of individual ethical development, even in the best of circumstances. Even among those who reach the highest level, there are bound to be immense differences in the type of self-transcendence attained. No one individual can imagine that his type of achievement is the only right one. In addition to the variability to genetic differences, there is the variability imposed by the division of labour in the community. When the community encourages specialization, it becomes as one-sided as to involve atrophy of other vital faculties.

Ethics need to be looked at from the point of view of society as well as from that of the individual. Once we consider social ethics, we realize that there is an

external and internal realism. An individual may well be adjusted to the ethical standards of a society, but these may be unrealistic. The primary reason for this deficiency is lack of knowledge.

In many primitive societies every disaster is ascribed either to witchcraft or some supernatural power. In the present day, it looks to us unrealistic. It is similarly possible that what looks to us today ethically realistic will prove some day in the future that it is wholly unrealistic. It becomes unrealistic only when the entire social scene such as its state of knowledge, its intellectual and moral climate, its social and economic structure and the very quality of the human beings living in it is transformed. This kind of transformation has been taking place since social organization came into being in the remote past. Human societies and the character of the human beings comprising them have radically changed and continue to change. Evolution has been and continues to be at work, producing a series of new results.

Social ethics is thus conditioned by four rather distinct sets of factors. One is political and concerns the nature of organized groups. Second is practical and concerns man's control over nature. Third is intellectual and concerns man's understanding of the macrocosm. Fourth is psychological or spiritual and concerns man's understanding and control of the microcosm of his own nature, more particularly his internal ethical mechanism.

Ethics of Mortality

It is the sense itself that witnesses in the experience of all men. It is in accordance with the evidence of sense, we, of necessity, judge of the imperceptible by reasoning. It is the soul that is the chief cause of sensation and coupled with it, internal feelings. So long as the soul is attached to the body, the body will never lose the sensation and internal feelings even though some other part of the body is lost. If we pay attention to internal feelings and to external sensations, according as a subject is general or particular, and to every immediate intuition in accordance with each of the standards of judgment, we shall be able to trace rightly the causes whence arose our mental disturbance and / or fear. By knowing the causes, it becomes possible to free ourselves from all that produce the disturbance or fear as the case may be.

Good and evil are in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. A right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable. It is because of the knowledge that 'certain death' takes away the craving for mortality. For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living.

An ordinary man says that he fears death not because it will be painful when it comes, but because it is painful in anticipation. For that which gives no trouble when it comes, is but an empty pain in anticipation. So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us because as long as we exist, death is not with us, but when death comes, we do not exist. It does not, therefore, concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more.

Many people, sometime or other, shun death as the greatest of evils or yearn for it as a respite from the evils in life. The wise man neither seeks to escape life, nor fears its cessation. Neither does life offend him, nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil to him. Just as with food he does not seek the larger share but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant in life.

Anyone that counsels the young to live well and the old to make a good end is not wise, for life in itself is desirable and it is the same training that teaches to live well and to die well. It is wise to bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor wholly not ours. This enables us not to expect something sure to happen, nor abandon hope of it as if it would not certainly come true.

One is to meditate on the principles of ethics when young and old. As one grows old, one may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth one may be old as well, since one will know no fear of what is to come. Then if one meditates on the things that make one happy, one will be happy as one has the things and if one does not have, one will do all to win them to be happy. It is a conscious attempt to be happy.

The principles to live a good life are firm faith in the immortality and blessedness of God and belief that death is nothing to human beings. God is there and knowledge of Him is by clear vision. It is the soul that perceives God. Ordinary men

do not have conception of God from sensations of the soul, but make false suppositions such as that the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings the good by the gift of God. Blessedness of God is unconditional and for all. Its knowledge through sensation makes one's life blissful.

19. Realization within Self

Morality in an individual human being implies an end in itself. It implies that something is to be done and the doing of it by an agent. If one considers them as end and means, one cannot separate the two. If one changes the position of end and means, doing becomes the end and 'to be done' becomes the means; and one does not violate the moral consciousness. The act for one means one's act and there is no end beyond the act. This amounts to saying that there is nothing good except good will. In short, for morality the end implies the act and the act implies self-realization. For example, if pleasure be the feeling of self and accompanies the act, this indicates that the putting forth of the act is also the putting forth of the self.

In an act what we do is, perfectly or imperfectly, to realize ourselves. All that we can realize is our ends, or the objects we desire. All that we can desire is, in a word, self.

It is true that my thought, as my thought, cannot exist apart from me thinking it. Therefore, my proposed end must, as such, be a state of me. All my ends are my thoughts, but all my thoughts are not my ends. By self-realization is, therefore, meant that, if I have an idea of any future external event, I should realize myself practically when I see the event taking place.

A desired object is my thought, but is something more. That something more is that is desired by me. In desire, what is desired must in all cases be self. In the words of Bradley, 'The essence of desire for an object would be the feeling of our affirmation in the idea of something not ourself, felt against the feeling of ourself as, without the object, void and negated'. It is the tension of this relation that produces motion. In such a case, nothing is desired except that which is identified with ourselves, and we can aim at nothing except so far as we aim at ourselves in it. Thus what we want in desire, in so far as we want it, is ourselves in some form or is some state of ourselves. Our wanting anything else cannot be explained psychologically.

If we ask ourselves what we should wish or desire most for, we find some general wish, which would include and imply our particular wishes. If we turn to life, we see that no man has disconnected particular ends. He looks beyond the moment, beyond the particular circumstance or position. His ends are subordinated to wider ends. Each situation is seen consciously or unconsciously as part of a broader situation. In a sequence of acts, he aims at realizing some larger whole, which is not real in any particular act as such, and yet is realized in the body of acts, which carries it out. It is a fact of experience that larger ends embrace smaller ends. So we may say that the self we realize is identified with its whole. In other words, the ideas of the states of self we realize are associated with ideas that stand for wholes.

The question arises whether these larger wholes are included in one whole. This needs investigation. Every man has a notion of happiness, though he may not quite know what it is. Most men have a life they live, tolerably satisfied. That life is fairly systematic. This life is generally seen to be a sphere including spheres, the

lower spheres subordinating to themselves and qualifying particular actions, and themselves subordinated to and qualified by the whole.

Most men have an ideal of life - a notion of perfect happiness, which is never attained in real life. This ideal of perfect happiness is not something fragmented or discontinuous, but is brought before the mind as a unity. If imagined more in detail, it looks like a system where particulars sub-serve one whole. The end we desire is, therefore, the finding and possessing ourselves as a whole.

In our day-to-day life, one realizes that one's sensuous existence is different from one's true nature. One feels one is different in self from what one is in an act. On that impulse, one alters the sensuous facts till one finds in them nothing but oneself carried out. Then one possesses one's world and one does not possess it until one finds one's will in it. One does not find that will until what one has is a harmonious whole in system.

Is a harmonious life all that we want in practice? Not so. A doctrine must not only hold together without contradiction, but must as well hold the facts together. It is no human ideal to lead 'the life of an oyster'. It is not correct to find out just what we happen to be and to have, and then to contract our wants to that limit. If we try to do that, morality tells us that we are false to ourselves. Against the sensuous facts around and within us, we must forever attempt to widen our ideal. Our true being is not the extreme of the unity, or of diversity, but the identity of both. So, self-realization means more than the mere assertion of the self as a whole. 'Realize oneself' does not mean merely to 'be a whole', but to 'be an infinite whole'.

Finite means limited from the outside and by the outside. The finite is to know itself as this, or not, as finite. If its knowledge does not fall wholly within itself, so far it is not finite. As it knows that it is limited from the outside and by the outside, it means that it knows the outside. If its whole being falls within itself, then in knowing itself, it knows that there is nothing outside itself. In such an event it is not finite.

If I am to realize myself, it must be as infinite. The question arises as to what 'infinite' means. The infinite is the unity of the finite and the infinite. The finite is determined from the outside. It means that to characterize and distinguish it is 'in fact' to divide it. In the infinite, there can be distinction, without division. This is a unity holding within itself all positive and negative factors. At the same time, the whole is so present in each that each has its own being in its opposite, and depends on that relation for its own life. The negative is also its affirmation. Thus the infinite has a distinction, and so a negation in itself, but is distinct from and negated by nothing but itself.

Far from being one something which is not another something, it is a whole in which both one and the other are mere elements. This whole is hence 'relative' through and through, but the relation does not fall outside it. The relatives are moments in which it is the relation of itself to itself, and so is above the relation, and is absolute reality. The finite is relative to something else. The infinite is self-related. It is this kind of infinite that the mind is. Circle is the simplest symbol of this principle, the line that returns into itself, not the straight line produced indefinitely.

This is realized in the satisfaction of desire. In this regard, one has oneself and its opposite, and the return from the opposite, the finding in the other nothing but self. This explains the adage, 'realize yourself as an infinite whole'. In other words, 'be specified in yourself, but not specified by anything foreign to yourself'.

The objection arises as Bradley puts it: 'Morality tells us to progress; it tells us we are not concluded in ourselves, nor perfect, but that there exists a not-ourself which never does wholly become ourself. And apart from morality, it is obvious that I and you, this man and the other man are finite beings. We are not one another; more or less, we must limit each other's sphere; I am what I am more or less by external relations, and I do not fall wholly within myself. Thus I am to be infinite and to have no limit from the outside; and yet I am one among others, and therefore am finite. It is all very well to tell me that in me there is infinity, the perfect identity of subject and object - that I may be willing perhaps to believe, but nonetheless I am finite'.

It is true that one is finite. One is both finite and infinite. That is why one's moral life is in a state of perpetual progress. One must progress because one has '*an other'* which is to be, and yet never quite is, oneself.

It is not that one intends to increase the quantum of one's self. One wishes to be nothing but one's true self, to be rid of all external relations, to bring them all within one and so to be wholly within one's self.

One is to be perfectly homogeneous. But one cannot be, unless one is fully specified. The question that arises is, 'how can one be extended as to take in one's external relations?' The answer is to be, 'one cannot be a whole, unless one joins a whole'. The question further continues: 'Being limited and so not a whole, how is one to extend oneself so as to be a whole?' The answer is to be a member in a whole. Here one's private self, one's finitude ceases to exist as such. It becomes a function of an organism. One must be not a mere piece of, but a member in or part of, a whole. This one must know and will oneself.

The whole to which one belongs specifies itself in the detail of its functions and yet remains homogeneous. It lives only one life, not many, and yet cannot live except in its many members. Each one of the members is alive, but not apart from the whole, which lives in it. The organism is homogeneous because it is specified, and specified because it is homogeneous.

The question still remains, in the words of Bradley, thus: 'But, what is that to me? I remain one member, and I am not other members. The more perfect the organism, the more it is specified, and so much the intenser becomes its homogeneity. But its 'more' means my 'less'. The unity falls in the whole and so outside me; and the greater specification of the whole means the making me more special, more narrowed and limited and less developed within myself'.

The issue begs of an important fact for consideration. In the moral organism, the members are aware of themselves, and as members. The relations of the others to me are not mere external relations. I know myself as a member. That is, I am aware of my own function. It also means that I am aware of the whole as specifying itself in

me. The will of the whole knowingly wills itself in me. The will of the whole is the will of the members, and so, in willing my own function, I do know that the others will themselves in me.

Similarly I also know that I will myself in the others, and find in them my will as not mine, and yet as mine. It is not true that the homogeneity falls outside me. It is not only in me, but also for me. Apart from my life in it, my knowledge of it and devotion to it I am not myself. When it goes out, my heart or spirit goes out with it. I feel happy where it succeeds. I suffer where it fails or is maimed. I perish if the love of it is separated from me.

It is no doubt true that the distinction of separate selves remains. But the point is that, in morality, the existence of my mere private self, as such, is something which ought not to be, and which, so far as I am moral, has already ceased. I shall be morally realized only when my personal self utterly ceases to be my exclusive self, and is no more a will outside others' wills, finding in all the others, nothing but self.

Thus the adage 'Realize yourself as an infinite whole' means 'realize yourself as the self-conscious member of an infinite whole, by realizing that whole in yourself'. When the whole is truly infinite and when the personal will is wholly made one with it, then one will have reached the pinnacle of homogeneity and specification in one, and have attained perfect self-realization.

All ethics, either explicitly or by implication, presupposes something which is the good that has the character of an end. The moral good is an end in itself. It is to be pursued for its sake. The end does not fall outside the doer. One cannot make an ultimate end of anything except oneself. Nor can one make oneself a mere means to something else. Nor does the end fall outside the activity. The moral consciousness assures one that the activity is an end in itself. The end is a doing, which is to be done. The activity is good in itself and not for the sake of a result beyond.

In other words, the good is the Good Will. The end is will for the sake of will. In relation to me, it is the realization of the good will in me or of myself as good will. In this role, I am an end to myself, an absolute and ultimate end. There is nothing, which is good unless it be a good will.

It is the truth of life and of the moral consciousness. This is no metaphysical explanation. A man is called good when he is moral, and not for other attributes. He is moral when his actions conform to and embody a good will, or when his will is good.

But good will signifies nothing except that will is the end. It does not say what will is the end. We call the good will indifferently like the universal will, the free will, the autonomous will or the formal will.

First, the very notion of the moral end is that it should be an end absolutely, not conditionally. It is an end for me and everyone else, without limitation to any this or that. In the character of common standard and aim, it is above everybody. It is thus objective and universal. Second, it is not conditioned by anything, nor does it owe its existence or attributes to anything, which is not itself. It has no end or aim beyond

itself, nor is it constituted or determined by anything else. Hence it is the free will. Third, being the will universal and an end to itself, it is autonomous, too. Being universal, it may be said to be a law to itself and to will its own law. For the same reason, in willing what is valid for itself, it wills what is valid for all. Fourth, in willing itself, it wills the universal that is not particular. Any possible object of desire or wished-for event has a content that is 'material'. Only that will is good, which wills itself as not particular. In other words, it wills itself as form. The good will, then, is the will determined by the form only, which realizes itself as the bare form of the will.

The self is to be realized as the good will, that is, the will that realizes an end, which is above and superior to everybody and capable of taking the shape of a law or an ought. Thus, the end is a realization of the good will superior to us and also self-realization. Bringing these two together, the end is a realization of ourselves as the will, which is above us.

As pointed out earlier, the will must be objective, universal, existent through its particulars and concrete. For morality, the good will has no meaning if it is not the will of living human beings. It is like the soul, which lives so far as the body lives, which makes the body a living entity and which, without the body, is as unreal an abstraction as the body without it. It is a moral organism. It is conscious self-realization because only by the will of its self-conscious members can the moral organism give itself reality.

It is the self-realization of the whole being because it is the one and the same will which lives and acts in the life and action of each. It is the self-realization of each member because each member cannot find the function, which makes him himself, apart from the whole to which he belongs. To be himself he must go beyond himself, to live his life he must live a life which is not merely his own, but which, nonetheless, is intensely and emphatically his own individuality. In the realized idea which, superior to him, affirms itself in the continuous process, each will have found the end - self-realization, duty and happiness - in one as an organ, in the social organism.

20. Relations – Duties

Relations universally measure duties. One is to maintain one's own position towards others. One need not examine what the other is doing, but what one must do is that one's *will* shall be conformable to nature. Another will not damage one unless one chooses. One will be damaged when one thinks that one is damaged. In this way one will discover one's duty from the relation of a neighbor, a member of the family, a member of the society, etc.

As to piety towards the gods, one must know that the chief thing is to have right opinions about them, to think that they exist, and that they administer the all well and justly. One is to fix oneself in this duty to obey them, and yield to them in everything as being accomplished by the wisest intelligence. If one does so, one will never blame the gods, nor accuse them of neglecting one. It is not possible for this to be done in any other way than by withdrawing from the things, which are not in our power and by placing the good and the evil only in those things, which are in our power.

Every man is formed by nature to turn away from the things, which appear harmful and the things, which are the cause of harm. He will follow and admire the things, which are useful and the cause of the useful. It is impossible then for a person who thinks that he is harmed to be delighted with that, which he thinks to be the cause of the harm. It is also impossible to be pleased with the harm itself.

Thus where one's interest is, there piety is. Consequently he who takes care to desire as he ought, and to avoid as he ought, at the same time, also cares after piety. To sacrifice and to offer first fruits according to custom and tradition, purely, not meanly, nor carelessly, nor scantily, nor above ability is a thing which each is to do.

One is to prescribe some form to oneself, which one shall observe both when one is alone and when one meets with men. Silence is the general rule, or what alone is necessary is said and in a few words. Rarely and only when the occasion demands, shall one say something.

One is not to laugh much, nor on many occasions, nor excessive.

One is to refuse to take an oath, if possible. If it is not, one is to refuse as far as one is able to refuse it.

One is to be careful of one's company. One must know that if one's companion is impure, whoever keeps company with him also becomes impure, though he should happen to be pure.

One is to apply the things that relate to the body as far as the bare use, such as food, drink, clothing, house, etc is necessary. One is to exclude everything, which is for show or luxury.

As to sexual pleasure, one is to act in the way conformable to custom.

If somebody reports to one that a certain person speaks ill of one, one does not make any comment on what has been told him. Instead, one may say that, 'the man did not know the rest of my faults, for he would not have mentioned only these'.

One shall not go to the felicitations of others, nor visit them readily. But if one attends such occasions, one is to observe gravity and sedateness, and also avoid making oneself disagreeable.

When one is to go to any of those who are in great power, one is to place before oneself that one will not find the man at home or that one will be excluded or that the door will not be opened to one or that the man will not care about one. And if, with all this, it is one's duty to visit him, one must bear what happens and never say to oneself that it was not worth the trouble. For this is silly and marks the character of a man who is offended by externals.

While one is in company with others, one is to take care not to speak much and excessive about one's own acts and dangers. It may be pleasant to one to make mention of one's dangers, but it is not so pleasant to others to hear of what has happened to one. One is to take care not to provoke laughter, as this is a slippery way toward vulgar habits. This will diminish the respect of one's neighbours. One is not to indulge in obscene talk, or permit it in the company in which one is. If anything of this kind happens, if there is a good opportunity, one is to rebuke the man who indulges in such talk. If there is no such opportunity, one is to show plainly that one is displeased at such talk by one's silence or expression of dissatisfaction by one's countenance or blushing.

If one receives the impression of any pleasure, one is to guard oneself against being carried away by it. One must let the thing wait and allow oneself a certain delay on one's part. Then one is to think of both times, of the time when one will enjoy the pleasure and of the time after the enjoyment of the pleasure when one will repent and reproach oneself. One is to set against these things how one will rejoice if one has abstained from the pleasure and how one will commend oneself. But if it seems reasonable to do the thing, one is to take care that the charm of it, and the pleasure and the attraction of it shall not conquer one. On the other hand, one is to consider how much better it is to be conscious, by its avoidance, that one has gained this victory over the sensuous pleasure.

When one has decided that a thing ought to be done and is doing it, one shall never avoid being seen doing it, though several people shall form an unfavourable opinion about it. If it is not right to do it, one is to avoid doing it. If it is right, why should one be afraid of those who find fault?

If one has assumed a character above one's strength, one has acted in this manner in an unbecoming way, and one has neglected that which one might have fulfilled.

In walking about one takes care not to step on a nail or to sprain one's foot. Similarly one is to take care not to damage one's ruling faculty. If one observes this rule in every act, one will undertake the act with more security.

The measure of possession to every man is the body, as the foot is of the shoe. If one stands on the demands of the body, one will maintain the measure. But if one passes beyond it, one must then of necessity be hurried, as it were, down a precipice. As also for the shoe, if one goes beyond the necessities of the foot, the shoe is gilded and will be an obstruction. There is no limit to that which has once passed the true measure.

It is a mark of mean capacity to spend much time on the things, which concern the body such as eating, drinking, exercise. These things need be done as subordinate things. One's care is to be directed to the mind and the soul.

When any person treats or speaks ill of one, one is to remember that he does or says this because he thinks it is his duty. It is not possible for him to follow that which seems right to one, but that which seems right to him. Accordingly if he is wrong in his opinion, he is the person who is hurt for he is the person who has been deceived. If a man supposes the true conjunction to be false, it is not the conjunction, which is hindered, but the man who has been deceived about it. If one proceeds from these opinions, one will be mild in his reaction to him who reviles one.

Some one says, 'I am richer than you, therefore my possessions are greater than yours. I am more eloquent than you; therefore my speech is superior to yours'. But one is neither possession, nor speech.

One is not to vomit one's knowledge before uninstructed people. Even sheep do not vomit up the grass to show to the shepherd how much they have eaten. When they have internally digested the pasture, they produce externally wool and milk. One is to speak aloud through one's acts rather than through one's words.

The condition and characteristic of an uninstructed person is that he never expects from himself either advantage or harm, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is that he expects all advantage and harm from himself. The marks of someone who is making progress in character are that he censures no man, praises no man, blames no man, accuses no man and says nothing about himself as if he were somebody or knew something. If he is impeded or hindered, he blames himself. If a man praises him, he ridicules the praiser to himself. If a man censures him, he makes no defence. He removes all desires from himself. He transfers aversion to those things, only of the things within his power that are contrary to nature. He employs a moderate movement toward everything. He does not care whether he is considered foolish or ignorant. In short, he watches himself as if he were an enemy and lying in an ambush.

Whatever rules are proposed to one for the conduct of life, one is to abide by them as if they were laws, as if one would be guilty of impiety if one transgressed any of them. Whatever appears to one to be the best shall be a law, which must not be

transgressed. One is to live continually improving oneself, attending to nothing except reason.

The important principles of ethical philosophy are first that we must not lie, the second that of demonstration and the third that which is confirmatory of the first two and explanatory. The third is necessary on account of the second, and the second on account of the first. The most necessary and that on which we ought to rest is the first. But all our earnestness is about the third. As a result, we entirely neglect the first. Therefore we lie; but the demonstration that we ought not to lie, we have ready to hand.

21. Desire - Aversion

Of desires, some are natural, others vain. Of the natural desires, some are necessary and others merely natural. Of the necessary, some are necessary for happiness, some for the repose of the body and others for very life. The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the soul's freedom from disturbance, for this is the aim of life of blessedness. It is only to obtain this end that we always act to avoid pain and fear. When this is secured, the soul is at peace.

We need pleasure, when we feel pain in the absence of pleasure. When we do not feel pain, we no longer need pleasure. For this reason, we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. We, therefore, recognize that pleasure is the first good innate to us. From pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance. We return to pleasure time and again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. The limit of quantity in pleasure is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, at once.

Though pleasure is the first good and also natural to us, we do not choose every pleasure. Sometimes we pass over many pleasures when greater discomfort accrues to us as a result of them. Similarly, we may think many pains better than pleasures because a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Thus every pleasure is good because of its natural kinship to us, and yet we may not choose every pleasure. Similarly, though every pain is an evil, yet not all are to be avoided. By way of consideration of advantages and disadvantages, we are to form our judgment on all these matters. For, the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.

No pleasure is a bad thing in itself. But the means, which produce some pleasures, bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures.

Independence of desire is another great good. We may not at all times enjoy but a few things. If we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine belief that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard. Plain food brings us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the pain due to want is removed. Even a morsel of food produces the highest pleasure, when one that needs it puts it to one's lips.

To grow accustomed to simple and not luxurious ways of life gives us health to the full. Such a course makes a man alert for the needful employments of life. When after long intervals, he has access to luxuries, he is not attracted towards them and becomes fearless of fortune.

Of desires, all, that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary. They only involve a craving, which is easily dispelled when the objects are hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.

He who has learnt the limits of life knows that, that which removes the pain due to want and makes the whole of life complete, is easy to obtain. He realizes that there is no need of actions that involve competition.

When we consider that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality. This pleasure is freedom from pain in the body and trouble in the mind. What produces a pleasant life is sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choices, and avoidance and banishing mere opinions.

There are two sorts of motions in human beings - one is called vital, the other voluntary. The vital motions are begun in generation and continued without interruption through their whole life such as the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc. The voluntary motions are such as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs as is fancied in mind. These motions depend upon a precedent thought of *whither*, *which way*, *what*, etc. Imagination is, therefore, the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. It causes small beginnings of the motion within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking and other visible actions. These are called Endeavour. Emotion is indeed e-motion, that is, energy in motion.

The endeavor, when it is toward something, which causes it, is called Appetite or Desire. The endeavour, when it is from-ward something, it is generally called Aversion. Both of them signify the motions – one of approaching and the other of retiring.

That which men desire, they are also said to 'love', and to 'hate' those things for which they have aversion. Desire and love are the same thing except that by desire we signify the absence of the object and by love the presence of the same. Similarly, by aversion we signify the absence and by hate the presence of the object.

Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men, as appetite of food, appetite of excretion and of exoneration, which may properly be called aversions. Some appetites of particular things proceed from experience and trial of their effects upon themselves or other men. But we have aversion for things which, we know, have hurt us and also those that we do not know whether they will hurt us or not.

Those things, which we neither desire nor hate, we are said to contemn. Contempt is an immobility or contumacy of the mind in resisting the action of certain things, and proceeding from that, the mind is already moved otherwise by other more potent objects, or from want of experience of them.

Human body is always in mutation. It is, therefore, impossible that the same things should always cause in a human being the same appetite and aversion. It is much less that all men can consent in the desire of any one and the same object.

Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire is what he, for his part, calls good. He calls the object of his hate and aversion, evil and of his contempt, vile, or contemptible or inconsiderable. These words of good, evil, vile or contemptible are used with relation to the person that uses them. There is nothing, nor

any common rule of good, evil or contemptible, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves.

The sense in a human organism is only motion caused by the action of the external objects. It is in the nature of appearance to the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, odour, etc. When the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears and other organs to the mind, the real effect there is nothing but motion or endeavour. This consists in appetite to or aversion from the object moving. The sense of that motion is what is called either delight or trouble of mind.

This motion, which is called appetite and for the appearance of it *delight* and *pleasure*, seems to be corroboration of the vital motion and help thereunto.

Pleasure or delight is, therefore, the appearance or sense of good; and *molestation* or *displeasure* the appearance or sense of evil. Consequently all appetite, desire or love is accompanied with some delight, and all hatred or aversion is accompanied with displeasure and offence.

Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present. They may be called pleasures of sense - sensual. Of this kind are all that is pleasant to the sight, hearing, smell, taste or touch. Others arise from the expectation that proceeds from foresight of the end or consequence of things, whether those things in the sense please or displease. These are pleasures of the mind and are generally called *joy*. Similarly, displeasures are some in the sense, and are called *pain*. Others in the sense, in the expectation of consequences, are called *grief*.

These simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy and grief have their names for diverse consideration. They are diversely called, from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire, secondly from the object loved or hated, thirdly from the consideration of many of them together, and fourthly from the alteration or succession itself.

Thomas Hobbes elucidates the passions graphically: 'Appetite with an opinion of attaining is called Hope. The same without such opinion, Despair. Aversion with opinion of hurt from the object, Fear. The same with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, Courage. Sudden courage, Anger. Constant hope, Confidence of ourselves. Constant despair, Diffidence of ourselves. Anger for great hurt done to another when we conceive the same to be done by injury, Indignation. Desire of good to another, Benevolence, Good Will, Charity. If to man generally, Good nature. Desire of riches, Covetousness… Desire of office of precedence, Ambition. Desire to know why and how, Curiosity, such as is in no other living creature but man. Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind or imagined from tales publicly allowed, Religion; not allowed, Superstition. And when the power is truly such as we imagine, True Religion'.

Vice may be defined as a course of behaviour consented to by the will and having results which are bad, primarily because they are God-eclipsing and, secondarily, because they are physically or psychologically harmful to the agent or his fellows. Ignorance of self is something that corresponds to this description.

If most of us remain ignorant of ourselves, it is because self-knowledge is painful and we prefer the pleasures of illusion. As for the consequences of such ignorance, they are bad by every criterion, from the utilitarian to the transcendental. It is bad because self-ignorance leads to unrealistic behaviour and so causes all kinds of troubles to all concerned. It is also bad because, without self-knowledge, there can be no true humility, which is a virtue in one's relations with others. In the absence of self-knowledge, there can be no effective self-naughting and, therefore, unitive knowledge of God.

Fear, worry, anxiety, etc form the central core of individualized selfhood. Fear cannot be got rid of by personal effort, but only by the ego's absorption in a cause greater than its own interests. Absorption in any cause will rid the mind of some of its fears. But absorption in the loving and knowing of the Divine can rid it of all fear. When the cause is less than the highest, the sense of fear and anxiety is transferred from the self to the cause. But if the sacrifice is made for God and for others for God's sake, there can be no fear or abiding anxiety. It is for the reason that nothing can be a menace to the divine Ground. Even failure and disaster are to be accepted as being in accord with the divine Will. If the love of God is intense enough, it casts out this projected fear and anxiety for cherished persons and institutions. The love of God arises because of humility on realization of their personal nothingness.

22. Ends - Means

'The end justifies the means' is an age-old maxim. The conception involved in the maxim is basically the same as that in the notion of ends-in-themselves. The conception that certain things are ends-in-themselves may justify the belief that the relation of ends-means is unilateral proceeding from end to means.

It leads to two views. One is that only the specially selected 'end' in view will actually be brought into existence by the means used, with some intervening unseen force preventing the means employed from having their other effects. The second view is that other consequences flowing from the means, apart from the end, may be completely ignored and brushed aside, however obnoxious they are. This arbitrary selection of some part of the consequences as the end and hence as the justification of the means used is the result of holding that it, as the end, is an end-in-itself, and hence possessed of value irrespective of all its existential relations. This notion is inherent in every view that assumes that ends can be valued apart from appraisal of the means used in attaining the said ends. This is a fallacy.

It is now well established that 'effects' are also 'causes'. In other words, it means that nothing is final in the sense that it is not part of an ongoing stream of events. It follows that the distinction between ends and means is only temporal and relational. Every condition that is to be brought into existence in order to serve as means is, in that connection, an object of desire and an end-in-view, while the end actually reached is a means to further ends as well as a test of valuations earlier made. Since the end attained is a condition of further existential occurrences, it can be appraised as a potential obstacle and a potential resource. If we are able to abandon the notion of some objects as being ends-in-themselves, it is possible for us to frame ends-in-view and form desires on the basis of practical propositions of the temporal relations of events to one another.

Generalized ideas of ends and values exist as expressions of habit and as uncritical and probably invalid ideas. They also exist in the same way as valid general ideas arise in any subject. Desires and interests are carried over from one situation to another, which recur. They get consolidated. General ends ensue. These general ideas are used as intellectual instrumentalities in judgment of particular cases as they arise. They are tools that direct and facilitate examination of things in specific cases while they are also developed and tested by the results of their application in these cases. This leads to the situation that general ideas of value function as rules for evaluation of particular desires and that the desires, by the mere fact of their occurrence, confer value upon objects as ends, entirely independent of their contexts in the continuity of activities.

This leads to the enquiry into the conditions under which desires take shape and foreseen consequences are projected as ends to be reached. These conditions are those of need, deficit and conflict. In addition, the tension between a person and his environment is another condition. There is no other occasion for evoking desire for something else. There is nothing to induce the formation of an end, much less the formation of a particular end out of the indefinite ends theoretically possible.

Transformation of active tendencies into a desire in which a particular end-in-view is incorporated is organized by the needs of an actual situation.

For example, a physician has to determine the value of various courses of action and their results in the case of a particular patient. He forms ends-in-view having the value that justifies their adoption, on the ground of what his examination discloses what requires to be done for the patient. He estimates the worth of what he undertakes on the ground of its capacity to produce a condition in which the health of the patient is restored. He does not have an idea of health as an absolute end-in-itself, an absolute good by which to determine what to do. On the other hand, he forms his general idea of health as an end and a value for the patient on the ground of what he considers the best course to relieve the patient of his ailment, which ultimately leads to good health thereafter. It is true that he has a general and abstract conception of health of the patient as the ultimate end. But it is the outcome of a number of definite, empirical enquiries, not a preconditioning standard for carrying on enquiries.

Ends-in-view are thus appraised or valued as good or bad on the basis of their serviceability in the direction of their behaviour dealing with states of affairs with inherent conflict .They are appraised as fit or unfit, proper or improper, right or wrong on the ground of their required-ness in accomplishing this end.

The attained end or consequence is always an organization of activities that enter as factors. The end-in-view is that particular activity which operates as a coordinating factor of all other sub-activities involved. The form of an attained end or consequence is always the same – adequate coordination. Thus the ultimate end is the unified organization of activities, while the end-in-view is the special activity, which is the means of effecting this coordination. In the continuous process of organizing activities into a coordinated and coordinating unity, a constituent activity is both an end and a means. It is an end in so far as it temporally and relatively brings the particular activity to a close. It is a means in so far as it provides a condition to be taken into account in further and continuing activity. Thus means are constituents of ends attained and ends are usable as means to further ends.

The words ‘activity’ and ‘activities’ involve existential material. For example, breathing involves air, buying and selling involve commodities, enquiry involves investigation, etc. No human activity operates in a vacuum. It acts in the world and has materials upon which and through which it produces results. On the other hand no material such as air, water, wood means anything except as it is employed in some human activity to produce something.

The ‘organization of activities’ includes within itself organization of the materials existing in the world. That organization which is the final value for each specific situation of valuation thus forms part of the existential conditions that have to be taken into account in further formation of desires and interests or valuations. To the degree in which desires and interests are formed after critical review of the conditions, which, as means, determine the actual outcome, the more continuous become subsequent activities. The consequences then attained of the subsequent activities are evaluated as means in the continuum of action.

Each of the things produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by the agent. The proper object of the will is the good and the end. As a result, things, which proceed from will, must be directed to some end. Each thing achieves its ultimate end through its own action. Thus, in acting every agent intends an end. In the case of things, which obviously act for an end, we call that the end toward which the inclination of the agent tends. Every inclination of an agent tends toward something definite. As heating comes from heat, cooling from cold, actions are specifically distinguished by virtue of a diversity of active powers.

An action may sometimes terminate in something, which is made, as building does in a house and as healing does in health. Other times it does not, as in the cases of understanding and sensing. If an action does, in fact, terminate in something that is made, the inclination of the agent tends through the action toward the thing that is produced. But, if it does not terminate in a product, then the inclination of the agent tends toward the action itself. So it must be that every agent in acting intends an end, sometimes the action itself, sometimes a thing produced by the action.

For every agent, the principle of its action is either its nature or its intellect. The agent that acts with nature as its principle is just as much directed to a definite end, in its action, as is the agent that acts through intellect as its principle. Therefore, every agent acts for an end.

23. Reason - Conscience

Role of Reason

Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical categories. Morality is comprehended under the practical category. It is supposed to influence our passions and actions. It is to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding. It is our experience that men are often governed by their duties and are deterred from some actions by the opinion of their being unjust, and impelled to others by that of obligation.

Some ethical philosophers hold that, as morals have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows that they cannot be derived from reason. Morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. Reason is utterly impotent in this regard. The rules of morality cannot, therefore, be conclusions of our reason. As long as it is allowed that reason has no influence on our passions and actions, it cannot be true that morality is discovered by a deduction of reason.

Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement is incapable of being true or false, and cannot be an object of our reason.

Our passions, volitions, actions, etc are not susceptible of such agreement or disagreement. They are original facts and realities, complete in themselves. Nor do they imply any reference to other passions, volitions and actions. Based on this approach, they cannot be said to conform to reason. Moral distinctions, therefore, cannot be said to be the offspring of reason.

Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of an active principle like conscience, or a sense of morals. Reason or science is nothing but the comparing of ideas, and the discovery of their relations. If the same relations have different characters, it must evidently follow that those characters are not discovered by reason.

It is observed that reason can have an influence on our conduct in two ways. One is when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something, which is a proper object of it. The other is when it discovers the connection of causes and effects so as to afford us means of exerting any passion. These are the only kinds of judgment that can accompany our actions. It is very likely that these judgments may be false and erroneous. When they turn out to be false, they are rendered unreasonable and cannot be said to conform to any rational reason.

On the whole, the distinction between the moral good and evil cannot be made by reason as that distinction has an influence upon our actions of which reason alone is incapable. Reason and judgment may prompt and direct a passion. They may be the mediate cause of action. But it cannot be that a judgment of this kind, either in its truth or falsehood, is attended with virtue or vice. As to the judgments caused by other

judgments, they can still less bestow moral qualities on the actions that are their causes.

Thus, according to them, morality is not an object of reason. Virtue and vice are not matters of fact whose existence can be inferred by reason. In any action there are only certain passions, motives, volitions, thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in any action. As long as we consider the object, the vice entirely escapes us. We find it only if we reflect on the action and find a sentiment of disapprobation that arises in us towards the action. Here is a matter of fact. It is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in us, not in the object.

When we pronounce any action or character to be vicious, we mean nothing except that from the constitution of our nature we have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of the action or event. Virtue and vice can be compared to sounds, colours, heat, cold, etc which are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind. Nothing is more real, or concerns us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure, pain or unease. If these are favourable to virtue and unfavourable to vice, they help in the regulation of our conduct and behaviour.

Virtue and vice are discoverable, if not merely by reason or the comparison of ideas but by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion. Our decisions concerning morality are evidently perceptions in the category of impressions. Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judged of.

Impressions arise in experience, every moment. These impressions give rise to a feeling of pleasure or sense of unease in varying measure. An action or sentiment or character is virtuous or vicious because its view causes a pleasure or unease of a particular kind. In giving a reason for the said pleasure or unease, we explain sufficiently the virtue or vice that attends on it. To have a sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no further; nor do we enquire into the cause of the satisfaction.

We do not infer a character to be virtuous because it just pleases. In feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we feel, in effect, that it is virtuous. We make a similar kind of judgment in all matters concerning aesthetics, tastes, sensations, etc. Our approbation is implied in the immediate pleasure they convey to us.

Moral good and evil are thus distinguished by our sentiments, not by reason. These sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and passions, or from reflections on their tendency to happiness of mankind, and of particular persons. Both these causes are intertwined in our judgments of morals.

Reflections on the tendencies of actions have by far the greatest influence, and determine the contours of our duty. In some instances, sentiment produces approbation. Wit and a certain easy and disengaged behaviour are qualities immediately agreeable to others, generating sympathy. As such they command their love and esteem. Some of these qualities produce satisfaction in others by particular

original principles of human nature, which cannot be accounted for. Others may be resolved into principles that are more general in nature.

Conscience

Conscience is the faculty within human beings that decides on the moral quality of their thoughts, words and deeds. It makes us conscious of the worth of our thoughts, words and actions and gives rise to a feeling of pleasure if they are good, and of pain if they are evil.

The moral sense of an individual identifies the consciousness of right and wrong with the inner voice - the voice of an inner moral law. Inner voice or feelings are considered as edicts of one's conscience. Conscience has thus become a faculty of the mind that judges immediately and finally on moral matters. Human reason and conscience are thus considered the final arbiter of right and wrong.

All socio-religious traditions have notions of moral law and moral judgment. All encourage reflectivity and offer conceptual tools and practical techniques for self-evaluation. Conscience makes us potentially morally liable. It also makes us aware of potential moral support.

When conscience is alive, it evaluates the action of the self as part of a continuing moral action and interaction with others. The healthy conscience lives in the present. In the moment of conscience, consciousness becomes conscious of its past social unconsciousness and moves on. By its very nature, it lives in the presence of another human being or beings. It forges an intention, takes an initiative, faces others with a proposal and issues forth in a public act. Healthy consciences are not closed, but open. They share their feelings and experiences and thereby form, or enjoy forming action.

24. Virtue

Virtue, generally, in all sorts of subjects, is something that is valued for eminence, and consists in comparison. For, if all things are equal in men, nothing will be praised.

The beginning and the greatest good is prudence. From prudence are sprung all other virtues. It teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honourably and justly. Reversely, it is not possible to live a life of prudence, honour and justice without living pleasantly.

The virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. The blessed and pleasant nature knows no trouble itself. Nor does it cause trouble to another. It is never constrained by anger or favour. Such emotions exist only in the weak.

There is a sharp distinction between virtue and morality as coordinate and independent forms of goodness. Moral philosophy rightly concentrates its attention on the fact of obligation. On the other hand, in the lives of those whom we admire most, the sense of obligation, though important, is not a dominating factor. It is virtue that makes them great. Virtue is thus no indispensable basis of morality.

The states of mind that merit praise are called virtues. Virtues are distinguished into intellectual and moral categories. Philosophical wisdom, understanding, practical wisdom, etc are called intellectual virtues. Liberality, temperance, benevolence, charity, etc are called moral virtues. Intellectual virtue owes its birth and growth to teaching. For this reason, it requires experience and time. On the other hand, moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.

We get virtues by first exercising them. We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts, etc. By abstaining from pleasures, we become temperate. When we have become temperate, we shall be most able to abstain from pleasures. So is the case in regard to courage. By being habituated to despise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against them, we become brave. When we have become brave, we shall be most able to stand our ground against them. It makes all the difference whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our early childhood through youth.

We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts. The man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent. The man, who stands his ground against things that are terrible, and delights in this or at least is not pained, is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward.

Moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains. It is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things; and on account of the pain, we abstain from noble things. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our early

youth both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought. This is the right education.

If the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure or pain, virtue will be concerned with pleasure or pain, too. We measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule of pleasure and pain. Because of this position, the whole concern of virtue is with pains and pleasures. The man who uses them well will be good, he who uses them badly bad.

A question arises as to what is meant by saying that we must become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts, etc. If the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character, it does not mean that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them. In the first place, he must have knowledge. Second, he must choose the acts and for their own sake. Third, his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. While knowledge has little or no weight, the other conditions, which result from doing just and temperate acts, are very important and count for everything.

Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man will do, as all other just and temperate men would do in similar circumstances. It is, therefore, said that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced. It is by doing temperate acts that the temperate man is produced. Without doing these acts, no one will have the prospect of becoming good.

What is actually virtue? In the soul are found three kinds of things - passions, faculties and states of character. By passions are meant appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity and the feelings that are accompanied generally by pleasure or pain. By faculties are meant the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these passions, that is, of becoming angry, being pained, feeling pity, etc. By states of character are meant the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions. For example, with reference to anger, we stand badly if we feel it violently. Or we stand well if we feel it only moderately. So is the case with other passions.

Neither the virtues nor the vices are passions. We are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but only on the ground of our virtues and vices. Similarly we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions, but only for our virtues and vices.

We feel anger and fear without choice. But the virtues are modes of choice, or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions, we are said to be moved. But in respect of the virtues and the vices, we are said to be disposed in a particular way, not moved. For these reasons, they are not faculties, too. We have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature.

If the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states of character. Every virtue or excellence brings into good condition

the thing of which it is excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well. For example, the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good. It is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the virtue of man will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well.

This will be more evident if the specific nature of virtue is considered. In everything that is continuous and divisible, it is possible to take more, less or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us. The equal is an intermediate between excess and short or defect. By the intermediate is meant the mean between the two extremes.

Following this principle, the moral virtue that is associated with passions and actions aims at the mean of the passion concerned. For example, fear, confidence, appetite, anger, pity, and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little. Either way, any of these passions is not felt well. But to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way is what is both intermediate and the best. This is characteristic of virtue.

Similarly, with regard to actions also there is excess, deficit or short, and the intermediate. Thus virtue is concerned with passions and actions in which either excess or deficit is a form of failure while the intermediate or the mean is a form of success, being praised. Being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean.

Also, it is possible to fail in many ways, while to succeed is possible only in one way. For this reason too, excess and deficit are characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue. In the words of Aristotle, 'virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, that is, the mean relative to us, this being determined by rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it'.

Neither every action, nor every passion admits of mean. Some passions and actions are bad in themselves. For example, spite, shamelessness, envy, etc are bad passions. Adultery, theft, murder, etc are bad actions. It is not possible to be right ever with such passions and actions. In such cases there cannot be a mean, excess or a deficiency. In whatever way it is done, it is bad and, therefore, evil.

These statements of conduct are general in nature and, therefore, apply more widely. But statements that are particular concerning individual cases are more genuine. The statements have to harmonize with the facts in individual cases.

In individual cases, it may be said that courage is the mean in regard to feelings of fear and confidence. The man who exceeds in confidence is considered rash; he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. Similarly, temperance is the mean in regard to pleasures and pains - not all of them, and not so much in regard to pains. Self-indulgence is the excess of pleasures. Persons deficient of them may be called 'insensible'.

Liberality is the mean in regard to giving and taking of money; the excess is prodigality and the deficiency meanness. Proper pride is the mean in regard to honour and dishonour; the excess is a kind of empty vanity and the deficiency undue humility. Good temper is the mean in regard to anger where there is no excess or deficiency. Truthfulness is the mean in regard to truth; the excess is boastfulness and the deficiency mock modesty. Ready-witted is the mean in regard to pleasantness in the giving of amusement, and the disposition ready-wit; the excess is buffoonery and the deficiency is the state of boorishness. Friendliness is the mean in regard to general pleasantness exhibited in life; the excess is a flatterer or an obsequious person subserving his ends, the deficiency an unpleasant, quarrelsome or surly sort of person.

There are also means in the passions, and concerned with the passions. Since shame is not a virtue, praise is extended to the modest man. Thus, modesty is the mean in regard to shame; the excess is bashfulness and the deficiency shamelessness. Righteous indignation is the mean between envy and spite, and these states are concerned with the pain and pleasure that are felt at the fortunes of neighbours, friends, etc. For example, the man characterized by righteous indignation is pained at undeserved good fortune of his neighbour. But the envious man is pained at all good fortune, while the spiteful man rejoices at the misfortune of another.

The one at the extreme of a passion may be called *irascible* and the one falling short of the same passion may be called inirascible. The virtue, being mean, may generally be called irascibility and the vice inirascibility.

The moral virtue is thus a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency, and that it is such that its character is to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions. It is no easy task to be good, for the reason that it is no easy task to find the right middle way. Anyone can get angry, give or spend money. But to do this to the right man, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, in the right way, etc. is not for everyone, nor is it easy. Therefore, true goodness is rare, laudable and noble. The intermediate stage in all things is to be praised. But it becomes necessary on occasions that we must incline towards the excess, some other times towards the deficiency so that we shall most easily hit the mean and what is right.

As virtue is concerned with passions and actions, praise and blame are bestowed on voluntary passions and actions. On involuntary passions and actions are bestowed pardon and sometimes pity. Involuntary passions and actions are those that take place under compulsion, or owing to ignorance. That of which the moving principle is outside the agent is compulsory. Compulsory actions are, therefore, those when the cause is in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing.

Choice is most closely bound up with virtue, and to discriminate characters better than actions do. Choice seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary. The difference between the two concepts is clear. For example, infants and the lower animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice. Acts done on the spur of the moment may be voluntary, but not as chosen. Choice involves a rational principle and thought. Its very name suggests that it is what is chosen among alternatives, before other things.

Thus, in brief, the virtues are means and states of character. The virtues tend, by their own nature, to the doing of the acts by which they are produced. They are in our power, voluntary and act as the right rule prescribes.

But actions and states of character are not voluntary in the same way. We are masters of our actions from the beginning right to the end if only we know the particular facts. Though we control the beginning of our states of character, the gradual progress is not obvious, any more than it is in illness. The states of character are voluntary in the sense that it is in our power to act in a particular way or not to act.

As for the virtues of the soul, they are of two kinds - virtues of character and virtues of intellect. As for the soul itself, it may be conceived that it has two parts - that which grasps a rule or rational principle, and the other irrational.

The former part has again two divisions – one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes are invariable, and the other by which we contemplate variable things.Where objects differ in kind, the part of the soul answering to different objects is different in kind. This is in virtue of a certain kinship between that part of the soul and the objects. These two divisions may be called the scientific and the calculative. To deliberate and to calculate are the same thing. No one deliberates about the invariable. Therefore, the calculative is one part of the faculty, which grasps a rational principle. The best state of each of these two divisions is the virtue of each.

The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work. There are three things in the soul which control action and Truth - sensation, reason and desire.

Of these, sensation originates no action. This is evident from the fact that the lower animals have sensation, but no share in action. What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire. As moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the choice must pursue just what the desire asserts. This kind of intellect and of truth is practical. Of the intellect, which is contemplative, the good and the bad states are truth and falsity respectively. Indeed this is the work of everything intellectual. The good state is Truth in agreement with right desire in respect of that part which is practical and intellectual.

The efficient cause of action - the origin of action - is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state. Good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. Intellect, however, moves nothing. The intellect that aims at an end is alone practical. This is so with the productive intellect as well. For, good action is an end and desire aims at this. Hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire. Such an origin of action is man.

It is, however, to be noted that nothing that is past can ever be an object of choice. No one deliberates about the past. What is past is not capable of not having taken place. As the saying goes, to make undone things that have once been done is lacking even to God.

The work of both the intellectual parts, the practical and the productive, then, is truth. Therefore, the states that each of these parts reaches truth are the virtues of the two parts.

The states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number. They are art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom and intuitive knowledge. Judgment and opinion are not included in these states as there is a possibility of being mistaken in them.

All art is concerned 'with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made'. Art is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, by necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance with nature. They have their origin in themselves. Making and acting being different, art must be a matter of making, not of acting.

The object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. We all suppose that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise. Of things capable of being otherwise, we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation, whether they exist or not. That is why the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. It is eternal as things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal. Things that are eternal are imperishable. Thus scientific knowledge is judgment about things that are universal and necessary. The conclusions of demonstration and all scientific knowledge follow from first principles as scientific knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground.

As for practical wisdom, it is thought to be the mark of a man to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself generally, not in some particular respect. Practical wisdom is neither scientific knowledge, nor art.

It is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. Good action itself is its end. We say that people have practical wisdom when they can see what is good for them and what is good for men in general. It is, therefore, a state of capacity to act with regard to human goods.

Practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art. As the soul has two parts that can follow a course of reasoning, practical wisdom must be the virtue of that part which forms opinions. Opinion itself is about the variable and so is practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is concerned not only with universals, but also with the particulars. It is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars. This is why some who do not know but have experience are more practical than others who know. As practical wisdom is concerned with action, one is to have both wisdom and action.

As for philosophic wisdom, it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule, that is virtue.

The first principles from which what is scientifically known follows cannot be an object of scientific knowledge, art or practical wisdom. It is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles. Wisdom is the most finished of the forms of knowledge. The wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess Truth about the first principles. Therefore, wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with the scientific knowledge of the highest objects.

We do just, brave and other virtuous acts in relation to each other, while observing our respective duties in regard to contracts and services and also passions. All these actions are typically human. Some of them even arise from the body, and virtue of character is bound up in many ways with the passions. Practical wisdom is also linked to virtue of character and vice-versa. This is for the reason that the principles of practical wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtues and rightness in morals is in accordance with practical wisdom.

The moral virtues are connected with the passions. As such they belong to our composite nature. The virtues of our composite nature are human; so are the life and the happiness that correspond to these. The excellence of the reason is a thing apart.

It is often debated whether the will or the deed is more essential to *virtue*, which is assumed to involve both. It is true that its perfection involves both. For deeds, many things are needed, the more, the greater and nobler the deeds are. But the man contemplating the truth needs no such thing in the exercise of his activity. Such things may, indeed, be hindrance to his activity, that is, contemplation. But so far as he is a man and lives in a society with other people, he chooses to do virtuous acts. He, therefore, needs such aids to living a human life.

Being a man, one will also need external prosperity. Our nature is not sufficient for the purpose of contemplation alone. Our body is to be healthy and be provided with food and other attention. This does not mean that a man to be happy needs many or great things, merely because he cannot be supremely happy without external goods. For, self-sufficiency and action do not involve excess. Even with moderate advantages one can act virtuously. It is enough that man has just sufficient goods to be active in life in accordance with virtue, to be happy.

It is often debated whether virtue and vice are natural or unnatural. Consideration of this issue depends on how ‘nature’ is understood. If nature is understood as opposed to miracles, both virtue and vice are natural. If it is understood as opposed to what is unusual, perhaps virtue or vice may be regarded as unnatural as in the case of heroic virtue or brutal barbarity. If it is understood as opposed to being artificial, both virtue and vice are equally artificial and out of nature.

Every quality in us or others that gives pleasure causes pride or love. Similarly every quality that produces uneasiness excites humility or hatred. It follows that these two particulars - virtue and the power of producing love or pride and vice and the power of producing humility or hatred – are to be considered as equivalent. We have,

therefore, to judge the one by the other. We may pronounce any quality of the mind virtuous that causes love or pride, and any one vicious that causes humility or hatred.

If any action is either virtuous or vicious, it is only as a sign of some quality or character. It must extend upon durable principles of the mind. The principles extend over the whole conduct and enter into the personal character. Actions themselves do not proceed from any constant principle. Therefore, they have no influence on love or hatred, or pride or humility. Consequently they are never considered in morality.

In this background, we do not consider any single action or actions in our enquiry concerning the origin of morals. It is only the quality or character from which the action proceeds, that matters. These alone are durable enough to affect our sentiments concerning the person. It is true that actions are better indicators of a character than words, wishes or sentiments. But it is only in so far as they are such indicators that they are attended with love or hatred.

Thus, every quality of mind is denominated virtuous that gives pleasure; while every quality of mind is denominated vicious that produces pain.

By perfection is originally meant the accomplishment of a thing proposed by a man. Not only the man who does the act, but also everyone else who has really known or has believed that he has known the mind and intention of the author of that work will call it perfect, too. This seems to have been the first signification of the word.

Afterwards men began to think out universal ideas which each had formed of things and called them perfect. On the other hand, man called a thing imperfect which seemed to agree less with his typal conception, though complete in all respects. This is why the words 'perfect' and 'imperfect' are commonly applied traditionally to natural objects not made with human hands.

By perfection, ethically, is meant reality, that is, the essence of any object in so far as it exists and acts in a certain manner with no regard to its duration.

In the words of Lacordaire, 'humility does not consist in hiding our talents and virtues, in thinking ourselves worse and more ordinary than we are, but in possessing a clear knowledge of all that is lacking in us and in not exalting ourselves for that which we have, seeing that God has freely given it us and that, with all His gifts, we are still of infinitely little importance.'

The aim and purpose of human life is the unitive knowledge of God. Among the indispensable means to that end is right conduct. By the degree and kind of virtue achieved, the degree of liberating knowledge may be assessed and its quality evaluated.

The virtue, which is accompanied and perfected by the love and knowledge of God, is quite different from the byproducts of self-improvement by means of personal effort. The self-improvement, either unassisted or, if assisted, seconded by the pseudo-graces which arise when the individual devotes himself, not to the goal of God, but to a projection of his own favourite ideas or moral excellences, results in

hardness, fanaticism, uncharitableness and spiritual pride. These are the worst of moral evils.

Where the grace is genuinely supernatural, amelioration in one aspect of the total personality is not accompanied by deterioration elsewhere. To distinguish the true grace from the false one is generally difficult. But as time and circumstances reveal the full extent of their consequences on the soul, discrimination becomes possible even to observers with no special gifts of insight. True grace and inspiration are given when, and to the extent to which, a human being gives up self-will and abandons himself, moment by moment, through constant recollectedness and non-attachment, to the will of God.

One may have spent all one's life in the belief that one is wholly devoted to others, and never self-seeking. Nothing so feeds self-conceit as this sort of internal testimony that one is free from self-love, and always generously devoted to one's neighbours. But all this devotion that seems to be for others is really for oneself. It is the 'I' who makes one so keen and sensitive. One wants God as well as man to be always satisfied with one, and one wants to be satisfied with oneself in all one's dealings with God.

The virtue of non-violence has led to the concepts of different moral duties. To tell someone a lie, for example, is regarded as inflicting a mental injury on that person. Stealing, of course, is another form of injury. As there is not much distinction between acts and omissions, even the possession of wealth is seen as depriving the poor and hungry of the means to satisfy their wants. Thus the principle of non-possession of property beyond what satisfies the minimum needs of the family of the individual is an offshoot of the principle of non-violence as a virtue.

The virtue of compassion for all promoted by Buddha is an ethic against withdrawal from the world and for universal brotherhood. The ultimate goal resulting from the universal compassion is *Nirvana*, a state in which all living beings are free from pain and sorrow. This ethics is without bounds.

The 'middle path' between self-indulgence and self-renunciation also promoted by him is not so much a path between these two extremes. It is the one that draws together the benefits of both. Through living a life of compassion and love for all, a person achieves the liberation from selfish cravings sought by an ascetic, and a serenity and satisfaction that are more fulfilling than anything obtained by indulgence in carnal pleasure.

It is sometimes thought that, as a state of freedom from pain and sorrow can be reached by meditation, Buddhism teaches withdrawal from the real world. *Nirvana*, however, is not to be sought for oneself alone. It is regarded as a unity of the individual self with the universal Self in which all things take part. In the *Mahayana* school of Buddhism, the aspirant for Enlightenment even takes a vow not to accept final release until everything that exists in the universe has attained *Nirvana*.

25. Justice

Plato explains the nature and the origin of justice in The Republic thus:

'What people say is that to do wrong is, in itself, a desirable thing; on the other hand, it is not at all desirable to suffer wrong for the harm to the sufferer outweighs the advantage to the doer. Consequently, when men have had a taste of both, those who have not the power to seize the advantage and escape the harm decide that they would be better off if they made a compact neither to do wrong, nor to suffer it. So they began to make laws and covenants with one another; and whatever the law prescribed they called lawful and right. That is what right or justice is and how it came into existence. So justice is accepted as a compromise, and valued, not as good in itself, but for lack of power to do wrong.

The justice, which arises from nature, is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed. For all living things, which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust. Justice is never anything in itself. But in the dealings of men with one another, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear, which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions. In its general aspect, justice is the same for all as it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another. But in the context of individual peculiarities of a country or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all. It also happens that what was once considered just, may turn out to be unjust later, in the face of changed circumstances in spite of the fact that it has the sanction of law.

Men practise justice against their grain and instincts, for lack of power to do wrong. Men do right only under compulsion'.

We think of justice as a quality that may exist in a whole community as well as an individual, and the community is the bigger of the two. Justice is, therefore, to be in the community in a larger measure than in an individual. A state - the community organized - comes into being because no individual is self-sufficing. We have all many needs. Having all these needs, we call in one another's help to satisfy our various requirements. When we have collected a number of helpers and associates to live together in one area, we call that settlement a state. So if one man gives another what he has to give in exchange for what he can get, it is because each finds that to do so is for his own advantage.

No two people are born exactly alike. There are innate differences, which fit them for different occupations. So more things will be produced and the work is better done when everyman is set free from all other occupations to do, at the right time, the one thing for which he is naturally fitted.

According to Plato, the state is to have four virtues or qualities of which justice is the fourth and important. Justice is that universal principle that everyone

ought to perform the one function in the community for which his nature has best suited him.

Justice also means minding one's own business, in a certain form, and not meddling with other men's concerns. When each order such as the Guardian, the Auxiliary, the tradesman, the craftsman keeps to its own proper business in the community and does its own work, that is justice and it makes a just society. No harm is, however, done if there is a general interchange of most forms of work with the people exchanging their positions and tools and taking on each other's jobs, as long as the people perform the functions for which their natures have best suited them.

An individual is 'just' in the same way that the state or community is just. An individual is just fulfilling his proper function, only if the several parts of his nature fulfill theirs. It is the business of reason to guide the individual's action with wisdom and forethought on behalf of the soul. The two will be brought into harmony by that combination of mentally and bodily training. When both are thus nurtured and trained to know their functions, they must be set in command over the appetites, which are by nature covetous insatiably. The two must keep watch on the bodily pleasures to be in limits so that the body keeps to its own work. The individual is considered just for the reason that each part of his nature is exercising its proper function, of ruling or of being ruled.

In reality, justice is not a matter of external behaviour, but of the inward self. In other words, it is a matter of attending to all that is, in the fullest sense, a man's proper concern. The just man does not allow the several elements in his soul to usurp one another's functions. He is the one who sets his house in order by self-mastery and discipline. Bringing the three parts-body, mind and soul-into perfect harmony and making himself one man instead of many, he goes about his temporal work.

In relation to his activity, when he speaks of just and honorable conduct, he means the behavior that helps to produce and to preserve this habit of mind. When he speaks of wisdom, he means the knowledge, which presides over such conduct. Any action, which tends to break down this habit, will be for him unjust; and the notions governing it will be ignorance and folly for him. The just man is most free from trouble, the unjust full of trouble. To do the greatest of wrongs to one's own community is injustice.

The concept of justice has two principles. First, each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all. Second, inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for every one's advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which they may be gained are open to all. These principles express justice as a complex of three ideas - liberty, equality and reward for services contributing to the common good. The term 'person' is to be construed variously depending on the circumstances. It means human individuals and also includes nations, states, business firms, religious institutions, identifiable interest groups, etc.

But fundamental to justice is the concept of fairness, which relates to right dealing between persons who are cooperating with or competing against one another. This bears resemblance to fair competition, fair games and fair bargains.

In the words of John Rawls, 'the question of fairness arises when free persons, who have no authority over one other, are engaging in a joint activity and amongst themselves settling or acknowledging the rules, which define it and which determine the respective shares in its benefits and burdens'.

A practice is considered fair if no one, participating in it, feels that he or any of the others is taken advantage of, or they are forced to give in to claims which they do not regard as legitimate. This implies that each has a conception of legitimate claims, which he thinks it reasonable for himself as well as the others to acknowledge. If one thinks of the principles of justice as arising in the manner described, then they do define this sort of conception. A practice is just or fair when it satisfies the principles, which those who participate in it could propose to one another for mutual acceptance in the said circumstances.

It is this notion of the possibility of mutual acknowledgment of principles by free persons with no authority over one another that makes the concept of fairness fundamental to justice. When such acknowledgment is possible, there can be true community among people in their common practices. To judge practices by the principles so arrived at is to apply the standards of fairness to them.

When the participants in a practice accept its rules as fair, there arises a prima facie duty of the parties to each other to act in accordance with the practice, when it befalls them to comply. Performance of duty by one leads to one's acquiring a corresponding right in similar acquiescence on the part of those benefited by the performance of one's duty. The rights and the duties so arising are special rights and duties in that they depend on the parties having engaged in a common practice and knowingly accepted its benefits. This duty is called *fair-play*.

The duty of fair-play stands apart from other prima facie duties such as fidelity and gratitude, as a basic moral notion. These duties are all clearly distinct. The duty of fair-play implies a constraint on self-interest in particular cases. The acceptance of the duty of fair-play by participants in a common practice is a reflection in each person of the recognition of the aspirations and interests of the others to be realized by their joint activity. To acknowledge these duties in some measure is to having the elements of morality. It is not a matter of choice, or of intuiting moral qualities, or a matter of the expression of attitudes. It is simply the possession of one of the forms of conduct in which the recognition of others as persons is manifested.

One consequence of this conception is that, where it applies, there is no moral value in the satisfaction of a claim incompatible with it. This conception assimilates justice to benevolence, which, in turn, promotes general welfare. Justice is a kind of efficiency.

Justice is useful to society. The public utility is the sole origin of justice. The reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the sole foundation of its merit. This virtue derives its existence entirely from its necessary use to the intercourse and social state of mankind. The use and tendency of this virtue is to procure happiness and security by preserving order in society. The rules of equity and justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that unity which results to the people from their strict and regular observance. This virtue implants perfect moderation and humanity in the human mind.

Few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of nature. But by art, labour and industry, we extract them in great abundance. Hence, the ideas of property become necessary in all civil society. Acceptance of justice and fair-play for enjoyment of property becomes the social ethics. That way justice derives its usefulness to the people. Thus arise its merit and moral obligation.

The good of mankind is the only object of all the laws and regulations that constitute the basis of justice. This virtue is necessary for peace and interest of the society that men's possessions are separated and protected. Further the rules that make such separation and protection must be such as can best be contrived to serve the interests of the society further. To establish laws for the regulation of property or possessions, we must be acquainted with the nature and situation of man, and put in place such rules and regulations as are most useful and beneficial. They are to be such that they do not give away to selfish avidity and extensive enthusiasm.

What is a man's property? Anything, which it is lawful for him, for him alone, to use. To distinguish these objects of property, we must have recourse to customs, precedents, analogies, statutes and a host of other circumstances. Some of them may be constant and some may be variable or arbitrary. What ultimately counts is the interest and happiness of human society. All the laws and regulations must sub-serve this end.

In general, all questions of property are to be subordinate to the authority of civil laws that extend, refrain, modify and alter the rules of natural justice, according to the particular convenience of each community. These laws and regulations ought to have a constant reference to the constitution of government, the manners, the climate, the religious composition of the population, the commerce, the situation of each society, etc.

'Justice is sometimes taken to be synonymous with or equivalent to law, sometimes to be distinct from law and superior to it. Justice in one of its aspects is held to consist in *conformity with law*, but it is also asserted that *law must conform to justice*. What at one moment is taken as the standard whereby to judge what is just and unjust can in turn, in its manifestation as empirical fact, be itself judged in the same way; this happens when we appeal, in the name of justice, to a higher ideal criterion which transcends all rules of positive law and must, therefore, rest on some other foundation', in the words of Prof. Del Vecchio.

The two senses of justice which Del Vecchio refers to are legal justice and ethical justice. For him, ethical justice is a universal and comprehensive virtue and has grown to its modern status as a distinct virtue along with others. In a juridical sense, it has developed into a matter of rights and obligations. Juridical justice is still divided into distributive justice and retributive justice. Retributive justice is further subdivided into equalizing or commutative justice, and coercive or penal justice. Distributive justice is sub-divided into re-cognitive justice and attributive justice.

Even the written codes such as the statutes, constitutions, judicial precedents, procedures are also not formulated precisely in clear and unambiguous terms. Legal terms such as liability, conspiracy are no doubt defined in law. But their definitions remain vague, as it is impossible to specify in advance the details of all conceivable circumstances in which they are to be applied.

This way, not only the unwritten but also written rules of the society are subjected to continuing interpretation. So far as the law is concerned, the judicial system exercises the function of interpretation. But interpretation plays a role in everyone's ethical deliberations, too. The body of law, the judicial precedents, procedures, etc does not settle all questions. It may be that the particular question at issue may have no direct answer.

26. Values

The empirical theory of values is that it merely formulates and justifies the socially prevailing habit of regarding enjoyments, as they are actually experienced as values in and of themselves. It does not concern itself with regulation of these enjoyments. Without the intervention of thought, enjoyments are not values but problematic goods, becoming values when they reissue in a changed form from intelligent behaviour.

We regard our direct and original experience of things liked and enjoyed as only possibilities of values to be achieved. This enjoyment becomes a value when we discover the relations upon which its presence depends. Such an operational explanation gives a conception of a value, not a value itself. The utilization of the conception in action results in an object having secure and intelligent value.

This concept can be explained by pointing to the difference between the enjoyed and the enjoyable, the desired and the desirable, etc. To say that something is enjoyed is to make a statement about a fact, something already happened or in existence. It is not to judge the value of that fact and it is the end of the matter.

The fact that something is enjoyable only raises the issue of its enjoyabiltiy. It does not settle it. To say that something is enjoyable is to define it in its connections and interactions. The fact that it is enjoyable poses a problem to judgment. How shall the enjoyment be rated? Is it a value or not? Is it to be cherished or not?

Therefore, to declare something enjoyable is to assert that it needs specifiable conditions. In effect, it is a judgment that the enjoyment is welcome. It involves a prediction. It contemplates a future in which something will happen in a certain way. That it is enjoyable is the content of a proposition of fact. It is a judgment, an appraisal and an estimate that has to do with the direction of action. It is a value.

The element of direction by an idea of value applies to science as well as to any action. It is for the reason that in every scientific activity, there is passed a constant succession of estimates.

‘Taste’ is an appreciation at once cultivated, and active in the expression of the nature of judgments of value. The formation of taste is the chief matter wherever values enter in, whether intellectual, aesthetic or moral. Expertise in taste is at once the result as well as the reward of constant exercise of thinking. Taste is the outcome of experience brought cumulatively to bear on the intelligent appreciation of the real worth of likings and enjoyments.

A person completely reveals himself in the things, which he judges enjoyable and desirable. Such judgments are the only alternative to the dominance of belief by impulse, chance, blind habit and self-interest. The formation of a cultivated and effectively operative good judgments or taste with respect to what is aesthetic, admirable, intellectually acceptable and morally approvable is the highest task set to human beings by the events of experience.

Intuitions or relatively immediate judgments do not precede reflective enquiry, but are the cumulative products of much thoughtful experience.

In so far as the conditions and consequences of the things liked are thought about, propositions of likes are of instrumental value in reaching judgments of value. If one likes a thing, one likes it; there can be no dispute about it. A judgment about what is to be liked or desired is, on the other hand, a claim on future action.

It is a matter of experience that likings and enjoyments are of all kinds many of which are condemned in reflective judgment. By way of self-justification, an enjoyment creates a tendency to assert that the thing enjoyed is a value. This assertion of validity adds authority to the fact. It is a decision that the object has a right to exist and hence a claim upon action to further its existence.

Values may, thus, be connected inherently with liking, and yet not with every liking but only with those that judgment has approved, after examination of the relation upon which the object liked depends. A casual liking is one that happens without knowledge of how it occurs, or to what effect. The difference between a casual liking and the one based on a judgment that is worth having, and striven for, makes all the difference between enjoyments which are causal and enjoyments that have value and hence a claim upon our attitude and conduct.

John Dewey articulates that ‘judgments about values are judgments about the conditions and the results of experienced objects; judgments about that which should regulate the formation of our desires, affections and enjoyments. For whatever decides their formation will determine the main course of our conduct, personal and social’.

If we know the conditions under which the act of liking, of desire and enjoyment take place, we are in a position to know the consequences of that act. The difference between enjoyment and enjoyable becomes effective, just at this point. The more connections and interactions we ascertain, the more we know the object in question. Thinking is search for these connections.

Enjoyments that issue from conduct directed from within into relations have a meaning and validity owing to the way in which they are experienced. Such enjoyments do not leave any bitterness. Even in the midst of direct enjoyment, there is a sense of validity that intensifies the enjoyment. There is solicitude for perpetuation of the object having value that is radically different from mere anxiety to perpetuate the feeling of enjoyment.

This establishes that there are no values apart from things actually enjoyed as good. In the same way, judgment of the value of an object to be experienced is instrumental to its appreciation when realized. There is no value except where there is satisfaction. But, there have to be certain conditions fulfilled to transform a satisfaction into a value. There is a notion that values are already well known and that all which is lacking is the will to cultivating them in the order of their worth. In fact,

what is lacking is not the will to act upon goods already known, but the will to know what they are.

The value or worth of a man is his price, so much as would be given for the use of his power. It is, therefore, not absolute but dependent on the need and judgment of another. One rates oneself, as most men do, at the highest value. Yet one's true value is no more than others esteem it.

The manifestation of the value we set on one another is that which is commonly called honouring and dishonouring. To value a man at a high rate is to honour him, at a low rate to dishonour him. The comparison of high and low is to the rate of value that each man sets on himself.

The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him in a society, is that which men commonly call Dignity. Offices of command, public employment generally understand this value, etc held by the man.

To pray to another for aid of any kind is to Honour as it is a sign we have an opinion he has power to help. The more difficult the aid is, the more is the honour. To obey is to honour as no man obeys another who he thinks has no power to help or hurt him. Consequently, to disobey is to dishonour.

Worthiness is a thing different from the worth or value of a man and also from his merit or desert, and consists in a particular power or ability for that whereof he is said to be worthy. This particular ability is called Fitness or Aptitude.

By manners, one means generally decency of behaviour in company of fellow beings. They are small morals. By manners, in a larger measure, are meant those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity. We have to consider that the felicity of this life consists not in the repose of a mind satisfied. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire from one object to another. The object of man's desire is not to enjoy only once for one instant of time. But it is to assure forever the way of his future desire. Therefore, the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men tend not only to the procuring but also to the assuring of a contended life.

The revolt in morals begins by rancour turning creative and giving birth to values. When the individuals are deprived of the direct outlets of action, there arises rancour in them and it compensates by an imaginary vengeance. All truly noble morality grows out of triumphant self-affirmation.

Slave ethics - ethics of the oppressed and the impotent, on the other hand, begins by saying *no* to a non-self or 'other'. This *no* is its creative act. This looking outward instead of inward is a fundamental feature of rancour. Slave ethics requires for its inception a sphere different from and hostile to its own. Physiologically, it requires an outside stimulus even to act at all. All its action is only reaction.

The opposite is the case with aristocratic valuations. Such values grow and act spontaneously. They seek out their contraries only in order to affirm themselves more gratefully and delightedly.

The happiness of the impotent and the oppressed is purely passive and takes the form of drugged tranquility and emotional slackness. The rancourous person is neither truthful, nor ingenuous, nor honest, nor forthright with himself. His soul squints. His mind loves hideouts, secret paths and side-ways. Everything hidden seems to him his own world, his security and his comfort. He is expert in silence, in waiting, in long memory, in self-depreciation and in self-humiliation. A race of such men will, in the end, be cleverer than a race of aristocrats. It will honour sharp-wittedness as a condition vital to its existence.

Among the noble, mental acuteness is less important than the unconscious instincts. That race or class shows signs of temerity to follow sudden impulses, to court danger or indulge in spurts of emotions such as rage, love, worship, gratitude or vengeance. In a noble man, resentment is absorbed in his instantaneous reaction. In most cases, it may not even arise. But for the weak and impotent people, it occurs without fail.

It is a sign of strong and rich temperaments that they do not for long take seriously their enemies, their misfortunes, or their misdeeds. They have in them a kind of plastic curative power and also a power of oblivion. The noble person respects his enemy. The adage 'loving one's own enemy' is possible only with him. On the other hand, the rancourous man creates enemies around. He conceives the enemy an evil one, as a fundamental idea. Simultaneously he conceives of himself as good, in juxtaposition to the enemy conceived. The noble minded, on the other hand, spontaneously creates the notion good, and later derives from it the conception of the bad.

Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of complete life, the greatest is the possession of friendship. The same conviction that gives us confidence that there is nothing terrible that lasts forever or for long also enables the protection of friendship most fully completed in the limited evils of life.

Every healthy morality is dominated by an instinct of life. Some commandment of life is fulfilled by a determinate moral principle. Some inhibition or hostile element in the path of life is removed. Anti-natural morality, that is, almost every morality that has been imposed, turns against the instincts of life.

When we speak of values, we speak with the inspiration, with the way of looking at things, which is part of life. Life itself forces us to posit values. Life itself values through us, when we posit values.

Morality in so far as it condemns for its own sake and not out of regard for the concerns, considerations and contrivances of life is a specific error. One need not have pity for it. Indeed, it is an idiosyncrasy of degenerates that has caused immense harm. On the other hand, morality has to make room in the heart of everybody for every kind of understanding, comprehending and approving. One shall not easily negate. One must make it a point to be an affirmer.

The ideal of love transcends all law. It is impossible to construct a social ethic out of the ideal of love in its pure form because the ideal presupposes the resolution of the conflict of life with life, which it is the concern of law to mitigate and restrain. Nonetheless, the ideal of love is the only foundation 'for an ethic which enables men to give themselves to values actually embodied in persons and existence, but also transcending every activity'. The law of love is involved in all approximations of justice, not only as the source of the norms of justice, but also as an ultimate perspective by which their limitations are discovered. The ideal of equality is a fact of the natural law, which transcends existence.

27. Good for Man

The most fundamental question in all ethics is how to define the term ‘good’. That which is meant by good is, in fact, except its converse bad, the only simple object of thought peculiar to ethics. A mistake with regard to it leads to a far larger number of erroneous ethical judgments than any other. Unless the concept of good is clearly understood and recognized, the rest of ethics is as good as useless from the point of view of systematic knowledge.

The main object of ethics, as a systematic science, is to give correct reasons for thinking that this or that is good. Unless the concept of good is properly understood and recognized, such reasons cannot be given. The direct object of ethics is knowledge and not practice. It is its business not only to obtain true results, but also to find valid reasons for them.

Philosophically it may be said that the propositions about the good are all synthetic and never analytic. ‘Good’ is a simple notion, as ‘yellow’ is a simple notion. One cannot explain by any manner of means to another who does not know yellow, what yellow is. So is the case with good. It is simply something which one is to think of or perceive. If one cannot think of or perceive it, another can never, by any definition, make its nature of it known to one. It is possible, for instance, to make a man understand what a tiger is. One can explain its features and characteristics and make it known. A complex object composed of parts can be explained. Even the parts, when brought to the simplest elements, can no longer be defined. Good and yellow are notions of such simple kind that do not permit of definition.

Good, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition in the true sense of that word. The true sense of ‘definition’ is that it is to state the parts that invariably compose a certain whole. In this sense, good has no definition, as it has no parts and is simple. It is one of those objects of thought incapable of any definition because they are the ultimate terms by reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be defined.

It may be true that all things, which are good, are also something else. It is also true that ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things that are good. To equate the other properties belonging to things that are good, to goodness itself, is a fallacy called ‘naturalistic fallacy’.

What we want to know is simply what is good. We may indeed agree that what most people think ‘good’ is actually so. We shall at all events be glad to know their opinions about what is good. We want to know exactly what it is that they so call.

Suppose a man says, ‘I am pleased’. This means that his mind, a certain definite mind, distinguished by certain definite marks from all others, has, at this moment, a certain definite feeling called pleasure. ‘Pleased’ means nothing but having pleasure. It does mean having the sensation of pleasure. It may be that we may be

more pleased or less pleased; we may have one or another kind of pleasure. But what we have is one definite thing, absolutely indefinable, some one thing that is the same in all the various degrees and in all the various kinds of it that there may be. We may be able to say how it is related to other things. For example, it is in the mind, that it causes desire, that we are conscious of it, etc. We can only describe its relations to other things, but cannot define it.

Every art and every enquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good. For this reason, the good has been declared to be that at which all things aim.

As for ends, there is certain difference among the activities and others that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. As there are many actions, arts and sciences, their ends also are many.

If there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else, then this must be the good and the chief good. If the end is the same for a single man and the state, the end of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete either to attain or to preserve than the end merely of one man, though it is also worthwhile to attain.

All knowledge and every pursuit aim at some good. Political science aims at what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. It is happiness, identified with living well and doing well, being happy. As to what constitutes happiness, there are differences of opinion. Some consider that happiness is simple pleasure, wealth or honour. Even among them, they differ from one another. One identifies it with health, when one is ill; one with wealth when one is poor, etc. Others consider, apart from these many goods, there is another that is self-subsistent causing the goodness of all these as well.

Judging from the lives that men lead, most men including men of the most vulgar type seem to identify the good or happiness with pleasure. That is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment.

There are three prominent types of life – pleasurable, political and contemplative. The mass of mankind is quite slavish in its tastes, preferring a life of physical pleasure.Some people of superior refinement and active disposition identify happiness with honour, which is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. These men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their goodness. Further they seek to be honoured by men of practical wisdom on the ground of their virtue. For them, at any rate, virtue is better. It may be that virtue is the end of the political life, rather than honor. Even this is incomplete, for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with life-long inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes.

The life of money making is one undertaken under compulsion. Wealth is evidently not the good; it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. One

might rather take the above objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that they are not ends.

The term good is used in the category of substance, in that of quality and in that of relation. Good has many senses as 'being'. For example, it is predicated in the category of substance as of God and reason; in the quality as of the virtues; in quantity as of that which is moderate; in relation as that of the useful; in time as that of the right opportunity; in place as that of the right locality, and the like. Clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and still be single. If so, it could not have been predicated in all the categories but one only.

Goods are to be spoken of in two ways - some good in themselves and the other by reason of their being useful. A question arises as to what sort of goods one would call good in themselves. The goods such as intelligence, sight, honours and certain pleasures may be placed among things good in themselves, if one pursues them for the sake of something else. But they do not satisfy the primary criterion that the account of the 'good' will have to appear as something identical in them all to be good in themselves, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of honour, wisdom and pleasure, the accounts are distinct and diverse in respect of their goodness.

The good we are seeking seems different in different actions, arts and sciences. The good of each is surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine, this is health; in strategy, victory; in architecture, a building; etc.

In every action and pursuit, the good is the end. It is only for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there is more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.

That, which is called evil, the opposite of good, when it is regulated and put in its own place, only enhances our admiration of the good. It is human nature to enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with the evil.

In the order of nature, pleasure depends on operation, not the converse. So, if the operations are not the ultimate end, the resulting pleasures are also not the ultimate end. Nor are they concomitant with the ultimate end.

The pleasures of food and sex are not the ultimate end, nor are they concomitant to the ultimate end. So, felicity cannot be located in these pleasures. Further, these pleasures are not agreeable to man by virtue of what is the noblest in him, but only by virtue of his sense capacity. For this reason, too, felicity cannot be located in pleasures of this kind.

Similarly, worldly power cannot be man's highest good. In its attainment, fortune plays an important part. It is also unstable. It is not subject to man's will. Oftentimes it comes to bad men. These characteristics are incompatible with the highest good. Also man is deemed good mainly in terms of his attainment of the highest good. He is not called good or bad only because he has power or not.

Everyone that can do good things need not be a good man, nor is a man bad because he is able to do evil things. Therefore, the highest good does not consist in the fact of being powerful.

Man's highest good does not lie in goods of the body such as health, beauty, strength, etc. Both good and bad men possess these things. They are unstable; they are not subject to the will. In between the soul and the body, the soul is better than the body. The body is alive and possesses the above goods by means of the soul. So, a good of the soul like understanding or contemplation is better than a good of the body. Therefore, the good of the body is not man's highest good. Further many animals are better endowed than man in bodily goods. If man's highest good is in bodily goods, the animals must have more felicity, which is obviously not the case. Therefore, human felicity does not consist in goods of the body.

The ultimate felicity of man does not consist in moral actions, too. All moral operations can be ordered to something else. For instance, the operations of justice are ordered to the preservation of peace among men. But human felicity is incapable of being ordered to a further end. Therefore, man's ultimate felicity does not lie in moral operations.

As for moral virtues, the mean is preserved in the internal passions and in regard to external things. But such a measuring is not possible to be the ultimate end of human life as these passions and external things are capable of being ordered to something else. Therefore, it is not possible for man's ultimate felicity to lie in acts of the moral virtues.

The terms 'good' and 'evil' indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves. They are nothing else than modes of thought or notions, which we form from the comparison of one thing with another. One and the same thing may be good, evil or indifferent. For example, music is good to a serene person, bad to one mourning, and indifferent to a deaf man.

Though things are that way, we must retain these words as they help us form an opinion of human conduct. By 'good' is meant a means by which we may approach nearer to the model of human nature we set before us. By 'evil' is meant everything, which we are certain, hinders us from reaching that model. In the context of men being perfect or imperfect, the same yardstick may apply.

The desires that are related to the mind in so far as it is conceived to consist of adequate ideas are properly called actions. The other desires not related to the mind, but determined by the power of objects which are without us are called the passive states. The actions indicate our power, while the passive states indicate our impotence and imperfect knowledge. Actions determined by man's power or reasons are always good. The others may be good as well as evil.

It is very profitable in life to make intellect or reason perfect as far as possible. In this one thing lies the highest happiness or blessedness of man. Blessedness is nothing but the peace of mind, which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God. To perfect the intellect is nothing but to understand God, together with His attributes,

actions and nature. Therefore, the chief desire by which man strives to govern all his other desires is that by which he is led adequately to conceive himself and all things by his intelligence.

There is no rational life without intelligence. Things are good only in so far as they assist man to enjoy that life of the mind determined by intelligence. We call such things evil, as hinder man from perfecting his reason and enjoying a rational life.

All those ends of which man is the efficient cause are necessarily good. It, therefore, follows that no evil can happen to man except from external causes. Being guided by reason is the most profitable course for a man for the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of a rational life.

As there is evidently more than one and we choose some of them for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends. But the chief good is something evidently final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking. If there is more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. We consider final, without any reservation, that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.

We choose happiness as the end always for itself and never for the sake of something else. As regards the virtues such as honor, pleasure, reason etc, we choose them for themselves and also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness for the sake of these virtues, or rather for anything other than itself.

From the point of self-sufficiency, the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. By being self-sufficient is meant what is sufficient not only for a man by himself but also for his family, and in general his friends and fellow citizens, as man is born into a society. The 'self-sufficient' can be defined as that which, when isolated, makes life desirable and lacking in nothing. Happiness is to be such and it is what we think it most desirable of all things. It is not to be counted as one good thing among others as it leads to comparison and, therefore, cannot be final. Happiness, thus, is something final, self-sufficient and the end of action.

A question is often asked whether happiness can be acquired by learning, habituation or some other sort of training, or comes in virtue of divine providence or chance. If there is any gift of God to human beings, happiness is most surely God-given of all human things in as much as it is the best. Even if it is not God-given, but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, it is still among the most God-like things and blessed, as it is the end of virtue. As for those who have virtue, they may win happiness by a certain kind of effort, study and care. It is better to be happy thus than by chance. This is for the reason that to entrust to chance what is the greatest and the most noble would be a very defective arrangement.

Happiness as the chief or final good is related to the function of man. The function of man is related to body and mind, and to the soul. In so far as it is the activity of the soul that implies a rational principle, human good turns out to be the

activity of the soul in accordance with virtue in a complete life. If there is more than one virtue, it is in accordance with the best and the most complete virtue.

As for the external goods related to the body and mind, we use friends, riches, political power, etc as instruments. There are certain other things such as good birth, good children, beauty, social status, etc. Happiness seems to need this kind of prosperity, too. For this reason, some identify happiness with good fortune, while others identify it only with virtue.

Happiness is the proper good of an intellectual nature, by reason of what is proper to that nature. Appetite is not peculiar to intellectual nature as it is present in all things, though differently in different things. This diversity arises from the fact that things are differently related to knowledge. Things lacking in knowledge have only natural appetite. Things with sensory knowledge have sense appetite. Things of intellectual knowledge have an appetite proportionate to this knowledge that is will.

So the will is not peculiar to intellectual nature by virtue of being an appetite, but only in so far as it depends on intellect. However, the intellect, in itself, is peculiar to an intellectual nature. Therefore, happiness or felicity consists substantially and principally in an act of the intellect rather than in an act of the will. It is evident that it is impossible for human felicity to consist in bodily pleasures, the chief of which are those of food and sex.

Happiness is thus an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue. If we consider the nature of human virtue, it enables us to see the nature of happiness. By human virtue is meant not that of the body, but of the soul. Happiness then is an activity of the soul.

It is apparent that all things are ordered to one good, as to their ultimate end. If nothing tends toward a thing as an end, unless this thing is a good, it is necessary that the good, as good, be the end. Therefore, that which is the highest good is, from the highest point of view, the end of all things. But there is only one highest good with nothing beyond and this is the Divine Will. So all things are ordered to their highest good as their ultimate end and this is the Divine Will.

In view of the foregoing, the conclusion is that the ultimate felicity of man lies in the contemplation of Truth. Indeed, it is the only operation proper to man, and in it he shares nothing in common with other sentient beings. This is ordered to nothing else as an end, as contemplation of Truth is sought for its own sake. For this operation, man is self-sufficient, for he needs no help from external things. In fact, all other human operations seem to be ordered to this one, as to an end. All human functions and virtues sub-serve the contemplation of Truth as the ultimate end. So the conclusion remains that man’s ultimate felicity consists in the contemplation of Truth, based on the considering of spiritual, eternal and divine matters.

28. Things in our Power

Prudence is the bottom-line of ethical action. It teaches us how to live pleasantly, honourably and justly. One is to meditate prudently on the things one handles in one's acts.

Of things, some are in our power and others are not. In our power are whatever are our own acts such as opinion, desire, aversion, movement toward a thing, etc. Not in our power are not our own acts such as the body, property, reputation, offices. The things in our power are by nature free and not subject to restraint or hindrance. The things not in our power are by nature weak, subject to restraint, in the power of others. If someone thinks that things in his power alone are his and things in the power of another the other's, no man will ever compel him or hinder. He will not blame any other, nor will another harm him, for he will have no enemy and will not suffer any harm.

If anyone desires great things, he must not lay hold of them with a small effort. He must not attempt to have many things at a time. He must leave some things entirely and postpone others for the present. If he aims at power and wealth besides great things, he will fail in those things through which alone happiness and freedom are secured. One is to practise to see every harsh appearance as an appearance only and examine whether it is in one's power or not, to act upon. If it relates to anything which is not in one' power, one must be ready to say that it does not concern one.

Desire contains in it the hope of obtaining that which one desires. The hope in aversion is that one will not fall into that which one attempts to avoid. One who fails in one's desire is unfortunate. One who falls into that which one wants to avoid is unhappy. Then if one attempts to avoid only the things contrary to nature, which are within one's power, one will not be involved in any of the things which one wants to avoid. But if one attempts to avoid death or disease, one will be unhappy. One is, therefore, to take away aversion from all things, which are not in one's power, and transfer it to the things contrary to nature, which are in one's power. One is to destroy desire completely for the present. It is wise only sparingly to move towards the things in our power and which it will be good to desire.

In everything, which pleases the soul or supplies a want or is loved, one is 'to act the nature of the thing to his want'. If one loves an earthen vessel, one is to remember that it is an earthen vessel which one loves. Supposing it gets broken, one will not be disturbed.

When one takes up any act, one is to remind oneself of what kind of an act it is. One is to say to oneself that one is about to do the act intended and also to maintain one's will in a manner conformable to nature.

Men are disturbed not by the things that happen, but by the opinions about the things. For example, there is nothing terrible amount death, but the opinion about death is that it is terrible. If a person grieves over the death of a family member or loss of property, one is to understand clearly that it is not that which has happened that

afflicts the grieving person, but it is the opinion about the occurrence which afflicts the person. One can show sympathy to the grieving person in words, but take care to see that one does not lament internally.

When we are impeded or disturbed or grieved, we shall not blame others, but ourselves, that is, our opinions. It is the act of an ill-instructed man to blame others for his own bad condition. It is the act of one who has begun to be instructed to lay the blame on oneself. If one's instruction is complete, one will blame neither another nor oneself.

One is not to be elated at any advantage or excellence that belongs to another. When in the use of appearances one is conformable to nature, it is good for one to get elated, for then one will be elated at something good which is one's own.

One is to remember that it is not another that reviles, strikes or insults one, but it is one's opinion about these things as being insulting. When another irritates one, one must know that it is one's own opinion that has irritated one. One is, therefore, to try especially not to be carried away by the appearance. If one takes time before reacting, one will easily master oneself.

One shall not desire that the things, which happen, should happen as one wish. One should wish the things, which happen to be, as they are. Then one will have a tranquil flow of life.

Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless the will itself chooses. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will. If one adds this kind of reflection on the occasion of everything that happens, one will find it an impediment to something else, but not to oneself.

On the occasion of an event that befalls one, one is to turn oneself and enquire what power one has for turning it to use. If one sees a beautiful person of opposite sex, one will find that the power to resist is continence. If one is to suffer pain, one will find that the power to resist is endurance. If another abuses one, one finds the power to resist is patience. If one has been habituated to this way of life, the appearances will not carry one along with them.

One is never to say about anything, 'I have lost it', but say 'I have restored it'. May be another who has taken away something belonging to one is a bad man. But what is it to one, by whose hands the Giver demanded it back? So long as He allows one, one is to take care of it as a thing that belongs to another. When it is taken away from one, one is no more concerned with it.

If one seems to another to be a person of importance, one is to distrust oneself. One is to know that it is not easy both to keep one's will in a condition conformable to nature and to secure external things. If one is careful about one thing, it is an absolute necessity that one will neglect the other or others.

If one desires to have one's children, wife and friends to live forever, one is silly. This amounts to having the things, which are not in one's power, to be in one's

power, and the things, which belong to others, to be one's. But if one wishes not to fail in one's desires, one is able to do that. If one wishes to be free, one shall neither wish for anything nor avoid anything, which depends on others.

One is to behave in life as at a banquet. When something is carried round and opposite, one is to stretch one's hand and take a portion with decency. If it passes by, one shall not detain it. If it does not come, one shall not desire it until it is opposite to one. One is to act this way with respect to spouse, children, offices, wealth etc. If one takes none of the things, which are set before one and even despises them, then one will be divine.

One can be invincible if one enters into no contest in which it is not in one's power to win. When one observes a man honoured before others, possessed of great power or highly esteemed for any reason, one is not to suppose him happy and be not carried away by the appearance. If the nature of the good is in our power, neither envy nor jealousy will have a place in us. One shall not wish to hold a high office, and yet to be a free man. This is possible only if one does not care the things, which are not in one's power.

If one keeps death before one's own eyes daily, one will never think of anything mean, nor desire anything extravagantly.

If it should ever happen to one to be turned to externals in order to please some person, one must know that one has lost one's purpose in life. One is to be satisfied in everything with being a philosopher, appearing so to oneself.

Let not one be afflicted by such thoughts, as 'I shall live un-honoured and be nobody nowhere'. If want of honour is an evil, one cannot be in evil through the fault of another any more than one can be involved in anything base. How will one be nobody nowhere, when one ought to be somebody in those things only which are in one's power, in which indeed it is permitted to one to be a man of the greatest worth? In whatever way one acts, one is to maintain one's fidelity and modesty. As a mark is not setup for the purpose of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world.

If another is preferred to one in social events, one is to rejoice that the other has obtained them if they are good. If they are bad, one need not be grieved that one has not obtained them. How can one obtain an equal share with another when one does not pay the price of flattery, personal attention or the like? If one wishes both not to pay the price and to obtain the things, one is insatiable and silly.

We may learn the will of nature from the things in which we do not differ from one another. If another man's child or wife is dead, everyone will say that this is an event incident to man. But when one's own wife or child is dead, one laments. One ought to remember how one feels when one hears that a similar thing has happened to another.

When one has recourse to divination, one is to remember that one does not know how it will turn out, but one is to enquire from the diviner. If any of the things

is not within one's power, it is absolutely necessary that it must be neither good nor bad. One does not, therefore, bring to the diviner desire or aversion. If one does so, one will approach him with fear.

But having determined in mind that everything, which shall result, is indifferent and does not concern one, whatever it may be, for it will be in one's power to use it well, one is to approach the gods as one's advisers with full confidence. One is then to go to divination about those matters in which the entire enquiry has reference to the result and in which means are not given either by reason or by any other art for knowing the thing, which is the subject of the enquiry. On the other hand, when one is to share a friend's danger or that of one's country, one must not consult the diviner whether one must share it. Here reason prevails that even with any risk to one, one should share the dangers of one's friends and of one's country.

The relation of will to necessity is a matter of controversy. By necessity is meant one that is in no way in our power, but which has its way even when our will is opposed to it. Our choices of living well or ill obviously are not subject to this kind of necessity. The fact is that we do many things, which we would most certainly not do if we did not choose to do them. The most obvious case is our willing itself. If we will, there is an act of willing. There is none if we do not want one. We would certainly not make a choice if we did not make to choose it.

When we say we must choose freely, when we choose at all, we do not subject free choice to any necessity, which destroys our liberty. Even when a person suffers against his will from the will of others, there is a voluntary act - not, of course, of the person who suffers. Therefore, a human will prevails. The conclusion is that we are by no means under compulsion to abandon free choice.

29. Naturalism

Nature has made men generally equal in the faculties of the body and mind. Though there is found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body and of quicker mind than another, yet, when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not as considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not be able to claim.

As to the strength of the body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest either by secret machination or in collusion with others. As to faculties of the mind, there is a greater equality among men than that of strength. 'Prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto'.

The nature of men is such that, howsoever, they may acknowledge others to be more learned and intelligent, yet they will hardly believe there are any as wise as themselves. This establishes that men are rather equal in that regard than being unequal. There is not ordinarily a greater sign of equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share of ability.

From this presumed equality of ability arises equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. Therefore, if any two men desire the same thing, which they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies. In the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, they endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.

In the nature of man, there are three principal causes of quarrel - competition, diffidence and glory. The first makes men invade for gain, the second for safety and the third for reputation. The first use violence or force to make themselves masters of other persons. The second defend themselves. The third use trifles such as a word, a smile, a different opinion, any other sign of under-value, etc.

It is, therefore, manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition called war – one man against the other. War consists not in battle or fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by confrontation is sufficiently known. In such condition there is no place for industry as the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no orderly growth or culture.

Consequent to this situation is that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have no place there. Where there is no common power, there is no law. Where there is no law, no injustice. Right and wrong, justice and injustice, therefore, relate to men in society subject to law.

The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death or injury, desire of things necessary to commodious living and a hope by their industry and effort to obtain them. Reason suggests convenient articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are what we call the Laws of Nature.

The right of nature is the liberty each man has to use his own power for the preservation of his own life using the aptest means thereunto. By Liberty is meant the absence of external impediments, which may take away part of a man's power to do what he would.

A Law of Nature is a general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or takes away the means of preserving the same, or to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved.

The first law is, therefore, that a man is to seek peace and follow it. When he cannot obtain it, he has the right of nature to defend himself by all means he can. From this law of nature flows the second law that a man shall be willing to lay down his right to all things and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself, in so far as it is necessary for his peace, security and well being, when other men are equally willing to limit the exercise of their liberty similarly.

The natural laws involve mutual transferring of rights among men which they call Contract. When the transferring of right is not mutual, but one of the parties transfers in hope to gain thereby friendship or service from another, or for any similar consideration, this is not contract but Gift, Grace, etc. If a covenant is made wherein neither performs but trusts one another, upon any reasonable suspicion, the covenant becomes Void. If there is a common power set over both of them with the right and force to compel performance, it is not void.

From this flows the third law of nature that men perform their covenants made. In the absence of this natural law, covenants are in vain but empty words. In this law of nature lies the fountain of Justice. When a covenant is made, to break it is unjust. Injustice is no more than non-performance of covenant. Whatever is not unjust is just.

As justice depends on antecedent covenant, Gratitude depends on antecedent Grace or Free Gift. The next natural law flowing from this concept is that a man who receives benefit from another by way of grace or free gift shall endeavour that he who gives it has no reasonable cause to repent himself of his goodwill. He will have occasion to repent if the receiver does not reciprocate to the expectation of the giver. The breach of this law is called Ingratitude. This has the same relation to grace that injustice has to obligation by covenant.

The fifth law of nature is complaisance, that is to say, that every man is to strive to accommodate himself to the rest. The sixth law of nature is that upon caution of future time, a man must pardon the offences past of those, repenting, desire it. This is for the reason that pardon is nothing but granting of peace. But, for those who persevere in their hostility, even though they are granted peace, such grant of peace is considered fear of them. Even then if pardon is not granted, it is considered a sign of an aversion to peace and, therefore, contrary to the law of nature.

The seventh law of nature is that in retribution of evil for evil, men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow. This law forbids

us to inflict punishment with any other design than for correction of the offender or direction of others. This law is consequent to the previous law that commands pardon upon security of the future time.

The eighth law of nature is that no man by deed, word, countenance or gesture declares hatred or contempt for another. The breach of this law is commonly called *contumely*. This is for the reason that all signs of hatred or contempt provoke to fight as most men choose rather not to be revenged.

The ninth law of nature is that every man acknowledges another as his equal by nature, as all men are considered equal in the condition of mere nature. The tenth law of nature is that at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man requires to reserve to himself any right which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest. The observers of this law are those who we call *modest*, and the breakers *arrogant* men. If a man is to judge between one man and another, the precept is that he deals equally between them.

The eleventh law of nature is that such things as cannot be divided be enjoyed in common if it is possible; and if the quantity of thing permits, without stint; otherwise proportionately to the number of them that have right. Otherwise, the distribution becomes unequal and is contrary to equity. If certain things can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in common, then the law of nature requires that lot shall determine the entire right either for the first possession or the alternate use. Equal (or equitable) distribution is of the law of nature; and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined.

Of lots, there are two kinds - arbitrary and natural. Arbitrary is that, which is agreed on by the competitors. Natural is either primogeniture or first seizure.

It is a law of nature that all men that mediate peace be allowed safe conduct. For the law that commands peace as the end commands intercession as the means. To intercession, the means is safe conduct. It is also a law of nature that they that are at controversy as to the exercise of their rights shall submit to the judgment of an arbitrator. As every man is presumed to do all things to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own case. For the same reason, no man is to be appointed an arbitrator, to whom greater profit, honor or pleasure apparently arises out of the victory of one of the parties.

These are the laws of nature dictating peace as a means of the conservation of men in civil society. The science of these laws is moral philosophy, for moral philosophy is but the science of what is good and evil in the conservation and society of mankind.

Good and evil are the names that signify our appetites and aversions. They vary from society to society based on customs and doctrines undercurrent in the said societies. Men differ not only in their judgment on the means of what is pleasant and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch and sight but also of what is conformable or disagreeable to reason in the actions of common life. Further, the same man differs from himself in different times. Sometimes he calls something good. Some other

times he calls the same thing evil. Therefore, so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, private appetite is the measure of good and evil. Consequently all men agree that peace is good. As such the way or means of peace such as justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy and the other laws of nature are good. These are nothing but moral virtues and their contrary are vices. As such the science of virtue and vice is considered moral philosophy.

30. Utilitarianism

Continuous success in obtaining those things, which a man from time to time desires such as continuous prospering, is what some ethical philosophers call Felicity. This is felicity of this life. For them, there is no such thing as perpetual tranquility of mind while we live here. It is for the reason that life itself is but motion and can never be without desire, or without fear, no more than without sense. The doctrine they propound is Utilitarianism.

The doctrine of Utilitarianism states that nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters - pain and pleasure. On the one hand is the standard of right and wrong, and on the other is the chain of causes and effects fastened to pain and pleasure. They govern us in all what we do, in all what we say and all what we think. A man remains subject to them. The more he resists them, the more they persist. The principle of the *greatest felicity* or the *greatest happiness* or *utility* recognizes this subjection and assumes it for the foundation of that system so that reason and law weave the edifice of felicity.

By the principle of felicity is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency, which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the person whose interest is in question. In other words, its purpose is to promote or to oppose that happiness. This concerns every action. It means not only every action of a private individual but of every measure of the state.

By felicity is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness, or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the person whose interest is considered. It concerns either an individual or a community of which the individual is part. The community is a fictitious body composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting it, as if it were its members. The interest of the community then is the sum total of the interests of the several members that compose it. The interest of a community is relevant in the context of the combined interests of its members.

A thing is said to promote the interest of an individual when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures, or to diminish the sum total of his pains. An action may be said to conform to the principle of utility or felicity with respect to the community at large, when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.

A person may be said to be a partisan of the principle of felicity when the approbation or disapprobation he attaches to any action or measure is determined by and proportioned to its conformity or unconformity to the laws or dictates of felicity. Of an action that is conformable to the principle of felicity, one may say that the action ought to be done or ought not to be done or that it is right it should be done, etc. In this context, the words ought, right, wrong, etc have a meaning. Otherwise, they have no meaning.

Among principles adverse to that of felicity are sympathy and antipathy. The principle of sympathy and antipathy is that principle which approves or disapproves of certain actions merely because a person finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them, holding approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic ground. This is only a principle in name rather than in reality. What one expects to find in a principle is something that points out some external consideration as a means of justifying the internal sentiments of approbation or disapprobation. This principle does not satisfy this consideration. It thus signifies the negation of all principle.

To determine which of the human actions are to be approved or disapproved, one is to take counsel of one's own feelings. If one finds in oneself a propensity to approve the actions, they are right. If one finds a propensity to condemn them, they are wrong. The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of right and wrong may all be reduced to the principle of sympathy and antipathy. The dictates of this principle will frequently coincide with those of felicity, though perhaps without intending any such thing.

The principle of sympathy and antipathy is most likely to err on the side of severity. This principle leads to award of punishment in many cases that deserve none; in many cases that deserve some, it may lead to more than what they deserve. There will be enough examples for this principle to err on the side of lenity, too.

The other principle that professes to recur for the standard of right and wrong is the theological principle, meaning the will of God. This is, in fact, not a distinct principle. The human instinct generally reveals that whatever is right is conformable to the will of God. But it may be necessary to know first whether a thing is right objectively, in order to know thence whether it is conformable to the will of God.

Two elements go into action. First is the motive or cause operating in the mind of an individual. Second is the ground or reason that warrants approbation. The only right ground of action is the consideration of felicity or utility. If it is a right principle of action and of approbation in any one case, it is so in every other case. Other principles such as motives may be the reasons why such and such an act have been done. But it is the principle of felicity alone that determines that a particular act might or ought to have been done. The principle of felicity does need no regulator. It regulates itself.

The happiness of the individuals of whom the community is composed consists in their pleasures and security and is the sole end, which the lawgiver of the community ought to have in view. This is the sole standard in conformity to which each individual ought to be made to fashion his behavior. This leads to take a view of 'pleasure and pain' itself, in the character of efficient causes or means.

There are four distinguishable sources from which pleasure and pain are to flow. They are the physical, the political, the popular and the religious. As the pleasures and pains belonging to each one of them are capable of giving a binding force to any law or rule of conduct, all of them may be termed sanctions.

If it is in the present life and from the ordinary course of nature that the pleasure or the pain takes place or is expected, it may be said to issue from or to belong to the *physical sanction.* If it is at the hands of a particular person or set of persons in the community called the executive or judicial authority constituted under the sovereignty of the state, it may be said to issue from the *political sanction*. If it is at the hands of common people in the community with whom the person may have concerns in the course of his life, according to the spontaneous disposition of such people, and not according to any settled or concerted rules, it may be said to issue from the *popular or moral sanction.* If it is from a superior invisible being or phenomenon, it may be said to issue from the *religious sanction*.

Pleasures or pains expected to issue from the physical, political or popular sanctions must be expected to be experienced, if ever, in the present life. Those expected to issue from the religious sanction may be expected to be experienced in the present life or in a future one.

Pleasures and the avoidance of pains are the ends, which the state or the lawgiver has to have in view. It behooves him, therefore, to understand their value. Pleasures and pains are the instruments he has to work with. He is to understand their force, which is again, in other words, their value.

To a person, the value of a pleasure or pain, considered by itself, will be greater according to its intensity, its duration, its certainty or uncertainty and its propinquity or remoteness. These circumstances are to be considered in estimating a pleasure or a pain each considered by itself.

But when the value of any pleasure or pain is considered for the purpose of estimating the tendency of any act by which it is produced, there are a few other circumstances to be taken into account. First is its fecundity or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind. That is, pleasures if it be a pleasure, pains if it be a pain. Second is its purity or the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind. That is, pains if it be a pleasure, pleasures if it be a pain. Third is its extent. That is the number of persons to whom it extends, or who are affected by it.

Pleasures and pains may generally be called interesting perceptions. They are either simple or complex. The simple ones are those any one of which cannot be resolved into more. The complex ones are those, which are resolvable into diverse simple ones.

A complex interesting perception may comprise pleasures alone, pains alone, or a pleasure or pleasures and a pain or pains together. What determines a complex pleasure is the nature of the exciting cause. Whatever pleasures are excited all at once by the action of the same cause are apt to be looked upon as constituting all together, but one pleasure.

Human nature is susceptible to several simple pleasures. They are the pleasures of each sense. The examples of the pleasures of the sense are like the simple

pleasures of sight excited by the perception of agreeable colors, figures, greenery, mountains, etc, the simple pleasures of the ear excited by the perceptions of the chirping of the birds, the murmuring of waters, the rustling of wind, etc, the pleasures of the smell excited by the fragrance of flowers, etc, and the agreeable inward sensation produced by brisk circulation of blood and ventilation of it in the lungs by pure air such as is breathed in the countryside.

The other simple pleasures relate to wealth, skill, amity, good name, power, piety, benevolence, malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation, relief, those dependent on association, etc. The several simple pains relate to the senses, privation, awkwardness, enmity, ill- fame, etc.

Pleasure is thought to be most intimately connected with our human nature. To enjoy or to hate the things is thought to have the greatest bearing on virtue of character. These things extend right through life, with a weight and power of their own, in respect both to virtue and to happy life. This is so because men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful.

Every sense is active in relation to its object, and a sense in good condition acts perfectly in relation to the most beautiful of its objects. Perfect activity seems to be of this nature. It follows that in the case of each sense, the best activity is that of the best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest of its objects. This activity will be the most complete and pleasant.

There is pleasure in respect of any sense including thought and contemplation. The most complete pleasure is the pleasantest. The pleasure of a well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its objects is the most complete. Here the pleasure completes the activity.

But the pleasure does not complete it in the same way as the combination of object and sense, both good, just as health and the doctor are not the cause of a man being healthy. Pleasure completes the activity as an end, which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age. It does not complete the activity as the corresponding permanent state does, by its immanence. So long as both the intelligible or sensible object and the discriminating or contemplative faculty are as they should be, the pleasure will be involved in the activity. The same result follows when both the passive and the active factors are unchanged and are related to each other in the same way.

How is it, then, that no one is continuously pleased? Certainly all human beings are incapable of continuous activity. Therefore, pleasure also is not continuous as it accompanies activity. Some things delight us when they are new, but later do so less for the same reason. At first, the mind is in a state of stimulation and intensely active, like people are with respect to their vision when they look hard at a thing. But afterwards our activity gets relaxed. For the same reason the pleasure also is dulled.

One may presume that all men desire pleasure because they all aim at life. Life is an activity, and each man is active about those things and with those faculties that he loves most. For example, a musician is active with his listening to musical notes.

As pleasure completes the activities, so does life, which people desire. Therefore, people aim at pleasure because for everyone it completes life that is desirable. Both life and pleasure seem to be bound together and do not admit of separation. The reason is obvious. Pleasure does not arise without activity and every activity is completed by the attendant pleasure.

For this reason, pleasures seem to differ in kind. We think that different things in kind complete things different. Similarly, things differing in kind complete activities differing in kind. The activities of thoughts differ from those of the senses, and both differ among themselves, in kind. Similarly, the pleasures that complete them also differ in kind.

This is evident from the fact that each of the pleasures is bound to the activity it completes. And an activity is intensified by its proper pleasure, as those who engage in the activity with pleasure better judge each class of things. For example, those who are fond of music may progress in their proper function by enjoying it. Thus, the pleasures intensify the activities. What intensifies a thing is proper to it, but things different in kind have properties different in kind.

Since activities are made precise and enduring by their proper pleasures and injured by alien pleasures, evidently the two kinds of pleasure are far apart. Indeed, alien pleasures do pretty the same what proper pains do, as their proper pains destroy activities. So an activity suffers contrary effects from its proper pleasures and pains that supervene on it in virtue of its own nature.

Activities differ in respect of goodness and badness. Some are worthy to be chosen, some to be avoided and some are neutral. So are the pleasures, for to each activity there is a proper pleasure. The pleasure proper to a worthy activity is good and that to an unworthy activity bad. This is like the appetites for noble objectives being laudable and for base objects culpable.

But the pleasures involved in activities are more proper to them than the desires as the latter are separated both in time and in nature, while the former are close to the activities. The closeness of pleasures to activities is such that it is very difficult to distinguish one from the other. As activities are different, so are the corresponding pleasures. Among pleasures, some are superior to others.

Each animal is thought to have a proper pleasure that corresponds to its activity. This will be evident if we survey species by species. Dog, horse and man have different pleasures. It may be that the pleasures of a single species do not differ, but may vary.

In the case of men, they vary to a great extent. The same things that delight some cause pain to others, and vice versa. But in all such matters, that, which appears to the good man, is thought to be really so. If this is true, the good man and virtue seem to be the measure of each thing. So, if a thing appears to be a pleasure to a good man, it is a pleasure, and it is pleasant that he enjoys it. However, those that are admittedly disgraceful shall not be said to be pleasures.

The general tendency of an act is pernicious, according to the sum total of its consequences, that is, the difference between the sum of such as are good and the sum of such as are evil. Into the account of the consequences is to be taken not only the intentions but also the connection between certain consequences and the intentions. The connection is a means of producing other consequences. In this lies the difference between the rational and the irrational agency.

The intention with regard to the consequences of an act depends upon the state of the will or intention with respect to the act itself and the state of the understanding or perceptive faculties with regard to the circumstances which it is, or may appear to be, accompanied with. With respect to these circumstances, the perceptive faculty is susceptible of three states - consciousness, unconsciousness and false consciousness.

It is the state of consciousness when the person doing the act believes precisely those circumstances, and no others, to subsist, which really do subsist. It is the state of unconsciousness when the person fails to perceive certain circumstances to subsist which, however, do subsist. It is a state of false consciousness when the person believes or imagines certain circumstances to subsist, which, in fact, do not subsist.

Acts may be distinguished in several ways for several purposes. First the distinction is between their positive and negative nature. By positive acts are meant such as consist in motion or exertion. By negative acts are meant such as consist in keeping at rest. Thus to strike is a positive act. Not to strike on a certain occasion is a negative act.

The second distinction is between external and internal acts. By external acts are meant corporal acts such as acts of the body. By internal acts are meant mental acts such as the acts of the mind. To strike is an external or overt act. To intend to strike is an internal act.

Acts of discourse are a sort of mixture of the external and internal acts. To speak to another to strike, to write to him to strike or to make signs to him to strike are all so many acts of discourse.

As regards the circumstances that accompany the acts, there is nothing in the nature of things that excludes any imaginable object from being a circumstance to it. Any given object may be a circumstance to any other.

The consequences of an act are events. A circumstance may be related to an event in point of causality in one of four possible ways. First is the way of causation or production. Second is the way of derivation. Third is the way of collateral connection. Fourth is the way of conjunct influence. These several relations do not, all of them, attach upon an event with equal certainty. Every event may have a multitude of circumstances related to it. Of the circumstances that attach upon an event, we can discover a very small number of them. The number of circumstances that a man discovers is in proportion to his intellectual strength and also his inclination.

As for the circumstances of intention, the intention or will may regard one of two objects. First is the act itself. Second are its consequences. Of these objects that

which the intention regards is called *intentional*. It means that if it regards the act, then the act is intentional. If it regards the consequences, then the consequences are intentional. If the intention regards both the act and the consequences, the whole act may be said to be intentional. Whichever of these articles is not the object of the intention, it may be said unintentional.

Generally, we hear people speak of a good intention or of a bad intention. The goodness or badness of a man's intention is circumstance on which great stress is laid. But the import of it is ambiguous and obscure. Strictly speaking, nothing can be said to be good or bad, but either in itself. This can be said only in the case of pleasure or pain and with things that are the causes or preventives of pleasure and pain. But in a figurative way, a thing is said to be good or bad in consideration of its cause. The causes of intention are called *motives.* A man's intention then on any occasion may be called good or bad either with reference to the consequences of the act or with reference to his motives.

Every kind of act, consequently every kind of offence, is apt to assure a different character and be attended with different effects, according to the nature of the motive of the said act. By a motive is meant 'anything whatsoever, which, by influencing the will of a sensitive being, is supposed to serve as a means of determining him to act or voluntarily to forbear to act, upon any occasion'.

In every transaction that leads to punishment, four articles need consideration. First is the act itself that is done. Second is the circumstance in which it is done. Third is the intentionality that may have accompanied it. Fourth is the consciousness, unconsciousness or false consciousness that may have accompanied it. There are two other articles that have a bearing on the act. One is the particular motive or motives that gave birth to it. The other is the general disposition, which it indicates.

The word *motive* is indiscriminately used in one of two ways. First is to denote any of those really existing incidents from which the act is supposed to take its rise. This is styled *unfigurative sense.* Second is to denote a passion, an affection of the mind, a certain fictitious entity or the like. Motives of this category are avarice, indolence, benevolence, etc. This is styled *figurative sense*.

As to the real incidents to which the name of motive is given are of two different kinds. First is the internal perception of any individual lot of pleasure or pain the expectation of which is calculated to determine a person to act in a specific manner. This kind of motives is called internal or interior. Second is any external event the happening of which is regarded as having a tendency to bring about the perception of such pleasure or pain. This kind of motives is called external or exterior. A motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain, operating in a certain manner.

According to this doctrine, pleasure in itself is a good. Rather, immunity from pain is the only good. Pain is in itself an evil. Indeed, without exception, it is the only evil. It, therefore, follows that there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one. For example, let a man's motive be ill will. It may be malice, envy,

cruelty, etc. It is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive; it is the pleasure he has at the thought of the pain, which he expects his adversary will undergo.

It is common to speak of actions as proceeding from good or bad motives. If they are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects. They are good on account of their tendency to produce pleasure or avert pain. They are bad on account of their tendency to produce pain or avert pleasure. The point is that from one and the same motive, and from every kind of motive, may proceed actions that are good, others that are bad and some others that are indifferent.

If any sort of motive then is either good or bad on the score of its effect, this is the case only on individual occasions, and with individual motives. If any sort of motive can, in consideration of its effects, be termed with any propriety a bad one, it can only be with reference to the balance of all the effects it may have had of both kinds, that is, its most usual tendency.

As for emotions of lust, cruelty and avarice, these names are applied in the cases where the motives they signify happen to be bad. The names of these motives, considered apart from their effects, are sexual desire, displeasure and pecuniary interest. To sexual desire, when the effects of it are looked upon as bad, is given the name of lust. When we say that lust is a bad motive, it is a proposition that merely concerns the import of the word lust. If the proposition is transferred to the other word used for the same motive, that is, sexual desire, it does not turn out to be bad. So is the case with the other two. Thus the names lust, cruelty and avarice, applied to the thing, are false. Applied to the name, they are true but nugatory. It is necessary to realize that sexual desire does not merit the name of lust, displeasure the name of cruelty and pecuniary interest the name of avarice.

Of all the motives, goodwill is that of which the dictates are the closest to the principle of felicity or utility. The dictates of felicity are neither more nor less than the dictates of the most extensive and enlightened benevolence. The dictates of the other motives may be conformable or repugnant to those of felicity depending upon the circumstances. After goodwill, love of reputation and desire of amity have the next best chance of coinciding with the dictates of felicity.

The great majority of good actions is intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up. The thoughts of the most virtuous, on these occasions, are concerned with the benefit of the particular persons in focus, without, however, violating the legitimate expectations of anyone else. The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue. The multiplication of happiness is in relation to private utility, or happiness of only some few persons in a given situation.

The principle of utility or felicity or the greatest happiness, which is the foundation of morals to some moral philosophers, holds that actions are right in proportion, as they tend to promote happiness, and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness are intended pleasure and the absence of pain. By unhappiness are intended pain and the privation of pleasure. Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends. All desirable things are desirable

either for the pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. The end of human action is necessarily also the standard of morality, which may be defined as 'the rules and precepts for human conduct'.

The principle of utility does not lead to the person's or agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. Character is always the happier for its nobleness. It makes other people happier and the community in general is immensely a gainer by it. The principle of utility or felicity gains, therefore, its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others and his own, so far as happiness is concerned.

The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two – tranquility and excitement. With much tranquility, many find that they can be content with very little pleasure. With much excitement, many reconcile themselves to a considerable quantity of pain. It is possible for mankind to unite both of them.

One possible objection to the theory of utility is that, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness, there is not enough time previous to the contingent action. Mankind has, over a period of time, through experience, acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their happiness. The beliefs that have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitudes of people. They are also the rules for the ethical philosopher, until and unless he articulates better-reasoned ones. The corollaries from the principle of utility admit of indefinite and continuous improvement in a progressive state of the human mind.

Being rational creatures, men live their lives with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong as well as on the far more difficult questions of being wise and foolish. As long as foresight is a human quality, this will continue to be so. The fundamental principles of morality and the subordinate principles to apply it by constitute the core of ethical philosophy based on the principle of utility, to its votaries.

The principle of utility or felicity has all the sanctions that apply to any other system of morals. Those sanctions are either external or internal. As to external sanctions, they are the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure from fellow human beings or from God, along with what we may have of sympathy or affection for them, or of love and awe of Him, inclining us to do His will independently of selfish consequences. The internal sanction relates to duty, whatever our standard of duty may be. It is a feeling in our own mind, a pain that is intense, attendant on violation of duty, which, in properly cultivated moral natures, rises.

This feeling is the essence of conscience when it is disinterested and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it or with any of the merely accessory circumstances. This feeling is, in general, associated with collateral feelings arising or derived from sympathy, love and more from fear. Other elements associated with it are the forms of religious feeling, recollections of childhood and past life, self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, even occasionally

self-abasement. This complexity of feeling, constituting conscience, may be attributed to the idea of moral obligation.

The ultimate sanction, therefore, of all morality being a subjective feeling in our own minds, is the standard of utility. The sanction of that standard is the conscientious feelings of mankind. It is true that this sanction has no binding force on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to. But such people do not obey any other moral principle, too. They are not subject to any morality except through the external sanctions. On the other hand, that the feelings exist in human nature is a reality. It is established in experience that they are capable of acting with great force in which they have been cultivated.

When once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, this basis of powerful natural sentiment will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. The firm foundation for it is that of the social feelings of mankind, the desire to be in unity with fellow beings for individual and social good. The social state is at once so natural, so necessary and so habitual to man that he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body. In this way, people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of the interests of other people.

The good of others becomes to a person a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence. In an improving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on the increase, which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest. The tending of this feeling of unity and the interest of the individual coupled with the interest of the community constitutes the ultimate sanction for the happiness morality.

Generally, the only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that sound is audible is that people hear it. Similarly the proof that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. Each person's happiness is a good to that person. The general happiness is, therefore, a good to the community of all persons. Happiness is thus one of the ends of conduct and consequently one of the criteria of morality.

The ingredients of happiness are various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely as part of the aggregate. The principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure such as music, or any absence of pain such as good health is to be looked upon as means to a collective something called happiness, and so to be desired on that account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves. Besides being means, they are a part of the end.

Virtue, according to this doctrine, is not originally part of the end, but is capable of becoming so. Those who love it disinterestedly desire and cherish it, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their being, their happiness. Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united.

What is the nature of happiness? The happy life is thought to be virtuous. To each man the activity in accordance with his own disposition is most desirable and, therefore, to the good man that which is in accordance with virtue. A virtuous life requires exertion and does not consist in amusement. We feel that serious things are better than laughable things and those connected with amusement. Therefore, the activity of the serious and virtuous things is more of the nature of happiness, for happiness lies in virtuous activities.

If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue, and this will be that of the best thing in us. Different people see the best thing differently such as Pure Reason, Soul, Spirit being the most divine. The activity of this element, whatever it may be, in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. This activity is naturally contemplative.

First, this activity is the best, for not only is reason the best thing in us, but the objects of reason are the best of knowable objects. Second, it is the most continuous, for we can contemplate Truth more continuously than we can do anything.

The activity of philosophic reason is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities. At all events, the pursuit of it is thought to offer pleasures marvelous for their purity and their enduringness. We are aware that those who *know* pass their time more pleasantly than those we enquire. Contemplative activity is the most self-sufficient.

The philosopher contemplates Truth by himself when he is alone. He loves his activity for its own sake, for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating. The activity of reason, which is contemplative, is of serious worth and to have its pleasure proper to itself, augmenting its activity, its self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely happy man. It, therefore, follows that this will be the complete happiness of man for none of the attributes of happiness is incomplete.

If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to reason is divine in comparison with human life. As already stated, that which is proper to each thing is by nature the best and the most pleasant for each thing. Therefore, for man the life according to reason is the best and the pleasantest, for reason *is* for man more than anything else. This life, therefore, is the happiest. Happiness extends just so far as contemplation does. Those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy in virtue of the said contemplation. This is precious in itself. Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation.

The doctrine of utility, thus, considers that ultimately human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing that is not either a part of happiness or a means to happiness. It, therefore, postulates that actions leading to happiness are the only things desirable. If happiness is the sole end of human action and the promotion of it the test by which to judge all human conduct, it necessarily follows, according to the votaries of this doctrine, that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole.

It is not true that the principle of felicity or utility does not recognize the revealed will of God as the Supreme will of morals. If one who believes in the principle of utility believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, he necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals must fulfill the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. In a way, the theory of utility or Utilitarianism, according to its votaries, is a doctrine of ethics that interprets the will of God.

31. Subjectivism

Subjectivism, as a doctrine of ethics, has two meanings. One is that an individual chooses and makes himself. The other is that it is impossible for man to transcend human subjectivity. The second is the essential meaning of existentialism. It means to say that man chooses his own self, and in making this choice, he also chooses all men. To choose to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose, because we can never choose evil. We always choose the good, and nothing can be good for us, without being good for all.

If values are vague and too broad for any specific case, the only thing left for a man is to trust his instincts. An instinct is a feeling. The value of a feeling is to perform an act, which confirms and defines it.

There is no reality except in action. Man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to the extent that he fulfills himself. He is, therefore, nothing else than the ensemble of his acts, nothing else than his life. A man is a series of undertakings, the sum, the organization, the ensemble of the relationships, which make up these undertakings. Man makes himself. In choosing his ethics, he makes himself, and force of circumstances is such that he cannot abstain from choosing one. Choice always remains a choice in a given situation. We define man only in relationship to involvement.

One can bring moral judgment to bear on honesty. If man's situation is defined as a free choice with no excuses and no recourse, any man who takes refuse behind the excuse of his passions or who sets up determinism for its own sake, is a dishonest man. Dishonesty is obviously a falsehood because it belies the complete freedom of involvement. But the strictly coherent attitude of any one is that of honesty.

Similarly there can be moral judgment on freedom. Freedom in every specific circumstance can have no other aim than to want itself. It means that the ultimate meaning of the acts of honest men is the quest for freedom as such. We want freedom for its own sake in every circumstance. And in wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, as the freedom of others depends on ours. It is, therefore, possible to pass judgment on those who seek to hide from themselves the complete freedom of their existence and call them cowards. But such judgment can be from a strictly unbiased point of view.

One advantage of importing scientific or experimental habit into all matter of practice is that it cuts at the roots of subjectivism, also termed egoism. What is objectionable in subjectivism is the throwing of emphasis upon every change made in ourselves instead of the changes brought about in the world in which we live. Another advantage concerns the import of standards, principles and rules into human conduct.

With this import, all tenets about good and goods will be recognized to be hypotheses. Instead of being rigidly fixed, they will be treated as intellectual

instruments to be tested and acted upon. They lose all pretence to finality – the chief source of dogmatism. This will do away with the intolerance and fanaticism that attend the notion that beliefs and judgments are capable of inherent truth and authority. Any belief can only be considered tentative and hypothetical. It is not to be acted upon as such. It is to be framed with reference to its being a guide to action.

The content of ethics is variable; but a certain form of it is universal. It is always concrete and thereby unforeseeable. There is always the element of invention. The one thing that counts is *knowing*, though the inventing has been done in the name of freedom.

32. Mechanics of Ethics

Generalization Argument

The Generalization Argument runs thus: If everyone were to do the same thing, the consequences would be disastrous or undesirable; therefore, no one ought to do that. It also takes the form thus: The consequences of no one's doing that would be undesirable; therefore, everyone ought to do that. From this argument follows the generalization principle thus: What is right or wrong for one person must be right or wrong for any similar person in similar circumstances.

The consequences of everyone's acting in a certain way seem relevant to a moral judgment about that way of acting. There are other consequences, of course, in which this kind of consideration is irrelevant if the instances are absurd.

It is common knowledge that the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. In other words, whether an act is right or wrong depends on the circumstances or context in which it is done, or on the conditions or circumstances under which it is done. The generalization principle implies that an act that is right or wrong, is right or wrong on general grounds and, therefore, for a class of persons. This class of persons is determined by reasons in terms of which the act is right or wrong.

There is a similarity between the generalization principle and what is called the Golden Rule, which is stated thus: 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you'. If taken literally, the golden rule would be an abomination. For example, it could mean that one would wish for another's cooperation in sin and be willing to reciprocate it. Such interpretation is misinterpretation. The golden rule is the rule of equity, which states thus. 'Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable that another should do for me, that, by the same judgment, I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I should in the like case do for him'.

The generalization principle is an essential part of the meaning of distinctively moral terms such as right, wrong, ought, etc, in their distinctively moral sense. As such this principle is involved in, or presupposed by, every genuine moral judgment. It is also an essential feature of moral reasoning as it is presupposed to give a reason for moral judgment. It thus determines what can count as moral reasoning. At the same time, it is the reasons that are given in any particular case that determine the application of the principle as to the scope of the qualification, 'similar persons in similar circumstances'. It follows from this consideration that there can be no genuine moral judgment apart from reasons, and no moral reasons apart from the generalization principle. This provides all the proof or justification that this principle requires.

If the above line of argument is accepted, the theory or view that moral judgments cannot be supported by reasons, or that there is no such thing as a valid moral argument, does not hold water. There is, however, a distinction, what many hold, between the emotive and subjective ethical theories.

In respect of the both, moral judgments are regarded as having no objective significance. On the subjective theory, a moral judgment states that the agent or some one else has a certain attitude. On the emotive theory, a moral judgment does not say anything, but merely gives expression to an attitude. If one is unable to support by reasons any moral judgment, it cannot be considered a genuine moral judgment, but merely an indication what one likes or dislikes, and it is of no import.

The generalization principle can be said to apply to moral judgments explicitly. As Sidgwick states, 'whatever action any of us judges to be right for himself, he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances'. He also states, 'even when a moral judgment relates primarily to some particular action, we commonly regard it as applicable to any other action belonging to a certain definable class; so that the moral truth apprehended is implicitly conceived to be intrinsically universal, though particular in our first apprehension of it'. In other words, every moral judgment is intrinsically universal, if not explicitly, at least implicitly. Every moral judgment involves a generalization. Moral judgments possess the characteristics of implicit generality.

It is no doubt true that many sentences containing moral terms are ambiguous. They may be normally used as expressions both of practical judgments and of feelings. The important point is that, when required, one must be able to distinguish between the two types of expressions. Advancing practical arguments in favour of the presumed moral judgments makes all the difference. Advancing reasons does not amount to analyzing them. Analysis of reasons is on a different level of activity.

Verifiability

The criterion, which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact, is the criterion of verifiability. A statement is factually significant to any given person if he knows how to verify the proposition, which it purports to express. That is to say that he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or to reject it as being untrue or false.

In the first place, it is necessary to draw a distinction between practical verifiability and verifiability in principle. In many cases we believe propositions to be true, which we have not in fact taken steps to verify. Many of these propositions are verifiable, if only we take trouble to verify them. But there remain many significant propositions, concerning matters of fact that are not verifiable, even if we choose to verify them. Such propositions are verifiable in principle, though not in practice.

There is another distinction between the 'strong' and the 'weak' sense of the term 'verifiable'. A proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of the term, if its truth could be conclusively established in experience. But it is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it probable.

The ordinary system of ethics can be divided into four main categories. First is the category of propositions that express definitions of ethical terms or judgments about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions. Second is the category of propositions describing the phenomenon of moral experience and their causes. Third is the category of exhortations to moral virtue. Fourth is the category of actual ethical judgments.

The fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable, in as much as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgments in which they occur. They are also unanalysable for the reason that they are mere pseudo-concepts. The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content.

It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only to express feeling, but also to arouse feeling and so to stimulate action. Some of them are used in such a way as to give the sentences in which they occur, the effect of commands. In fact, we may define the meaning of the various ethical words in terms both of the different feelings they are ordinarily taken to express, and also the different responses, which they are calculated to provoke.

This leads to the realization that it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the validity of ethical judgments. It is because they have no objective validity whatsoever. If a sentence makes no statement at all, there is obviously no point in asking whether what it says is true or false. And the sentences, which simply express moral judgments, do not say anything. They are just expressions of pure feeling. As such they do not attract the category of truth or falsehood.

They are unverifiable for the reason that they do not express genuine propositions. A cry of pain or a word of command is equally unverifiable. The validity of ethical judgments is, therefore, not considered to be determined by the

nature of an agent's feelings. It does not imply that the existence of any feelings is a necessary and sufficient condition of the validity of an ethical judgment. On the other hand, it implies that ethical judgments have no validity.

The usage of language establishes this fact that humanity has clearly understood it. *Cunning* and *canny* are equivalent to *knowing*, and all the three adjectives pass a more or less unfavourable moral judgment on those to whom they are applied. Similarly, *conceit* is just *concept*. What a man's mind conceives is conceit, and is, therefore, clearly the supreme value of his ego. *Shrewd* is the participial form of *shrew* meaning *malicious* and is connected with *beshrew* meaning to curse, but applied, by way of rather dubious compliment, to astute businessmen and attorneys. Wizards are so called because they are wise, as in the American slang, a 'wise guy' is 'wise.' Conversely, an idiot was once popularly known as an innocent.

Relativist Analysis

A moral philosopher is commonly called a relativist. His analysis of ethical statements is said to be a relativist analysis, if he construes ethical statements to be relative. Such analysis includes an egocentric expression. It, therefore, follows that relativist analyses can always be conveniently and positively identified by direct inspection of their constituent expressions, however much they vary from one another.

The familiar characteristic of all relativist analyses is not *definitive* of relativism. It is, however, a consequence of the fact that relativist analyses contain egocentric expressions. What is not relativist analysis may be defined as absolutist analysis. It implies that ethical statements are true or false, and consistent or inconsistent with one another, without special reference to the people who happen to be assessing or asserting them.

A proposed analysis of ethical statements is dispositional if it construes ethical statements to assert that a certain being or beings, either actual or hypothetical, is or are disposed to react to something in a certain way. An 'ideal observer' may be considered the possible being that is the object of this analysis. The role of the ideal observer is to be capable of reacting in a manner, which will determine whether an ethical judgment is true or false.

The derivative characteristics of an analysis that is both absolutist and dispositional are that it is objectivist, it is rational and it is empirical. In so far as it is objectivist, it construes ethical statements to be assertions about the reactions of an ideal observer. In so far as it is relational, it construes ethical terms in such a way that to apply an ethical term to a particular thing such as an act is to assert that that thing is related in a certain way to some other thing, either actual or hypothetical.

In so far as it is empirical, the defining characteristics of an ideal observer are feelings of desire, emotions of approval and disproval or some other experiences accessible to some psychological observation. In order to define an absolutist dispositional analysis, it is, therefore, necessary to maintain that moral data are the moral experiences to which we appeal when in doubt about the correct solution of a moral problem, or when attempting to justify a moral belief.

It follows that the ethically significant reactions of an ideal observer are psychological in nature. Any plausible description of an ideal observer may be a description of the Witness Consciousness in the agent, also called Conscience.

The attributes of an ideal observer are that he is omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts; he is omni percipient; he is disinterested; he is dispassionate; and he is consistent. In other respects he is normal. If ethical statements are ever true, they are true only because, in virtue of the relevant psychological laws, any ideal observer would react in the same way to a particular act.

Bad Faith - Sincerity

By *Bad Faith* is meant that it is a lie to one's self on condition that the lie to oneself is distinguished from lying in general. Lying is a negative attitude. But this negation does not bear on consciousness itself. It aims only at the transcendent. The essence of the lie implies in fact that the liar actually is in complete possession of the truth, which he is hiding. A man does not lie about what he is ignorant of, nor does he lie when he is mistaken. Lying is a kind of cynical consciousness of the liar who affirms truth within himself but denies it in his words and that negation as such. The fact expressed does not exist and the original negation rests on a truth. But the inner disposition of the liar is positive; it could be the object of an affirmative judgment. The liar intends to deceive and he does not hide his intention from himself. It often happens that the liar is himself the victim of his lie, that he half- persuades himself of it. The common forms of the lie represent intermediaries between falsehood and bad faith.

As for bad faith, one who practises it hides a displeasing truth or presents as truth a pleasing untruth. Bad faith has, in appearance, the structure of falsehood. In bad faith, I am hiding the truth from myself. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. Bad faith implies, in essence, the unity of a single consciousness. It does not come to human reality from outside. One does not undergo bad faith, nor is one infected with it. It is not a state. But consciousness affects itself with bad faith.

The idea of sincerity is the antithesis of bad faith. Sincerity presents itself as a demand, and consequently is not a state. What is the ideal to be attained in relation to sincerity? It is that a man be for himself only what he is, reflecting his conscience.

Power

The power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means to obtain some future apparent good. It is either *original* or *instrumental*. Original or natural power is the eminence of the faculties of body or mind as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility, etc. Instrumental powers are those acquired by natural powers or by fortune. They are means and instruments to acquire more as riches, reputation, friends, luck, etc. The nature of power is to increase as it proceeds, like fame.

The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the powers of most men united, by consent, in one person, entity or institution, natural or civil that has the use of all their powers depending on the will of the person, entity or institution as the case may be. To have friends or to be part of a group or society is power. Organization of the state is power as it is the strength of its constituents united.

Richness joined with liberality is power as it secures friends and fame. Richness without liberality is no power as it exposes one to envy, as a prey.

Reputation of power is power, because it draws with it the adherence of those that need protection. So the reputation of love of a man's country is called popularity. Whatsoever quality makes a man beloved by or feared of many, or the reputation of such quality is power as it is a means to have the assistance and service of many.

Good success is power as it makes reputation of wisdom or good fortune, which makes men either fear him or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power is increase of power, because it gains love.

Reputation of prudence in governance is power because we commit the governance of ourselves to prudent men more willingly than to others. Eloquence is power, as it is seeming prudence.

Form is power, because, being a promise of good, it recommends persons to the favour of opposite sex and strangers.

Desire of ease and sensual delight disposes men to obey the common power. Fear of death and injury disposes them to the same. This is because by such desires a man abandons the protection that might be hoped for from his own industry and effort. On the contrary, ambitious men are inclined to pursue the causes of struggle for gain.

Desire of knowledge and arts of peace also inclines men to obey common power, for such desire contains a desire of leisure, and consequently protection from some other power than their own.

‘Whoever is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined himself, for that power is produced by him either through craft or force; and both of these are suspected by the one who has been raised to power’.

Because of the instinct to power, one never tries to avoid one difficulty without running into another. But prudence consists in being able to know the nature of the difficulties and taking the least harmful as good.

Of all social, moral and spiritual problems, the problem of power is the most difficult of solution. Craving for power is not a vice of the body. Consequently it does not know the limitations imposed by a tired or satiated physiology upon gluttony, intemperance and lust. With every successive satisfaction, the appetite for power continues to grow without end and without interruption by bodily fatigue or sickness.

Further, the nature of society is such that the higher a man climbs in the political, economic or religious hierarchy, the greater are his opportunities and resources for exercising power. But climbing higher is generally a slow process and the ambitious reach the top only when they are well advanced in life. The older he grows, the more chances he has to exercise power, fair or foul.

In this respect, his situation is different from that of a debauchee. The debauchee, too, does not leave voluntarily his vices, but at least, as he grows older, he finds his vices leaving him. On the other hand, the one hankering after power neither leaves his vices, nor is left by them. Old age intensifies his addictions by making it easier for him to satisfy his cravings on a larger scale and in a more spectacular way. That is why we see that political action, undertaken all too often, is not for the public good, but primarily to gratify the power lusts of bad but old men at the helm of affairs.

No infallible method seems ever to have been devised to control the political manifestations of the lust of power. As the very essence of power is expansive without limit, it is possible to check it by way of collision with another power. It is said that national unity is nothing but national servitude to a single man and his supporting oligarchy.

Hence any society that values liberty is to see that the power of its rulers is divided. Organized and balanced disunity is a necessary condition of liberty. One way to contain the unbridled exercise of power is to limit the tenure of office of its rulers. Any democratic polity, therefore, fixes a term of office for its rulers with or without the possibility of re-election. Where reelection is made possible, it may be for just one or more terms, depending upon local conditions, on the basis of universal suffrage.

Praise - Ignorance

Desire of praise disposes men to laudable actions such as please them whose judgment they value. Of those men whom we contemn, we contemn the praises, too. Desire of fame after death does the same. Though after death there is no sense of the praise given us on earth, yet such fame is not in vain. For men have a present delight therein from the foresight of it and of the benefit that may accrue thereby to their posterity. They may not see it, yet they imagine its utility. For anything that is pleasure to the sense, is also pleasure in the imagination.

Want of scientific approach or ignorance of causes rather constrains a man to rely on the advice and authority of others. If men do not rely on their own reason and judgment, they must rely on the opinion of some other who, they think, is wiser than themselves and do not see why he should deceive them.

Ignorance of the significance of words - want of understanding - disposes men to take on trust, the truth as well as the errors of those they trust, for neither truth nor error, nor can nonsense be detected without a proper understanding of words. It, therefore, follows that men give different names to one and the same thing from the difference of their own passions. For example, if a person approves the opinion of another, he calls it private opinion. But if he dislikes it, he calls it heresy, even though heresy is no different from a private opinion.

Ignorance of natural causes disposes a man to credulity, to believe impossibilities, for he is unable to detect them. Ignorance itself without malice is able to make a man both to believe lies and tell them, and also to invent them.

Anxiety for the future disposes a man to enquire into the causes of things as their knowledge makes him better prepared to order the present to his best advantage.

Men who make little or no enquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance of what it is that has the power to do them either good or harm, are inclined to suppose several kinds of powers invisible. Such people stand in awe of their own imagination. In times of distress, they invoke the invisible powers imagined. In times of success, expected or unexpected, such men give them thanks. They make creatures of their own fancy their gods. This fear of things invisible is the natural seat of what we call religion.

Obligation - Excuse

Actions are, in a peculiar way, revelatory of moral principles, as the function of moral principles is to guide conduct. The language of morals is a kind of prescriptive language. The question 'What shall I do?' is one that we cannot for long evade.

The problems of conduct have to be solved without delay. We cannot wait to see the solution in the next issue, because on the solution of the problems depends what happens in the next issue. As the problems of the conduct become more complex, there is a great need for an understanding of the language in which these problems are posed and answered.

If practical principles are accepted sufficiently long and unquestioningly, they come to have the force of intuition. Thus our ultimate moral principles can become so completely accepted by us. We treat them, not as universal imperatives, but as matters of fact. They have the same indubitability. Indeed, they create a sense of obligation.

When we have been brought up since childhood in obedience to a principle, the thought of not obeying it becomes abhorrent to us. If we fail to obey it, we suffer remorse. When we obey it, we feel at ease with ourselves. The feelings so generated ultimately result in the feeling of obligation, though in different degrees and with different content for different people.

To guide choices or actions, a moral judgment has to be such that if a person assents to it, he must assent to some imperative sentence derivable from it. This is to say that a moral judgment entails an imperative. In other words, this is to say that moral judgments guide actions and also that they entail imperatives.

Someone is accused of having done something if he is said to have done something bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome or in some other of the numerous possible ways untoward. Thereupon he, or someone on his behalf, will try to defend his conduct or to get him out of it.

In one defence, he accepts responsibility, but denies that it is bad. In the other he admits that it is bad, but does not accept full, or even any, responsibility. This is the kind of situations where we find 'excuses'. A study of excuses will help towards the positive development of a cautious, later-day version of conduct. To examine excuses is to examine cases where there has been some abnormality or failure.

33. Meta-ethics

The western ethical philosophy had shown three constant themes through over the last two millenniums since the Sophists till the 20th century. They are - (1) disagreements over whether ethical judgments are truths about the world or only reflections of the wishes of those who make them, (2) frequent attempts to show, in the face of considerable skepticism, either that it is in one's own interest to do what is good or that, even though this is not necessarily in one's own interest, it is the rational thing to do, and (3) repeated debates over just what goodness and the standard of right and wrong might be. The last century has seen new twists to these old themes and an increased attention to the application of ethics to practical problems. The major concerns listed above may be considered as meta-ethics, normative ethics and applied ethics respectively.

The methodology of ethics, also called meta-ethics, seeks to clarify the nature of ethical enquiry itself. It examines the logical functions of ethical language and the meaning of the ethical terms. Methodology may not be directly concerned with the question of what ethical principles one may have to adopt. But it has important bearings on ethics proper. For example, any specification of the meaning of the questions such as 'what is good life?', 'what is duty?', etc may influence one's views on what good life is and what one's duties are? Like moral persuasion, methodology is not distinctly separated from ethics proper. An ethical treatise consists of moralizing with the help of an ethical theory defended on methodological grounds.

Ethics by itself may not be a vehicle for becoming a better person. It will, however, help by making an individual intelligently aware of what is involved in holding an ethical belief and by cultivating a critical approach to the ethical principles. It helps one to realize clearly the great complexity of ethical problems and the many varied aspects of the ethical principles we habitually employ. It also helps to achieve a grasp of factors relevant to evaluation and application of ethical principles.

Ethics helps an individual to gain an acquaintance with ethical values of humanistic study. It includes a summation of important human values. The ethical philosophy of a given period sheds light on the attitudes and beliefs of the people of the time and thus helps in interpreting history of that period.

Meta-ethics deals not with substantive ethical theories or moral judgments, but rather with questions about the nature of these theories and judgments. One example of the methodology of meta-ethics is the 'open question argument'. It consists of taking the proposed definition of good and turning it into a question.

For example, if the proposed definition is 'Good means whatever leads to the greatest happiness of the greatest number', then the question asked is, 'is whatever leads to the greatest happiness of the greatest number good?' If the question is meaningful, that is, a negative answer is not self-contradictory, then the definition cannot be right, for a definition is supposed to preserve the meaning of the term defined.

For the proponents of meta-ethics, the open question argument does not do anything to show that pleasure, for instance, is not the sole criterion of the goodness of an action. It only shows that this cannot be known to be true by definition, and so, if it is to be known at all, it must be known by some other means. Basically they argue that all attempts to derive ethical conclusions from anything not itself ethical in nature are bound to fail.

The modern intuitionists in the footsteps of the proponents of meta-ethics claim that ethical knowledge is gained through an immediate apprehension of its truth. In other words, a true ethical judgment is self-evident as long as we are reflecting clearly and calmly, and our judgment is not distorted by self-interest or faulty upbringing. They take 'the convictions of thoughtful, well-educated people as the data of ethics'. This is subject to the condition that some may be illusory and they should be rejected when they do not stand up to 'the test of reflection'.

The intuitionists differ on the nature of the moral truths that are apprehended in this way. For some, they are valuable in themselves such as the pleasures of friendship and the enjoyment of beauty. Some others consider that we know it to be our duty to do acts of a certain type. These differences in approach reveal the lack of agreement about modern judgments that each claims to be self-evident.

Moral intuitionism faded over a period of time in the face of logical positivism. According to this approach, all true statements fall into two categories – logical truths and statements of fact. Moral judgments cannot fit into either category. They cannot be logical truths as they are no more than what conform to definitions. Nor are they the statements of fact as there is no way of verifying the truths the intuitionists claim to apprehend. This has led to the concept that moral judgments could not be truths at all.

This has led to the distinction of the facts a sentence may convey from the emotive impact it is intended to have. Moral judgments are significant because of their emotive impact. In saying that something is wrong, we are not merely expressing our disapproval of it, but encouraging those to whom we speak, to share our attitude. This is why we bother to argue about our moral views to secure their acceptance by others. The emotivists, on the other hand, are accused of being subjectivists in the sense that there are no possible standards of right and wrong other than one's own subjective feelings.

A different form of subjectivism has come into being in the form of existentialism. Its concept is 'to say that we are compelled by our situation, our nature or our role in life to act in a certain way is to exhibit bad faith'. As long as we choose 'authentically', there are no moral standards by which our conduct can be criticized.

Another approach to moral judgments has also developed. According to it, moral judgments are not primarily seeking to describe anything. Nor are we simply expressing our attitudes. Instead, moral judgments prescribe while the actions describe. The choice of prescription is that of the individual. No one will tell another what he or she must think right. Herein lies moral freedom. Notwithstanding the element of choice, the moral freedom guaranteed by descriptivism is compatible with a substantial amount of reasoning about moral judgments.

Such reasoning is possible because moral judgments must be universalizable. This universalizability is not a substantive moral principle, but a logical feature of the moral terms. This means that anyone who uses such terms as right and ought is committed to universalizability. Universalizability is a powerful means of reasoning against certain moral judgments. It can also be used to test the relevance of any difference.

Any value is defined in terms of the natural quality of being desired or being an object of interest. The greatest moral value is, therefore, to be found in whatever leads to the harmonious integration of interests. A moral principle must have a particular kind of content, that is, it must deal, for instance, with some aspect of wants, welfare or flourishing. Morality may be defined in such a way that moral principles are restricted to those that maximize well-being of the community.

When a moral judgment is to be prescribed universally, one must take into account all the ideals and preferences held by all those who will be affected by the action one is judging. In taking these into account, one cannot give any special weight to one's own ideals merely because they are one's own. The effect of this application of universalizability is that for a moral judgment to be universalizable, it must ultimately be based on the maximum possible satisfaction of the preferences of all those affected by it.

Even if moral judgments do not correspond to any objective facts or self-evident truths, they may still be proper candidates for being true or false. This position has come to be known as moral realism. For some, it makes moral judgments true or false at the cost of taking objectivity out of the notion of truth.

Our reasons for acting morally must depend on our desires because reason in action applies only to the best way of achieving what we desire. This view of practical reason virtually precludes any general answer to the question 'why should I be moral?' Intuitionists reject all attempts to offer extraneous reasons for being moral. For them, morality carries its own internal reasons for being followed. For the emotivists, anything an individual desires can be considered moral. This does not satisfy all, as all desires do not lead to generally accepted morality.

The connection between morality and self-interest is hard to rationalize. It is common experience that those who aim directly at their personal happiness in a selfish way do not find it. On the other hand, those whose lives have meaning or purpose apart from their own happiness, find happiness as well. If reason must always be based on desire, even our normal idea of prudence becomes incoherent.

One aspect of meta-ethical significance, propounded by Rawls, is his idea that a sound moral theory is one that matches reflective moral judgments. According to him, our 'reflective moral judgments' serve as a testing ground. This concept, however, weakens the notion of the applicability of certain independent standard to test the validity of the moral theory.

Another aspect of meta-ethical significance propounded by R.B. Brandt is his idea that everything capable of being expressed by the word 'good' can be more

clearly stated in terms of rational desires. He considers that an ideal process of cognitive psychotherapy eliminates all desires based on false beliefs, desires relating to the future, desires or aversions caused by others or early deprivation, etc. Whatever desires remain after such filtration are rational desires.

According to him, the notions of morally right and morally wrong are useful. What is morally wrong is what is prohibited by any moral code that fully rational people in a society approve of. He raises a question whether it is always rational to act morally. His answer is that such desires as benevolence survive cognitive psychotherapy and, therefore, a rational person will be benevolent. Similarly, a rational person will also be averse to dishonesty and have other moral motives. But these motives may occasionally conflict with self-interested desires and there is no guarantee that the moral motives will be the stronger. A fully rational person might support a certain kind of moral code and yet not act in accordance with it on every occasion.

As seen from the above, enough can be said on either side of the central issues of meta-ethics. There is ample room for disagreement about the extent to which reason can bring about agreed decisions on what we ought to do. There also remains the dispute about whether it is proper to refer to moral judgments as true or false. A complete reconciliation between morality and self-interest continues to be elusive as it has been through the ages.

34. Normative Ethics

Normative ethics seeks to set norms or standards for conduct. The term is commonly used in reference to the discussion of general theories about what one ought to do. Its crucial question is whether actions are to be judged right or wrong solely on the basis of their consequences. Theories that judge actions by their consequences are termed Consequentialist, though earlier they used to be referred to as Teleological.

The simplest form of Consequentialism is classical Utilitarianism. According to classical Utilitarianism, every action is to be judged good or bad according to whether its consequences do more than any alternative action to increase or, at least, to limit any unavoidable decrease in the net balance of pleasure over pain in the universe. This is also called hedonistic Utilitarianism.

An extension of Utilitarianism is Consequentialism, as propounded by G.E. Moore. According to it, the consequences of actions are decisive for their morality, but pleasure and pain are not the only consequences that matter. For example, beauty is good in itself, apart from the pleasure it brings. Similarly, the friendship of close personal relationships has an intrinsic value independent of its pleasantness. This approach is to judge actions by their consequences, but not solely by the amount of pleasure they produce.

Another form of Consequentialism is Preference Utilitarianism, which attempts to maximize the satisfaction of preferences. It finds its content in the desires that people generally have. It overcomes the objection that the production of simple, mindless pleasure becomes the supreme goal of all human activity. But most preference utilitarians base their judgments, not on the desires that people actually have, but rather on those they would have if they were fully informed and thinking clearly. As most people are less than fully informed and clear in their thoughts most of the time, it is difficult to discover what people would want in these conditions.

Consequentialists may also be separated into act utilitarians and rule utilitarians based on their approach to know if each individual action is to have the best consequences or if each rule is to lead to action with the best consequences. The distinction is in the specific context of Utilitarian ethics. Rule Utilitarianism has developed as a means of making the implications of Utilitarianism less shocking to ordinary moral consciousness. Rule Utilitarianism has its own limitations. If it is to be maintained as a distinct position, then there must be some restriction on how specific the rule can be so that at least some relevant consequences are not taken into account. But to ignore relevant consequences is to break with the very essence of Consequentialism. Therefore, Rule Utilitarianism is not a true form of Utilitarianism at all for some. As these differences indicate, Consequentialism can be held on the basis of widely differing meta-ethical views.

But everyday moral decisions are the domain of the intuitive level of moral thought. At this level we do not enter into fine calculations of consequences. Instead, we act in accordance with fundamental moral principles that we have learned and

accepted as determining, for all practical purposes, whether an act is right or wrong. These moral principles, when applied intuitively by most people, must be such as produce the best consequences overall. Also they have to be precise, brief and clear to be intelligible to all. Judgments made at the intuitive level will not be too different from judgments made by conventional morality.

While choosing principles of justice, people have to safeguard themselves against the worst possible outcome by two principles, first by insisting on the maximum amount of liberty compatible with the like liberty for others; and second by opting for the principle of 'maximin'. This principle seeks to maximize the welfare of all at the minimum level of society. This does not lead to equal distribution of wealth. If we accept certain assumptions about the effect of the incentives and the benefits that may flow to all from the productive labours of the more talented members of the society, the maximin principle allows considerable inequality.

Ethics considers that rights must be derived from more basic ethical principles or from accepted social and legal practices. But the tendency is reversed and rights are considered to constitute the basis of the ethical theory. Our rights to life, liberty and legitimately acquired property are considered absolute. No act can be justified if it violates them.

As a corollary, we have a duty to assist others in the preservation of their rights, without in any way infringing on them. Ethics gives rise to a fundamental right to equal concern and respect for all. Respect for others may require us to assist them and not merely leave them to fend for themselves. Accordingly this ethical principle obliges the state to intervene in many areas that rights are respected. This validates Kant's principle of respect for persons as the fundamental principle of ethics.

For the proponents of natural law ethics, there are certain basic human goods that we should not act against. These goods are life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness and religion. The identification of these goods is a matter of reflection, assisted by the findings of anthropologists. Each of the goods is regarded as equally fundamental and there is no hierarchy among them. Natural law ethics claims that it is not possible to measure the basic goods against each other. It prohibits any infringement of the right to these goods.

Ethical egoism is a concept that suggests that we should each consider only the consequences of our actions for our own interests. Its advantage is that it avoids any possible conflict between morality and self-interest. It is rational for us to pursue our own interest as long as it does not conflict with the reasonable interests of others. If the ethical egoist is right, then the rationality of morality is equally clear to him. Universal egoism is based on the principle 'everyone should do what is in her or his own interest'. This principle is universalizable, as it contains no reference to any particular interest of any particular individual. Others also accept it as it offers them the surest possible way of furthering their own interests. As such it is clearly an ethical principle.

But the claim that ethical egoism that all will be better off if everyone of us does what is in his or her own interest, is not always correct. It is common experience

that unless ground rules are followed, the interests of individuals are not served equitably. This calls for regulation and conditioning by the state, of the interests of individuals to conform to the interests of the community in the shape of minimum common ground rules.

35. Applied Ethics

Practical or applied ethics is another concept that concerns with the application of normative theories to practical moral problems. For millenniums, moral philosophers in all societies have concerned themselves with practical questions including suicide, exposure of infants, treatment of women, sexual morality, proper behavior of public officials, etc. As time has passed by, interest has centered on equality, human rights, justice, war, civil disobedience, racial including social discrimination, equitable distribution of wealth, abortion, euthanasia, the value of human life, environmental ethics, etc.

We often make statements such as 'all humans are equal'. Concepts of this nature, though heard in all generations, have often gained currency following social and political movements. The abandonment of colonialism and the movement towards democracy, though gradual, around the world are the result of political movements based on the concept of equality of human beings.

There is a general consensus on the unacceptability of discrimination based on race or caste or class. With no disagreement on such discrimination, the centre of attention has now moved to reverse discrimination. The questions now asked are whether it is acceptable to favour blacks in the USA, or scheduled castes, tribes and other backward classes in India for preferential treatment in education or employment or political power, on the ground that they had been discriminated against in the past and were generally so much worse off than the other sections of the communities. Or is this, too, a form of racial or social reverse discrimination, and unacceptable for that reason? The grounds for preferential treatment to the earlier disadvantaged races or communities are that the earlier neglect based on discrimination for generations has had the effect of not bringing the said races or communities on par with the better-off races or communities in their national groups and that it will take still longer time for application of the 'maximin' principle to be operative effectively.

Inequality between the sexes has been another focus of consideration. Does equality mean ending as far as possible differences in the sex roles, or can we have equal status for different roles? There has been a lively debate between feminists and their opponents on one hand, and among feminists themselves, on a different level, on the other hand about what a society without sexual inequality would be like.

Here, too, the legitimacy of reverse discrimination has been an issue of contention. The movements for equal rights to women in all spheres of public and social life are based generally on the concern for the welfare of women.

Concerns of justice and equality are generally limited in scope to a single society. Not much has been thought of about the distribution of wealth among societies. But philosophers have now begun to think about the moral implications of the inequality in wealth between the affluent societies and those even with minimum needs not being provided. What are the obligations of those who have plenty when others are starving? An ethical principle is worked out that affluent nations, as well as

affluent individuals, ought to be doing much more to help the poor than they are now generally doing.

An extension of the above principle is that the possession of wealth by an individual beyond what is required for his family is to be treated to be held in 'Trust'. The principle of 'Trusteeship' is that the possessor of the wealth though earned by him is to utilize his disposable wealth beyond the needs of his family for the welfare of his neighbours in the community of which he is part. It is loving, caring and sharing with the neighbors in need, though without sanction of law. Any sanction of law will only be counter-productive and breeds resistance. In the absence of legal sanction, the ethic of Trusteeship will be more compulsive in implementation as it gives true happiness to the individual.

Another issue related to equality is animal liberation. While all human beings are considered entitled to equal moral status, the need for more humane treatment to non-human animals has been stressed of late. This has led to a positive effect on attitudes and practices toward animals in many countries. Ethically, an animal liberation movement, sphere-headed by the societies for prevention of cruelty to animals, has taken roots in different countries.

Environmental ethics raise a host of difficult ethical questions, including the ancient one of the nature of intrinsic value. While ethical philosophers have agreed that human experiences have intrinsic value and that the pains and pleasures of non-human animals have some intrinsic significance, there has been no ethical explanation why it is bad if some of the animal species become extinct or the rain forests are felled or the ecological balance is unsettled. Are these developments to be regretted only because of the loss to humans or other sentient creatures? Or is there more to it than simply that? A view is gaining ground that animal species, forests, rivers, ecological systems, etc have a value independent of the instrumental value they may have for human beings or other sentient creatures. As a result, a movement is on for their protection based on ethical principles.

Our concern for the environment also raises the question of our obligations to future generations. How much do we owe to the future? From a social contract point of view of ethics or from the view of the ethical egoist, the answer is in the negative for the future generations are unable to reciprocate now for the benefit we may extend to them.

But, ethically speaking, the fact that the future generations do not now exist is no reason for giving less consideration to their interests than we give to our own, when we are certain that they will exist, though in the future, and will have interests that will be affected by what we do now. The storage of the radioactive wastes is another issue in focus. It is very clear that what we do now will indeed affect the interests of the generations to come.

Another issue related to the future generations is their size, which, by the population policies, we now choose, and the extent to which we encourage large or small families. Most environmentalists believe that the world is already dangerously over-crowded. This may be so, but the notion of over-population conceals a

philosophical issue. What is optimum population? Is it that population size at which the average level of welfare will be as high as possible? Or is, at the size at which the total amount of welfare, that is, the average multiplied by the total population, as great as possible? Answers to these questions may be counter-intuitive, and the questions remain baffling in applied ethics.

War and aggression are vital ethical concerns that affect peace. While national governments wage war or aggression even for a cause considered just, can they be supported ethically if the war or aggression causes untold suffering to the civilian population of whom the main sufferers are the old, women and children? Is conscription for such war or aggression legitimate? Is civil disobedience to the national government legitimate? Is there any moral responsibility for the national government for the loss and destruction it causes to another nation in the name of war or aggression even for an allegedly just cause?

These are some of the concerns of the war waged by the United States of America in October 2001 against the then Taliban regime of Afghanistan in the wake of heinous crimes committed in the U.S.A, by the terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan. The ethical principles postulate the right of the U.S.A to punish the perpetrators of the crimes in that country, in a way that the civilian population in Afghanistan has not been put to hardship. This has not been easy to attain. The issues raised by the US-UK aggression in Iraq in 1993 are still worse. The issues continue to be baffling until the forces that matter heed the voice of ethical reason.

In the words of Sri Aurobindo, 'only when man has developed, not merely a fellow-feeling with all men, but a dominant sense of unity and commonalty, only when he is aware of them not merely as brothers – that is a fragile bond – but as parts of himself, only when he has learned to live, not in his separate personal and communal ego-sense, but in a larger universal consciousness can the phenomenon of war, with whatever weapons, pass out of his life forever'.

The other issue related to war or its avoidance is the ethical acceptability of nuclear deterrence as a strategy. The use of nuclear warheads, though aimed at the enemy military might, will always result in immense suffering and hardship to the civilian populations. The use of the nuclear warheads will have effect on the health and well being of the future generations as is now still being felt in Japan for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War.

A number of ethical questions cluster around the human life span at both ends. 'Whether abortion is morally justifiable?' is the question often asked. The answer to it appears to depend on the way the question, 'what is it that makes killing a human being wrong' is answered. Moral philosophers consider whatever characteristics arise in the answer of the latter question might, as well, apply to the fetus in abortion. Some others consider that fetus has no right to protection of life as it is yet to be born and cannot be considered an individual living being.

Secondly, the need to restrict the size of population from the point of view of keeping the present and the future levels of population within limits in the general interest of the whole community of humanity makes it imperative to encourage

abortion. Some others consider that human life must be considered sacrosanct, irrespective of its characteristics. As such even if it is at the stage of fetus, it is worthy of protection. Those with the religious bent of mind argue that human beings are made in the image of God or that human beings have an immortal soul. Tampering with the life of fetus is for them sin and is to be prevented. People hold views on this subject differently. Ethical views are yet to crystallize in favour or against abortion in different countries.

As for euthanasia, issues similar to abortion are raised, when it is non-voluntary, as in the case of severely disabled newborn infants. When it is voluntary, there is support to it from those who hold that the state shall not interfere with the free, informed choice of its citizens in matters that do not cause any harm to others. But opposition to voluntary euthanasia centers on practical matters such as the difficulty of adequate safeguards to prevent its misuse or forcible use. It is likely to lead to a 'slippery slope' that may lead to non-voluntary euthanasia and eventually to the compulsory involuntary killing of those the state considers being socially undesirable.

Some ethical philosophers consider the moral significance of the distinction between killing and allowing dying. Situations of 'allowing to die' arise when a physician allows a patient with an incurable condition to die when life can still be prolonged, but will not take active steps to end the patient's life. Those who uphold a system of absolute rules consider that a distinction between acts and omissions is essential because they claim that we must never breach a valid moral rule that human life cannot be tampered with as long as it is possible to prolong it. But consequentialist philosophers consider that such a distinction does not possess any intrinsic moral significance as long as the patient with the incurable condition of disease is willing to die in the above circumstances.

The issues of abortion and euthanasia are at the core of the fast growing areas of applied ethics that deal with new developments in medicine and the biological sciences. This subject, known as bio-ethics, involves inter disciplinary approach among physicians, lawyers, scientists and theologians, all taking part.

Several major themes run through the subjects covered by bio-ethics. One, related to abortion and euthanasia, is whether the quality of a human life can be a reason for ending it or for deciding not to take steps to prolong it. As medical science can now keep alive severely disabled infants, pediatricians are regularly faced with this dilemma. Ethical principles favouring ending of life of infants, seriously and severely disabled with no possibility of recovery, with the consent of parents, are gaining acceptance.

Advances in medical science have raised other related questions. Even those who defend the doctrine of the sanctity of all human life do not subscribe to the view that doctors have to use extra-ordinary means to prolong life. But the distinction between ordinary and extra-ordinary means like that between acts and omissions is itself under attack. Critics assert that the wishes of the patient or, if they cannot be ascertained, the quality of the patient's life provides a more relevant basis for a decision than the nature of the means to be used.

Another theme is that of patient autonomy. This arises not only in the case of voluntary euthanasia but also in the area of human experimentation that has come under close scrutiny following reported abuses. It is an accepted ethical principle that patients must give informed consent to any experimental procedures. But how much and how detailed information the patient is to be given is the issue. The problem is acute in the case of randomly controlled tests, which scientists consider the most desirable way of testing the efficacy of a new procedure. Such a procedure requires that a patient agree to being administered randomly one of two or more forms of treatment than being treated of his ailment in the established way.

The allocation of scarce medical resources involves an ethical principle as to use of the said resources for treatment of ailments of patients. This involves the search of rational principles for allocation of scarce resources. In the super specialties hospitals run by Sri Sathya Sai, where the services are totally free, surgery for ailments of hearts and kidney transplants is preferred for children and younger people.

Some other themes concerning ethical principles involve human reproduction. The birth of human beings outside the human body has initiated a debate about the ethics of invitro fertilization. This leads to questions about the freezing of human embryos and what should be done with them when frozen, should the parents die before the formal birth of the beings. Another theme relates to the commercial offer by a surrogate mother to be impregnated with the sperm of the male, when his wife is infertile, for a fee, and then surrender the resulting baby to the couple.

The questions that arise are whether it is ethical for women to rent their wombs for the highest bidder or, whether, if the woman who has agreed to act as a surrogate and then changes her mind to keep the baby for herself, she can be allowed to do so. Some other theme relates to the wife, when her husband is infertile, if she is to be impregnated with the sperm of another male, for a fee, without his identity being disclosed both to the donor and the donee. This may be an acceptable ethical act as long as the identity of the donor and the donee is strictly and legally kept secret from each other and the fertilization is done with the express approval of the husband.

The culmination of such advances in human reproduction will be the mastery of genetic engineering. With more advances in this area of technology, more challenging issues arise for consideration in the years to come.

36. Future Ethics

Some thinkers consider that the next major stage in the evolution of social ethics may see a kind of political unification of the entire human species that will render national enmity much more difficult, universal minimum standards of freedom from want and disease, and of opportunities for education and enjoyment. It may also see an organized universal consciousness for the welfare of all as the dynamic core of our ethics and sufficient psychological understanding to enable the bulk of mankind to take the resolution of their intrinsic moral conflict to a point at which punishment is no longer demanded to appease the tension of inner guilt.

The specific steps that need to be taken to reach this next stage of ethical evolution are varied and difficult, though not impossible. First is the practical political step of discovery as to how to transfer a substantial part of the sovereign power of the several nation-states of the world to a central organization. Any success in this task will make it easier for men to give up their separatist ethics associated with the competing claims of nation states. On the other hand, any success in mobilizing opinion in favour of 'One World' concept, of a unified humanity instead of a split one, will facilitate the political process of unification. One such example is the universal condemnation of slavery as morally wrong that facilitated its actual abolition as a social practice.

Such a change in public opinion must, however, be accompanied by a much more profound ethical change before the world can feel at all safe from major physical conflicts. Humanity at large must discover a moral equivalent for war.

In other words, we must find a way of resolving our inner ethical conflict without recourse to a human enemy in the shape of another nation or organized group to be the target of our hatred and aggression. The world at large is assuredly not capable of resolving its conflict between hate and love, without the enemy syndrome for the discharge of our hatred and aggressive impulses. It is, however, possible to identify 'the enemy' with disease, poverty, hunger, ignorance and the other evil products of our social organization. Once the people at large realize that there is no longer any need for anybody anywhere to grow up deprived of the opportunities for a minimum standard of physical and mental well-being, we can make the attainment of that basic standard a major aim of social ethics.

It is also linked with advances in intellectual understanding. There is need to create awareness among people that it is ethically wrong to seek to resolve their inner moral conflicts by recourse to punishment, but it is desirable to substitute scientific treatment with the aid of dispassionate wisdom for such resolution of moral conflicts. The minimum requisite is understanding, and if it is handled with love, it is so much the better.

Intellectual understanding has a greater role to play. The bulk of the opinion around the globe has to believe that it is ethically right to increase knowledge and ethically wrong to put obstacles in its path. More specifically, knowledge and

understanding of the evolutionary process and of our own unique role in it are needed before a dynamic and directed ethics comes into being at this projected stage.

Finally, possibly the most difficult to achieve, the world is to be persuaded that its present concentration on materialism is one-sided and does not achieve realization of the ultimate goal of social ethics. Control of our own nature is of equal, if not more, importance with control of external nature.

To achieve this, we have to look inwards. This takes us back to the problem of resolving the basic internal ethical conflict. This resolution requires realization that it is possible of achievement if only the humanity applies the same degree of discipline to our moral and spiritual activities as many of us willingly do to our minds and bodies. In such an event we attain not merely freedom from primal guilt but a positive state of moral well-being which is of intrinsic value and satisfaction in itself. It is like the moral equivalent of the theological salvation. This needs an awareness to have a faith that it is ethically necessary and right to everyone to develop his internal moral and spiritual structure leading to universal brotherhood.

The relation of individual to social ethics becomes clear with an understanding of the stages of evolutionary progress. It is true that increase of knowledge, increase of control, increase of autonomy, increase in emotional capacity and enjoyment, increase in will and purpose, increase in individualization are all good as they all make for progress. As such they are to be part of our ethical goals. On the other hand, one-sided or exaggerated pursuit of any of one of these aims is inimical to progress, as one-sidedness is itself bad. These are the trends that have made for progress in the biological sector of evolution. They do so in the human social sector, too. Additionally these trends need the understanding and attainment of intrinsic values.

It is only by individuals that values can be actually understood and appreciated. It is thus ethically good for the individuals to pursue and to enjoy experiences of comprehension, of aesthetic satisfaction and of moral nobility. To experience these values, man needs to evolve, develop his potentialities and accomplish resolution of the inner moral conflict, which is at the root of his ethical activity, to a considerable degree.

If he is to achieve many-pointed development, he is to relate this resolution of inner conflict to all his outwardly directed activities related to knowledge and understanding, love, action, emotional and aesthetic appreciation. The only way in which he can do this fully and satisfactorily seems to be the way of the true ascetic - the way of acceptance, unitive knowledge and love. ‘He must merge inner and outer, lose self by transcendence of self, resolve all tensions - both the original and intrinsic tensions of his superego, and the later developing tensions between different parts of his experience and different sectors of his activity, in a harmonious working whole’, in the words of Julian Huxley.

In other words, he must build a comprehensive microcosm in which the facts and forces of the universe, of life, of society and of his own nature are unified and reconciled. This microcosm combines the past and the future in the present unity of consciousness, otherwise called the ‘eternal now’. By the same token, it is infinite in

quality, for consciousness combines the actual and the real with the abstract and the ideal in such a way that the microcosm identifies with the macrocosm itself.

Again in the words of Julian Huxley, 'the microcosm thus combines actuality and potentiality, fact and fancy, the recorded past and the speculative future, external phenomenon and internal purpose, all in relation to the polarized psychological forces of good and evil; and at its fullest development combines them in a smooth working unity'.

Intellectually viewed and in experience, there is no antithesis between individual and community. The individual has no meaning in isolation. The community of which he is part conditions his ethical development. Even if he is able to transcend the current morality, which his community considers just, it is because that the community permits such freedom of action or elasticity of ideals.

Further, though the highest products of evolution are individuals, yet the community is the mechanism, which increases control and autonomy of life. A critical evaluation of broad biological criteria of progress between the beginnings of our own species and the present day shows that the rate of advance has been accelerating ever.

If the same acceleration continues, and it cannot be otherwise, literally unimagined possibilities of further advance are in store before our descendents. From the standpoint of evolutionary ethics, therefore, it is our moral duty, the world community as a whole, to further this advance and not to hinder it. The individual can do this by devoting his energy to working as a cog in the social machine.

The understanding and realization of intrinsic values is crucial and primary to realization of further advances. Though individuals alone can experience intrinsic values, the community is still the mechanism and the medium to enable the individuals to realize them. It is seen that a few favoured individuals alone now enjoy the experience of intellectual and spiritual realization. It, therefore, becomes one of the moral duties of the individual to further the development of society in such a way that more and more of its members are able to realize and enjoy more and higher intrinsic values.

Thus, the relation between individual and society is like between ends and means. Fuller individualization is an evolutionary end. The developed human individual is the highest product of evolution. Only human beings are capable of having the experience of the highest intrinsic values such as those of love, beauty, knowledge, spiritual realization, etc. But the structure of social organization, if wrongly developed, can suppress individualization, can stand in the way of knowledge, love, beauty and spiritual realization entering the individual microcosm and can hamper over all individual development. Yet, the structure rightly organized can promote achievement of the same ends.

Against this background, the next important step to be taken by humanity is its own unification. This has already taken roots, but at different levels in different areas of social process. The unity of scientific research and knowledge is well advanced. Development of technology in communications in the form of Information

Technology including Internet has shrunk the world into an organized unit, with explosion of knowledge in all areas of concern to human civilization.

A consciousness has been sweeping across the human society for exercise and against infringement of human rights, with emphasis on the right to life in freedom. Colonialism has been buried. In the political arena, the trend has been towards democratic functioning, though democracy is at different levels of achievement in different nation states. The only logical outcome of these tendencies will be the creation of a single unified pool of tradition, organized politically in a single unified World Government.

That this process in human evolution leads to the union of all separate traditions in a single common pool, that the human diversity from competitive discord leads to harmonious symphony is no utopian thought. This is in line with man's distinctive method of evolution and opens the door to extraordinary human potentialities.

Sri Aurobindo, a mystic and a visionary, gives a graphic account of the evolution of life and man on earth and the prospect of his future evolution thus:

'All life on earth is a circumstance in an unfolding progressive evolution of a Spirit that has involved itself in Matter and is labouring to manifest itself in that reluctant substance. This is the whole secret of earthly existence…

When Nature, the Divine Power, had formed a body erect and empowered to think, to devise, to enquire into itself and things and work consciously both on things and self, she had what she wanted for her secret aim; relegating all else to the sphere of secondary movements, she turned toward that long-hidden aim – her main highest forces…

Mind is not all (that consciousness could achieve); for beyond Mind is a greater consciousness; there is a supermind and spirit. As Nature laboured in the animal, the vital being till she could manifest out of him man, the Manu, the thinker, so she is labouring in man, the mental being, till she can manifest out of him a spiritual and supramental godhead, the truth-conscious Seer, the knower by identity, the embodied Transcendental and Universal in the individual nature.

From the clod and metal to the plant, from the plant to the animal, from the animal to the man, so much has she completed of her journey; a huge stretch or a stupendous leap still remains before her. As from matter to life, from life to mind, so now she must pass from mind to supermind, from man to superman; this is the gulf that she has to bridge, the supreme miracle that she has to perform'…

Sri Aurobindo conceptualizes the superman that arises on earth thus:

'What is the human being? He is a mental being enslaved to life and matter. Where he is not enslaved to life and matter, he is a slave of his mind. To be the slave of mind is to be the slave of the false, the limited and the apparent.

The self that he has to become is to be the spiritual, the divine, the superman, the real Purusa. For that which is above the mental being is the superman. It is to be the master of the mind, the life and the body; it is to be a king over Nature. It is to be free and not a slave. It is to be one and not divided. It is to be immortal and not obscured by death. It is to be full of light and not darkened. It is to be full of bliss and not the sport of grief and suffering. It is to be uplifted into power and not cast into weakness. It is to live in the Infinite and possess the finite. It is to live in God and be one with Him in His being.

The human being is all these things. If he is not, he cannot become them. What is within him can only be revealed in his being. But he appears to be other than these only when he enslaves himself to appearances…

He is, therefore, to arise, transcend himself and become himself. He is man and the whole nature of man is to become more than himself. He was the man animal; he has become more than the animal man. He is the thinker, the craftsman, the seeker after beauty. He shall be more than the thinker; he shall be the seer of knowledge. He shall be more than the craftsman; he shall become the creator and master of his creation. He shall be more than the seeker of beauty; he shall enjoy all beauty and all delight.

To possess these is to become the superman. For it is to rise out of mind into the supermind. It is the power and light of the divine will and the divine consciousness. Supermind is superman. To rise beyond mind is, therefore, the condition. To be the superman is to live the divine life, to be a god; for the gods are the powers of God. This is to discover God in himself and reveal him to himself in all things'…

Then the major ethical problem of our day is none other than achieving spiritual transformation and entering into the spiritual age of man. All questions such as the control of the nuclear arsenal, the effective working of the international organizations such as the UNO, the possibility of a true World Government, eradication of disease, hunger and poverty in all parts of the world, free availability of technology and information across the present day frontiers, unhindered exercise of human rights, etc are merely parts of this comprehensive problem. The posterity will judge the present generation and its leaders as moral or immoral according as they have helped or hindered that transformation and unification.

It is into the divine within each man and each people that the man and the nation have to grow. The law of a growing inner freedom is that which will be most honoured in the spiritual age of mankind. The spiritual age will seek to diminish the element of external compulsion in human life. This does not mean breaking up the human society into the isolated actions of individuals.

The spiritual life is the consummation of a conscious and diversified oneness. Each man grows into the divine within himself through his own individual being. He sees equally in others the Divine who he sees in himself, and as the same Spirit in all. He, who sees God in all, will serve God freely in all. He will seek not only his own freedom, but the freedom of all, not only his own perfection, but the perfection of all.

He will not live either for himself or for his society, but for God in himself and for the Divine in the universe.

If mankind is to be spiritualized, it must, first, in the mass, cease to be the material or the vital man, and become the psychic and the true mental being. A spiritual human society is to realize three essential truths of existence - God, freedom and unity. These three are one indeed. One cannot realize freedom and unity without realizing God. One cannot possess freedom and unity without possessing God. God is only waiting to be known, while man seeks for Him everywhere worshipping images of his own mind-ego and life-ego. When this ego-pivot is abandoned, man has a real chance of achieving spirituality in his inner and outer life. What the spiritual man seeks is to find, by the loss of the ego, the Self, which is one in all, perfect and complete in each.

A spiritualized society would live, like its spiritualized individual, not in the ego, but in the spirit, not as the collective ego, but as the collective soul. A spiritualized society would make the revealing and finding of the divine Self in man the whole first aim of all its activities, its education, its science, its knowledge, its ethics, its art, its economical and political structure.

Such a society would treat, in its sociology, the individuals, from the saint to the criminal, as souls suffering and entangled in a net and to be rescued, souls growing and to be encouraged to grow, souls grown that can be the source of help to the less fortunate. It would regard the peoples as group-souls, the Divinity concealed and to be self-discovered in its human collectivities, group-souls meant to grow according to their own nature and by that growth to help each other and to help the whole race in the one common work of humanity. And that work would be to find the divine Self in the individual and the collectivity, and to realize spiritually, mentally, vitally and materially its greatest, richest and deepest possibilities in the inner life of all and their outer action and nature.

The spiritual age will set in when the common man begins to be alive to these truths and be willing to be moved by the triune Spirit. This is what the perennial religions have seen with adequate intuition when they refer to the kingdom of God on earth.

A spiritual religion - the religion of humanity - is the hope of the future. This means a growing realization that there is a divine Reality in which we are all one, that humanity is its highest present vehicle on earth, that the human race and the human being are the means by which it will progressively reveal itself here. It implies a dynamic attempt to live out this knowledge and bring out a kingdom of this divine Spirit on earth. This involves realization by the individual that only in the life of his fellow men is his own life complete. This also involves realization by the human race that only on the free and the full life of the individual can its own perfection and permanent happiness be founded.

The evolutionary approach makes it very clear that further progress is no myth. It is the most possible direction of change in the world – desirable materially, intellectually, spiritually and ethically. It also establishes that our human ethics have

their deep roots in the non-human universe and that our moral principles are not isolated to humanity alone but are, by the nature of things, related to the rest of the universe. When we understand this relationship, will we be able to lay down truly adequate ethical principles. While ethics cannot be regarded as having any absolute value, yet their relativity is neither chaotic nor meaningless. Ethics is, no doubt, relative to a process, meaningful and yet evolutionary.

Biologists have discovered that increase of knowledge is one of the characteristics of progress, both in the later biological and in the human phase of evolution. The analysis of our knowledge about progress as visualized by Sri Aurobindo and other visionaries should provide us definite guidance as to how we should plan spiritual change to make for further progress.

Man, the conscious microcosm, has been thrown up by the ever-interacting forces of the macrocosm. But his consciousness can now begin to influence the process of the macrocosm by guiding and acting as the unit of its evolution. Man's ethics and his moral and spiritual aspirations, therefore, constitute an integral part of the arising evolutionary spiritual progress.